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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part I provides 
a critique of the dominant approach to the analysis and 
examination of evidence in Anglo-American writings. The 
critique consists in showing that the dominant approach, on 
account of its atomism, does not capture the complexity of 
judicial fact-finding tasks or codify intuitive judgments about 
them. Recent attempts offering either mathematical or 
inductivist structures for the analysis of judicial evidence 
are explained and criticized as a resurgence of interest 
in atomistic analysis. Part III identifies a non-atomistic 
body of thought outside the mainstream of the dominant tradition. 
This body of thought is used as the starting-point for 
developing a holistic approach to the examination and analysis 
of evidence in Anglo-American judicial processes. 
1. 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The term evidence as used 1n this thesis. 
This thesis proposes a holistic approach to the examination 
and analysis of evidence in Anglo-American Judicial processes. The 
subject of evidence within the discipline of law has generally been 
conceived by most scholars as dealing with the rules of law which 
deal with the problems of evidence. Other evidence scholars such 
as Bentham, Wigmore and Twining have taken a broader V1ew of the 
subject in which the law of evidence 1S seen to be merely one subject 
in the field. l However the greater part of evidence scholarship 1n 
the Anglo-American tradition consists mainly 1n the exposition, 
explanation, classification, analysis and critique of evidence rules 
and their applications. The study of the history of the evidence 
rules, their justification and the search for a single underlying 
principle for their rationalisation is another important area of 
activity within this tradition. 2 
1. For Bentham and Wigmore see chs. 2 and 3 respectively; W. Twining: 
Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship" in Louis Waller and 
Enid Campbell (eds.), Well and Truly Tried (1983), p 211. The article 
forms part of a general thesis advocating a broadened approach to the 
study and teaching of evidence discussed by the author in the following: 
"Good-bye to Lewis Eliot" (1980) J.S.P.T.L. (N.S.) 9; Bentham on 
Evidence (forthcoming): Wigmore on Proof (forthcoming): "Some 
Scepticism about some Scepticisms Itf (1984) 11 J.S.Soc. 137; "Some 
Scepticism about some Scepticisms- II" (forthcoming); "Taking facts 
Seriously" in N. Gold (ed.), Essays on Legal Education (1982), p 51; 
"Identification and Misidentification: Redefining the Problem" in 
Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Brian Clifford (eds.), Evaluating Witness 
Evidence (1983), p 255; Analysis of Evidence (forthcoming); "Debating 
probabilities" (1980) 2 Liverpool Law Review 51; "Evidence and Legal 
Theory" (1984) 47, M.L.R. 261, 
2.An example of the study of the history of the rules of evidence for 
the purpose of their explanation and distinction as pure legal rules 
is J. B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 
(1898); examples of attempts to find an underlying explanatory 
priciple are: Gilbert's Best Evidence Rule and Stephen's principles 
of relevancy. For Gilbert see ch. 1; see ch. 3 below for Stephen. 
IIr 
2 . 
The term evidence as used in this thesis means facts and 
reports about facts which a fact-finder in a legal trial is entitled 
to receive and is required to evaluate before he reaches a decision 
on the existence of other facts which are necessary for the application 
or otherwise of substantive legal rules. The analysis of evidence 
in this conception of it has been attempted by most evidence scholars 
and the participants in the current probability debates. However, 
the literature relating to facts and reports about them has remained for 
a considerable time an integral part of scholarly concerns about 
evidence, but it has been overshadowed by the dominant concern and 
interest in evidence as a system of legal rules. The need for the 
identification and study of proof as a separate and distinct subject 
was expressed by Wigmore in his Science of Judicial Proof. 3 He 
stated: 
The study of the principles of evidence, for a lawyer, 
falls into two distinct parts. One is Proof in the 
general sense, - the part concerned with the ratiocinative 
process of contentious persuasion, - mind to mind, 
counsel to Judge or juror, each partisan seeking 
to move the mind of the tribunal. The other part 
is Admissibility, - the procedural rules devised by 
the law, and based on litigious experience and tradition, 
to guard the tribunal (particularly the jury) against 
erroneous persuasion. Hitherto, the latter has 
loomed largest in our formal studies, - has, in fact, 
monopolized them; while the former, virtually ignored, 
has been left to the chances of later acquisition, 
casual and empiric, in the course of practice'4 
An appraisal of Wigmore's and other similar attempts in the 
rationalist tradition shall be deferred until the central problems 
of judicial proof have been stated in the next section. 
B. Towards a rational theory of judicial proof. 
(1) The central problems stated: 
The study of judicial proof extends over a vast spectrum 
3. 1913-37. 
4. Ibid. P 3. 
3. 
of interrelated disciplines, e.g. philosophy, the philosophy of logic, 
methodology of science, forensic science, psychology and probability 
theory. It follows that a proper study of the subject of judicial 
proof should take into account its interdisciplinary nature. Judicial 
proof has also another interdisciplinary feature which does not only 
add to its complexity as a field of study but also singles out another 
complexity which relates to its tasks and the operations connected 
with them. The feature in question relates to the problems which 
evidence poses for the fact-finder in typical trial contexts. 
Individual items as well as the total mass of evidence in most types 
of case in legal trials involve determinations of logical, epistemological, 
methodological, empirical and pragmatic problems. Important examples 
of such problems are those concerned with relevance; the existence or 
non-existence of relevant facts (probability of the existence of facts); 
the problem of the probative value of evidence; the methodology to be 
adopted for such inquiries; and finally the sufficiency of evidence 
to establish the matter to which it relates. The contentious nature 
of litigation creates a further complexity discernable in the presence 
in most cases of conflicting and contradictory evidence which demands 
a process of elimination within the total mass of admitted evidence. 
The manner in which parties in litigation are allowed to introduce 
evidence for the consideration of the fact-finder is another complicating 
factor in the judicial fact-finding process. The existence of two 
requirements of proof in judicial inquiries - one deals with the proof 
of facts in issue - the other with the proof of substantive legal 
rules from those facts in issue, is a further complicating factor. in the 
trial process. 
A theory of proof as a logistic system for the character-
ization of judicial fact-finding tasks and the processes connected 
4. 
with the performance of those tasks, should seek to capture the 
complexity of the task. It should do so by attempting to codify 
the intuitive conception of the task and that of its performance. 
This thesis uses the above criterion to determine whether or not 
a theory of judicial proof satisfying to a greater or lesser extent 
this criterion exists in the Anglo-American tradition. The 
investigation starts with the dominant approach in the literature 
as exemplified in the writings of some leading scholars i.e. 
Gilbert, Bentham, Stephen, Wigmore and some participants in the 
current probability debates. The investigation is further carried 
outside the main stream of that tradition to identify the early 
beginnings and the emerging thought 0f what I termed the holistic 
approach. The holistic approach is developed into a theory which 
a1ms to satisfy the above criterion. 
(2) The dominant approach to the analysis of evidence 1n 
Anglo-American judicial processes. 
The study of the logical dimensions of evidence and proof 
has tended to concentrate on the logical analysis of evidence 
as simple propositions. The works of Gilbert, Bentham, Stephen, 
Wigmore, deal with this aspect in differing degrees and with 
differing emphasis. The current probability debates and in 
particular those centring on Jonathan Cohen's book The Probable 
and the Provable (1977) constitute a more advanced treatment of 
the same aspect with an emphasis on a search for criteria of 
assessment. While formal logic 1S important for the classification 
and analysis of the formal structures of evidence and the construction 
and appraisal of arguments about questions of fact, e.g. problems of 
relevance, it has very little to offer for the solution of many problems 
of evaluating evidence. Formal logic helps the trier of fact to 
determine the logical relationship between propositions, when the 
5. 
legal rules and other devices have narrowed do~~ the field of 
inquiry, but it does not help him to determine the probative value 
of evidence, or reach one particular inference rather than another. 
The emphasis on the logical aspect of judicial proof in the dominant 
body of literature in the field tends to overlook the other aspects 
of the subject and its processes and this obscures its complexities 
and their corresponding intuitive conceptions, and judgments about 
them. The following problems received very limited attention in 
that literature. 
(a) The empirical base of evidence reports. 
One of the basic problems which an evidence report poses 
for a fact-finder is the validation of its empirical warrant. The 
probability of a fact is distinct from its probative force or 
inferential value. In a trial context the two questions should 
be clearly distinguished since a valid inference presupposes the 
determination of the existence of the facts on which it is based. 
The validation of evidence reports is an empirical matter which 
should not be subjected to an inferential logical analysis. The 
mathematical Baysian approach tends to confuse these two matters 
(the empirical and the logical). The inductivist analysis is 
concerned mainly with the nomological inferential laws (Common 
Sense Generalizations). 
(b) Atomistic and sequential validation: 
The rationalist analysis assumes that each proposition 
constituting a single line of proof, is asserted by the court 
(believed or disbelieved) at a time when the whole evidence in the 
case is not heard. The same assumption is made with regard to 
inferences from one proposition to another in the same line of 
proof. The relationship of the process to the trial complexity 
6. 
in which this mental activity takes place is generally overlooked. 
This will be sho~~ to be a major defect in the conception of the 
trial and proof processes. As regards inferences from one 
proposition to another in the same line of proof, the trier of 
fact, in the light of the traditional treatment, is represented as 
making these inferences in isolation from the other propositions 
in different lines of proof, or let us say, the other evidence in 
the case, and because of that his inferences can at best be only 
probable. The result of this approach and way of looking at the 
trial and proof processes is a collection of dissected and unrelated 
inferences which must be looked into by the trier of fact, at the 
end of the process, to see if they add up to a probable result which 
satisfies the standard of proof. Some specific criticism in that 
direction can be made against these assumptions in the following. 
(i) It can be assumed that no rational being who has partial 
information, (a typical situation is the beginning of a judicial 
trial) and knows that more evidence is forthcoming, ought to commit 
himself to any sort of belief on that information. The order in 
which evidence is presented in a judicial trial of an issue of fact 
renders "complete" information before the whole evidence is 
concluded, an impossibility. 
(ii) The interdependence, in point of time, place and circumstance, 
of the constituent elements of a single occurrence requires, when 
we are ultimately concerned with the proof of the existence or non-
existence of that occurrence, the viewing of the totality of the 
elements involved in order to pronounce a judgment as to the existence 
or non-existence of the occurrence. 
7 . 
(c) An item-by-item analysis of the evidence: 
An item by item analysis of the evidence does not reveal the 
existence, in most types of legal case, of a process of elimination 
of most of the admitted items of relevant evidence. Some items, 
for example, may be eliminated because the facts to which they relate 
are not believed by the fact-finder to exist within the spatio-
temporal region in which they are alleged to have occurred. 
Validated items may further be eliminated from consideration because 
they lack probative force in the context of a particular trial and 
the other validated items. Even items which are accepted as true 
by the fact-finder and found to be probative may fail to prove the 
proposition to which they relate for lack of a spatio-temporal 
link with the occurrence to which they relate. The obscurity of 
this process of elimination in the dominant body of literature 
on evidence is probably responsible for the overs imp lis tic analysis 
of the recent probabilistic treatment of judicial proof by both 
Baconians and Pascalians. A good example of this is the assumption 
of transitivity in situations where non-transitivity can easily be 
pointed out. 
(d) The internal point of view of the fact-finder 
Finally, a trier of fact who reaches his decision after hearing 
the whole evidence in the case, in the manner indicated above ought to be 
morally certain, if that is what is expected of him, that his finding 
coincides with the existence or non-existence of the occurrence as 
the case may be. But doubt, which is generally associated with the 
certainty - probability dichotomy in relation to knowledge when we 
reflect on the possibility of knowing in the abstract, is excluded 
from the particular mind of the trier of fact in the particular 
investigation of the particular occurrence on the particular evidence. 
8. 
The consciousness of the trier of fact of the certainty of his 
beliefs tends to be ignored in this respect. 
To say this is not to deny the utility of the traditional 
body of learning on the non-logical aspects of the problem. 
Hardly any thought on the subject from Gilbert downwards is 
destitute of ideas which can be utilized. But many of these ideas 
are vague and inarticulated. 
C. The Intellectual Sources of the Atomistic Approach 
The aforementioned account is true of the dominant approach 
to the analysis of evidence in the Anglo-American tradition. I 
call this the atomistic approach. 
The establishment of the basic defects of the atomistic 
approach calls for a careful investigation of its intellectual 
history and the establishment of a linkage between the tradition 
and the philosophy or philosophies in which it is grounded. It 
also demands establishing a link between the atomistic approach 
and the philosophical sources of Anglo-American evidence scholar-
ship. The first link has already been established by Professor 
William Twining in a recent paper that starts with a brief historical 
and analytical survey of the highlights of the work of some Anglo-
American writers on evidence, notably Gilbert, Bentham, Evans, 
Phillipps, Starkie, Will, Best, Greenleaf, Taylor, Burrell, 
5 Appelton, Stephen, Chamberlayne, Thayer and Wigmore. Twining 
argues that all these writers belong to a single intellectual 
mainstream that he refers to as 'the rationalist tradition of 
6 
evidence scholarship'. These scholars share 'an underlying. 
5. W. Twining, "The Rationalist Tradition" op.cit. pp 211-242. 
6. Ibid. P 242. 
9. 
theory that may be characterised as optimistic rationalism,.7 
He points out certain disagreements, strains and controversies 
among these scholars, but concludes that despite these disagree-
ments they all show a remarkable homogeneity with regard to 10gical 
and epistemological assumptions about fact-finding in adjudication,.8 
The basic assumptions of that tradition which Twining restates and 
which are pertinent to the questions under discussion can be 
9 
summarized as follows: the implementation of substantive laws 
depends on the determination of the truth about allegations of facts 
which, in a rational system of adjudication, must be based on 
relevant evidence presented to the fact-finder. But since events 
and states of affairs occur independently of human observation, 
and the fact-finder was typically not a witness of those facts at 
the time they occurred, he can only decide, rationally, on reports 
about those facts. The truth of such reports consists in their 
correspondence to the events and states of affairs they report. 
The fact-finder, not being a percipient witness of the reported 
occurrence, cannot determine whether it existed as reported or not 
with absolute certainty. This does not, however, mean that present 
knowledge about past facts is not possible in principle; yet 
'knowledge' in this context means warranted beliefs that satisfy 
specified standards of proof relating to the truth of statements 
about facts. The conclusions which this type of 'knowledge' 
affords are not certain conclusions. The term probability is 
7. Ibid. P 247. 
8. Ibid. P 243. 
9. Ibid. pp 244-9. 
10. 
used in this context to refer to judgment about the truth of 
allegations about past events that fall short of certainty. Given 
that the application of substantive laws is necessarily dependent 
on determinations of allegations of facts the truth of which 
cannot be established with certainty, it follows that 'justice 
under the law must be satisfied with standards of proof falling 
short of absolute certainty'. Such judgments must be based on 
'the available' 'stock of knowledge' about the common course of 
events in the external world. The stock of knowledge necessary 
for probability judgments exists in the form of general propositions 
which 'include in a descending scale of probability, generalizations 
accepted by the scientific community as established, the opinions 
of experts and 'common sense' generalizations based on the 
experience of members of society'. The appropriate method for 
establishing these generalizations is, in principle, inductive. 
The application of induction makes it possible to assign a probable 
truth value to a present proposition about past events. It 
also provides a test of validity for inferences from evidence since 
in this view: 'the characteristic mode of reasoning appropriate 
to forming and justifying judgments of probability about alleged 
past facts is induction'. 
While referring to Bentham, Twining stated that there are 
direct and collateral ends of adjective laws: the direct end is 
rectitude of decision; the collateral end is minimizing the 
pains, vexation and expense of delay'. However, while the direct 
end forms an important social value it may give way to the abov~ 
10 
collateral value or other values which may be equally important. 
It is not of direct relevance to my thesis to embark on an 
10. Ibid p 247. -. 
11. 
investigation of the historical accuracy of Twining's thesis nor the 
acceptability of these assumptions. Twining's thesis is mainly 
a study of Anglo-American evidence scholarship from within. It 
does not go deep into the intellectual sources of that tradition 
beyond what can be gathered from leading Anglo-American legal writers 
on evidence. Furthermore Twining's thesis has not attempted to 
identify the atomistic nature of that tradition or link it in detail 
with the philosophy which provided its intellectual framework. 
The present thesis provides a direct linkage between the 
tradition and its philosophical sources. It also attempts to trace 
the atomistic analysis of evidence to its intellectual sources in 
the empiricist philosophy of the English School. This is done by 
the study of selected scholars in both disciplines. 
scholars are Gilbert, Bentham, Stephen and Wigmore. 
The evidence 
The study 
within English empiricist philosopohy is confined mainly to a 
study of the relevant parts of Bacon, Locke, Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill. 
The result of the investigation, the grounds of which cannot 
be gone into fully in this introduction, is that the atomistic 
approach is a natural product of the application of cognitivist 
empiricist philosophy and its methodologies. The investigation 
has also revealed that atomism is not limited to the traditional 
evidence scholars. It is reflected in the analysis of most 
participants in the current probability debates. Recent attempts 
to present judicial proof as a function of either mathematical or 
inductive probabilities, as I shall argue, are two extremes of one 
and the same philosophical tradition i.e. the empiricist school. 
It is for this reason that both the Baconians and the Pascalians 
12. 
have failed to provide satisfactory solutions for the problems of 
judicial proof. His finding makes it necessary to carry the 
investigation outside that dominant tradition or at least its 
mainstream. 
D. The Holistic Aplproach 
(1) Emerging Holists. Participants in the probability debates 
have thrown much light on the complexity of the judicial fact 
finding process. Some have also expressed their dissatisfaction 
with specific features of atomism. The recognition of an eliminative 
process and the rejection of atomicity of analysis are some examples 
of this dissatisfaction. It is important to note here that the 
objection to atomicity in this emerging thought is not one to an 
item-by-item analysis. It is an objection to that type of analysis 
when it is conducted in complete isolation from the other evidence 
in a case. These deviant atomists and others, who express, in 
one form or another any dissatisfaction with one or more features 
of atomism, I call emerging holists. 
(2) Glassford. A link can be discerned between this emerging 
thought an~ that expressed by a relatively isolated and largely 
neglected figure, James Glassford in his Essay in 1820. 11 The link 
consists mainly in a common critical attitude towards atomistic 
analysis. But there is this great difference between the two: 
emerging holism does not question the philosophical sources of the 
analysis or the appropriateness of the method it employs; Glassford 
on the other hand rejects both the analysis and its empiricist 
methodologies. He assigns a very limited role to generalised 
experience beyond his recognition of its role in determining what 
11. An Essay on the Principles of Evidence and Their Application 
to Subjects of Judicial Enquiry. 
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is relevant for the consideration of the fact-finder. He also 
expressly rejects the mathematical analysis and probably had 
little faith in the usefulness of Baconian methods in moral 
inquiries. Glassford's intellectual source is mainly the Scottish 
Common Sense school and that of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart in 
particular. That philosophy rejects the cognitivism of what it 
called the 'ideal theory' of which the philosophy of John Locke 
and English empiricism is viewed as an integral part. The 
significance of the discovery of Glassford and the investigation 
of his philosophical background in a different philosophical 
tradition from that of the atomist is that the rejection of 
atomistic analysis presupposes the rejection of its philosophical 
sources. 
The Scottish Common Sense school stressed the need for a 
methodology of knowledge. Both Reid and Stewart accepted and 
applied Bacon's methods to moral inquiries. Glassford, while 
agreeing with Reid and Stewart in rejecting the application of 
mathematical analysis to moral inquiry, does not seem to share 
their enthusiasm about Baconian methods. However, his book 
contains the germ of a method, which I call the holistic method. 
The holistic approach its thesis and analysis will be explicated 
and developed in this thesis. Some features of holism have 
already emerged in the course of criticising the atomistic 
approach. Holism advocates a conception of fact finding which 
contrasts squarely with the atomistic approach. Holism relegates 
the role of generalized experience and logic either to the stage 
preceding the commencement of the discovery process (relevance) or 
to a post-discovery stage (logical analysis); it assigns a major 
role to facts in the discovery process. It attempts to relate the 
14. 
analysis of evidence to the complexity of the task presented by 
various problems which the total mass of relevant evidence in 
different types of case pose for the fact-finder. The description of 
occurrences, events, objects, their identities qualities and relations 
within specific spatio-temporal re~lons by contending parties provide 
the fact-finder with the proper context for the investigation of 
the probability of evidentiary facts. The probability of an 
evidentiary fact is primarily a function of its consistent spatio-
temporal region (ESTR). It may be true that ln exceptional cases 
where the same evidentiary fact is alleged by both parties to 
exist within two independent spatio-temporal regions the determination 
of what existed or did not exist within one region operates to 
exclude or confirm the opposing allegation within the other 
inconsistent region. The determination of the probative force of 
an evidentiary fact, on the other hand, demands the establishment of 
an empirical link between the evidentiary fact spatio-temporal 
region and that of the fact in issue to which the evidentiary fact 
relates (PSTR). When all facts in issue are alleged to have existed 
within one PSTR, then any link between a fact ln lssue within that 
reglon and an evidentiary fact operates also as a link with the 
other facts ln lssue. When, on the other hand, the facts in issue 
are alleged to have existed within distinct spatio-temporal regions 
any evidence relevant to such region should not be treated as relevant 
to another independent spatio-temporal region. The relation of the 
facts in issue to the substantive legal rule i.e. as the necessary 
initial condition for its application, should not be treated a~ a 
warrant, in every case, of the transitivity of all relevant evidence 
indiscriminately to every fact in issue or to the legal conclusion 
reachable through their conjunction with the substantive legal rule. 
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The holistic analysis treats the fact-finding process as 
comparable to a discovery process in natural sciences as opposed to 
a p03t-discovery process. It concentrates on the problems of the 
process of fact-finding rather than the post-discovery analysis and 
testing of validated reports. For this reason it attempts to relate 
such concepts as relevance of a fact, its probability, and the 
probative force of the whole accepted evidence within a particular 
spatio-tempora1 reglon to the analysis of that process. 
E. Conclusions. 
The main aims and conclusions of this thesis can be briefly 
summarized as follows:-
(a) It seeks to test Twining's thesis about the homogeneity of 
the rationalist tradition. While most of his conclusions are 
confirmed, it is suggested that he does not give adequate weight 
to the alternative approach of James Glassford and the Scottish 
Common Sense school of philosophy (see (d) below). This thesis 
also seeks to extend Twining's account by analysing the links 
between specialized writings on judicial evidence and their 
philosophical sources. 
(b) It identifies and analyses the characteristically atomistic 
approach of the writings in the rationalist tradition and links 
that approach with its philosophical sources and provides a critique 
of both the approach and its philosophical foundations. 
(c) It establishes the resurgence of interest of the current 
probability debates in atomistic analysis. However, it identifies 
some deviant atomists and others and points out the significance 
and limitations of their analysis. 
(d) The research discovers a different evidence tradition grounded 
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1n a different philosophical thought, i.e. Glassford and the ascertain-
ment of his philosophical sources as the Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy. The distinct stance of Glassford vis-a-vis the other 
members of the Scottish Common Sense school has been established and 
viewed in this research as an indication of a search for a holistic 
method. 
(e) Finally the holistic germs in Glassford's essay and emerg1ng 
holism are developed into a positive theory of a holistic method for 
the analysis of judicial evidence. 
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PART I 
THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE ANALYSIS OF 
EVIDENCE CONCEIVED OF AS FACTS OR REPORTS 
ABOUT FACTS 
1 
Introduction 
Part I of this work attempts an investigation of the intellectual 
sources of the atomistic analysis of evidence conceived of as facts in 
adjudication in Anglo-American evidence scholarship. The study is 
confined to some scholars, within that tradition, who consider the 
analysis of evidence in that respect. The evidence scholars to be 
considered here are Sir Jeffery Gilbert, Jeremy Bentham, Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen and John Henry Wigmore. 2 The purpose of this 
1. This is a useful contexua1 distinction. A similar distinction was 
introduced by Thayer in the following passage: 'It must be noticed, then, 
that "evidence", in the sense used when we speak of the law of evidence, 
has not the large meaning imported to it in ordinary discourse. It is 
a term of forensic procedure; and imports something put forward in a 
court of justice.'. See, A Preliminary Treatise On Evidence at the 
Cornmon Law, (1898), '. 264. The ultimate object of Thayer in making the 
distinction was to narrow down the field of the law of evidence and its 
study as a system of rules to what pertains to judicial evidence in that 
conception of it: See ibid. p.1., and p. 485. While I do not agree 
that the study of evidence should be so narrowly conceived, the distinction 
is apt for my purpose since it limits my endeavour to a definite type of 
inquiry in relation to a definite body of information (the facts put 
forward in a court of justice). This thesis is confined to the analysis 
of that type of evidence in that type of context. It excludes the 
analysis of 'evidence' or information received by an investigator or a 
party at the preliminary or preparatory stages of a legal trial (e.g. 
the type of analysis presented by W. Twining and T. Anderson in their 
Ana ly sis of Evidence, (forthcoming» becaus e accordi ng to my thes is the 
context in which the analysis is performed plays a distinctive role in the 
identification of the evidence to be analysed and the manner in which it 
should be analysed. See also Peter Achinstein, (ed.), The Concept of 
Evidence (1983). 
2. This study does not include Thayer who is regarded by most lawyers 
as one of the great evidence scholars. To explain his omission we have 
to remember that Thayer's conception of the field of evidence was 
limited to what may be called 'a pure system of legal rules of evidence'. 
He regarded certain topics, including the present topic of this thesis, 
as collateral matters which are improperly treated as belonging to the law 
of evidence. He attempted to discriminate this from the law of evidence 
so as to relieve it of a great part of its difficulties and ambiguities, 
and declared that any study of this should be regarded as incidental and 
auxiliaryin the course of examination of the law of evidence. See Thayer, 
op.cit. pp. 1 and 273, see also ibid. prefatory note. 
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part of the thesis is twofold: to trace the atomistic approach of the 
rationalist philosophers to its immediate philosophical sources ~n 
empiricist thought; to argue further that the conceptual framework of 
both rationalists and empiricists provide inadequate conceptual tools for 
the analysis of evidence and the determination of what constitutes a 
rational decision on the evidence in adjudication. 3 
I hope by considering Gilbert's theory of evidence,4 and its 
derivation from the philosophy of John Locke, to show the original 
and immediate impact of the atomistic features of that philosophy on 
the first theory of evidence. The verS10ns of that model, however 
modified, assumed by other evidence scholars 1n the light of empiricist 
philosophy in general, and that of Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill 
in particular, will be considered when we deal with the theories of 
Bentham, Stephen, Wigmore and the probability debates. 
CHAPTER ONE 
GILBERT'S THEORY OF EVIDENCE: ITS LOGICAL AND 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS. 
A. Gilbert and Locke 
1. Gilbert's adaptation of Lockean theory of Knowledge. 
Gilbert was Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer from 1722 
until his death in 1726. He was the author of the Law of Evidence,S 
which was the first book on evidence in English and was published 1n 
1754. His philosophical source 1S explicitly the philosophy of John 
Locke. His knowledge of that philosophy is testified to by his 
3. See below chs. 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
4. Gilbert, The Law of Evidence, (1754). 
5. See Gilbert, Law of Evidence, Capel Lofft (ed.) 'Some account of the 
Lord Chief Baron Gilbert' (1791) p.i; See also Twining 'The Rationaliat 
Tradition' op.cit. p 215 et seq; See also Simpson, Biographical 
Dictionary of the Common Law; (1984). 
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Abridgement of Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding 6 and his consistent 
and coherent adaptation of that philosophy to his theory of evidence. The 
object of Gilbert was to establish that assent in a judicial determination 
1S, 1n effect, a demonstrative assent. He adapted some parts of Locke's 
theory of knowledge for that purpose. His best evidence principle, as 
we shall see, is an important part of that adaptation. Like Locke, 
Gilbert did not try to analyse the notion of evidence, or the inferential 
processes whereby the mind reaches its final assent. His was a descriptive, 
psychologistic theory of that assent, and the conditions for rendering the 
exercise of it demonstrative. The best evidence requirement is an 
essential condition to bring about that result. Gilbert expressed his 
view of the nature of judicial determination 1n the following passage: 
The first therefore, and most final Rule, in Relation to 
Evidence, is this, That a Man must have the utmost Evidence, 
the Nature of the Fact is capable of; For the Design of the 
Law is to come to rigid Demonstration in Matters of right, 
and there can be no Demonstration of a Fact without the best 
Evidence that the Nature of the Thing is capable of; less 
Evidence doth create but Opinion and Surmise, and does not 
leave a Man the entire Satisfaction, that arises from 
Demonstration, for if it be plainly seen in the Nature of 
the Transaction, that there is some more Evidence that doth 
not appear, the very not producing it is a Presumption, that 
it would have detected something more than appears already, 
and therefore the Mind does not acquiesce in any thing lower 
than the utmost Evidence the Fact is capable of. 7 
It is important to state here that though Gilbert recognised that the 
grounds on which the final assent is reached are only probable grounds, 
he was anxious to establish that the final assent has the effect of a 
d . 8 emonstrat10n. A strict Lockean demonstration can never be based 
on probable grounds. It requires simple and distinct ideas which are 
perceived to be necessarily connected. 9 Gilbert knew that judicial 
6. See Gilbert, Law of Evidence (Capel Lofft (ed.) 1791) p.3 et seq. 
7. Law of Evidence, pp 3-4. 
8. Ibid. p 2. 
9. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1691) p 434 
et seq. See also pp 59-320, 424 et seq, 546, 567-8. (This source shall 
hereafter be cited as 'Locke's Essay'). 
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evidence falls short of this degree of certainty when he stated that: 
All Certainty is a clear and distinct Perception, and all 
clear and distinct Perceptions depend upon a man's own 
proper Senses, for this in the first Place is certain, and 
that which we cannot doubt of if we would, that one 
10 Perception or Idea is not another, that one Man is not another ... 
Such certainty and rigid demonstration is foreign to the nature of reports 
about evidence as Gilbert himself states: 
Now most of the Business of civil Life subsists on the Actions 
of Men that are transient Things, and therefore often-times 
are not capable of strict Demonstration, which, as I said, is 
founded on the View of our Senses and therefore the Rights 
of Men must be determin'd by ProbabilitY.ll 
These reports of probabilities have to be contrasted with a man's own 
perceptions. Judges and juries who receive reports from witnesses 
are not themselves witnesses and consequently do not themselves have 
perceptual, or strictly demonstrative, knowledge of the situation. The 
question arises as to whether there is any way according to which such 
reports could have the effect of demonstration. Locke states that 
12 
certain probabilities do have such an effect; and most probably 
Gilbert was referring to this when he said: 
Now this in the first Place, is very plain, that when we can't 
see or hear any thing ourselves, and yet are obliged to make 
a Judgment of it, we must see and hear by Report from others; 
which is one Step farther from Demonstration, which is founded 
upon the View of our own Senses, and yet there is that Faith 
and Credit to be given to the Honesty and Integrity of credible 
and disinterested Witnesses, attesting any Fact under the 
Solemnities and Obligation of Religion, and the Dangers and 
Penalties of Perjury, that the Mind equally acquiesces therein 
as on a Knowledge by Demonstration, for it cannot have any more 
Reason to be doubted than if we ourselves had heard and seen it; 
and this is the Original of Tryals, and all manner of Evidence. 13 
As a matter of fact Locke models his theory of probability on his theory 
10. See Law of Evidence, p 2. 
ll. Ibid, P 3. 
12. Locke's Essay, pp 561-563. 
13. Law of Evidence, p 3 . 
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14 
of knowledge. A judgment of probability for exa~ple is established 
1n the same way the conclusion of a demonstration is established. 
As demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement 
of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs, which 
have a constant, immutable and visible connexion one with 
another; so probability is nothing but the appearance of such 
an agreement or disagreement by the intervention of proofs, 
whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least 
is not perceived to be so; but is, or appears for the most 
part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the 
proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary. 
15 
For Locke a probability which 1S established in this way can be 
d t h d f . t f d db" b b' l' 16 e ac e rom 1 s proo s an state as an 0 Ject1ve pro a 1 1ty. 
Thus ,he writes: 
The grounds of probability we have laid do\VTI in the foregoing 
chapter, as they are the foundations on which our assent is 
built, so are they also the measure whereby its several 
degrees are or ought to be regulated; only we are to take 
notice, that whatever grounds of probability there may be, 
they yet operate no further on the mind, which searches after 
truth and endeavours to judge right, than they appear at least 
in the first judgment or search that the mind makes. I 
confess, in the opinio~men have and firmly stick to in the 
world, their assent is not always from an actual view of the 
reasons that at first prevailed with them; it being in many 
cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those 
who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs 
which upon a due examination made them embrace that side of 
the question. It suffices that they have once with care and 
fairness sifted the matter as far as they could; and that 
they have searched into all the particulars that they could 
imagine to give any light to the question, and with the best 
of their skill cast up the account upon the whole evidence 
and thus, having once found on which side the probability 
14. The modelling of the theory of Probability on that of knowledge 
(i.e. Demonstration) resulted in the following assumptions on the part 
of the rationalist evidence scholars: that probable judgments on 
evidence must be reached inferentially; such inferences must be chosen 
from general laws of probability comparable to established and accepted 
scientific laws; a judicial proof should be concerned with the 
formulations of those general laws of inference as derived from general 
experience (Commonsense generalizations), and with inquiring into the 
methods whereby such laws could be established; the obviously mistaken 
assumption by some of the evidence scholars that a particular inference 
rather than the generalization from which it was inferred is inductively obtainec 
As to this see, for example, Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Pr?of, (1937), 
pp 18 et seq. 
15. Locke's Essay, p 555. 
16. Compare L. Jonathan Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, (1977), 
p 134. 
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appeared to them after as full and exact an inquiry as they 
can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories as 
a truth they have discovered; and for the future they remain 
satisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is 
the opinion that, by the proofs they have once seen of it, 
deserves such a degree of their assent as they afford it'
17 
It is clear from this and other passages that Locke treated probability In 
the same manner as he treated demonstration at least as far as the 
reasonIng process is concerned. The mind moves from one idea to another 
in the search for a connection to provide the link between the different 
'd 18 1 eas. That process in the case of demonstration produces a 
proposition whose proofs or intermediate ideas can be shown to any-
body because of their necessary connection, and the replicability of 
19 
the situation to which they apply. In the case of probability 
20 
only the conviction can be retained, the proofs cannot. Accordingly 
judgments of probability can be the conclusions of arguments. In 
most cases its grounds and conclusions are not as reliable as those 
of demonstration, but Locke considered certain probabilities to have 
a high degree of assurance or certainty similar to that produced by 
demonstration. 
He mentioned two situations and gave three examples to illustrate 
them. In the first situation the probable grounds according to Locke 
'rise so near to certainty that they govern our thoughts as absolutely, 
and influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration; 
and, in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them 
and certain knowledge. Our belief 
. ,21 
thus grounded rIses to assurance. 
17. Locke's Essay, pp 558-9 
18. Ibid, pp 567-8, 530-1 and 434. 
19. Ibid, P 427. 
20. Ibid, P 556. 
21. Ibid, P 562. 
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The example glven by Locke illustrative of this situation lS when: 
[TJhe general consent of all men in all ages, as far as it 
can be known, concurs with a man's constant and never 
failing experience in like cases, to confirm the truth 
of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses; 
such are all the stated constitutions and properties of 
bodies, and the regular proceedings of causes and effects 
in the ordinary course of nature.
22 
The second degree of assent, which is similar to that of 
demonstrative assurance, arlses in a second type of situation. 
In that situation, the probable grounds induce confidence rather 
than assurance. The examples given by Locke to illustrate that 
situation are twofold: 
[W]hen I find by my own experience, and the agreement of 
all others that mention it, a thing to be for the most 
part so; and that the particular instance of it is 
attested by many and undoubted witnesses; v.g., history 
giving us such an account of men in all ages, and my own 
experience, as far as I had an opportunity to observe, 
confirming it, that most men prefer their private 
advantage to the public ..•. 23 
The second illustration is of situations In which there are 
reliable reports about matters of fact that happen indifferently. 
Because, 'when any particular matter-of-fact is vouched by the 
concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent 
. I . bl ,24 lS a so unavolda e .. As to the impact of such grounds on the 
mind and its reliability In guiding its actions Locke has this to 
say: 'Probability upon such grounds carrles so much evidence with it, 
that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little 
liberty to believe or disbelieve as a demonstration does whether 
. ., 25 
we wlil know or be 19norant. 
22. Ibid, P 56l. 
23. Locke's Essay, p 562. 
24. rd. 
25. Ibid, pp 562-3. 
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It is true that Locke referred to other grounds of 
probability, which afford less confident degrees of assents, and 
he described the scale of such probabilities. For Gilbert what 
determines a probability along that scale is the required degree 
of assent. As we have already mentioned, he saw the alm of the 
law to be the attainment of a demonstrative assent on probable 
26 
grounds; and for him Lockean demonstration is the highest degree 
of Lockean probability. It is interesting in this respect to 
compare the following two passages by Gilbert and Locke respectively. 
Gilbert, referring to Locke, stated that: 
In the first Place, it has been observed by a very learned 
Man, that there are several Degrees from perfect Certainty 
and Demonstration, quite down to Improbability and Unlike-
liness, even to the Confines of Impossibility; and there 
are several Acts of the Mind proportion'd to these Degrees 
of Evidence, which may be called the Degrees of Assent, 
from full Assurance and Confidence, quite down to Conjecture, 
Doubt, Distrust and Disbelief.' '27 
The passage from Locke is: 
But, there being degrees herein, from the very neighbour-
hood of certainty and demonstration, quite down to 
improbability and unlikeliness, even to the confines of 
impossibility; and also degrees of assent from full 
assurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, 
and distrust .•. 28 
It is to be noticed that the neighbourhood of certainty of Locke 
becomes the perfect certainty of Gilbert. It may be argued that 
Gilbert inserted 'perfect certainty' to correspond to full 
assurance and confidence ln the corresponding scale of assent. 
The real reason seems to be an adherence to Lockean logic ln the 
lines immediately preceding his above-mentioned quotation where 
he stated: 
26. Law of Evidence, p 3. 
27. Ibid, p 1. 
28. Locke's Essay, p 556. 
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Our knowledge,as has been shown, being very narrow, 
and we not happy enough to find certain truth in every 
thing which we have occasion to consider, most of the 
propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay, act upon, 
are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their 
truth; yet some of them border so near upon certainty, 
that we make no doubt at all about them, but assent to 
them as firmly, and act according to that assent as 
resolutely, as if they were infallibly demonstrated, 
and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain. 
(Emphasis added.)29 
So the scale of probability includes a degree of perfect certainty, 
and the corresponding degree of assent is demonstrative. As we 
have seen Gilbert regarded the attainment of that to be the a~m 
of the law. According to this analysis Gilbert was concerned with 
the impact of the proofs when the judges of legal rights 'assent 
to them as firmly, and act according to that assent as resolutely 
as if they were undoubtedly demonstrated, ,30 
As we have seen, Gilbert was aware of the fact that reports 
from witnesses removed the tribunal at least one step further away 
from demonstration. To remedy this defect he argued that the 
fact that witnesses were on oath and disinterested enables the judge 
and Jury to treat their perceptions as their own. The existence of 
the oath also forces the fact finder to accept such reports as true. 
'ffiJveryplain and honest Man affirming the Truth of any matter under 
the Sanction and Solemnities of an Oath, is intitled to Faith and 
Credit, so that under such Attestation the Fact is understood to be 
, 31 fully proved. . These facts are the "ideas"from which the final 
probability is reached, and direct perception is not necessary for 
acceptance of them. 
But some grounds or ideas afford, ~n Gilbert's v~ew, a better 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Law of Evidence, pp 100-1 
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opportunity for compar1son because they retain the form of the 
evidence of the original idea or perception of the witness. 
Gilbert emphasized the nature of the matter reported by the witness 
and its liability to retain its original form when reported for 
the purpose of comparison: 
~~rmanent Things, which being constantly obvious to our 
Senses, do afford to them a very clear and distinct 
Comparison; but transient Things that cannot always 
occur to our Senses are generally more obscure, because 
they have no constant Being, but must be retrieved by 
Memory and Recollection' 32 
Of course what he refers to is not the perception itself but the 
thing that 1S the cause of the perception. He stated this when 
he wrote: 
As if the Question be, whether certain Land be the Land 
of J. S. or J. N. and a Record be produced whereby the 
Land appears to be transferred from J. S. to J. N. now 
when we Shew any such third Percepti~that doth 
necessarily infer the Relation in Question, this is 
call'd Knowledge by Demonstration, The way of Knowledge 
by necessary Inference is certainly the highest and 
clearest Knowledge that Mankind is capable of in his 
way of Reasoning, and therefore always to be sought 
when it may be had'
33 
When there is no oath to guarantee that result Gilbert resorted 
to a fiction of knowledge of the law even in the case of public 
records, which he regarded to be the paradigms of evidence. He 
stated this: 
On General Acts of Parliament, the printed Statute Book 
is Evidence; not that the printed Statutes are the 
perfect and authentick Copies of the Records themselves, 
for there is no absolute assurance of their Exactness, 
but ev'ry Person is supposed to apprehend and know the 
Law which he is bound to observe, and therefore the 
printed Statutes are allowed to be Evidence, because they 
are the Hints to that which are supposed to be lodged in 
every Man's Mind alreadY'34 
The important point however, 1S that either because of the oath, 
32. Ibid. pp 2-3. 
33. Ibid. P 2. 
34. Ibid. P 8. 
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or the fiction of knowledge of the law, the report of a witness 
or the contents of a document, public, or private, were considered 
to be as reliable as perceptions of the fact-finder of their 
. . 35 
or~g~n. That assumption is further fortified by the requirement 
of adducing the best evidence which we shall nO\~ proceed to 
consider. 
2. The best Evidence Requirements. 
We have already seen that the best evidence was mentioned 
by Gilbert in connection with and as a requirement of demonstration. 
This v~e\v ~s confirmed by what Locke said before Gilbert about the 
best evidence: 
This is what concerns assent in matters wherein testimony 
is made use of; concerning which, I think it may not be 
amiss to take notice of a rule observed in the law of 
England, which is, 'that though the attested copy of a 
record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy, never so 
well atteste~ and by never so credible witnesses, will 
not be admitted as a proof in judicature.' This is so 
generally approved as reasonabl~ and suited to the wisdom 
and caution to be used in our inquiry after material truths, 
that I never yet heard of anyone that blamed it. 36 
Locke's approval and commendation of the best evidence is based on 
the following rationale: 
This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right 
and wrong, carries this obvervation along with it, viz., 
'that any testimony, the farther off it is from the original 
truth, the less force and proof it has.' The being and 
existence of the thing itsel~ is what I call 'the original 
truth.' A credible man vouching his knowledge of it, is 
a good proof: but if another equally credible do witness 
it from his report, the testimony is weaker; and a third 
that attests the hearsay of an hearsay, is yet less 
considerable' 37 
35. Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Bowring (ed.), 
Works of Jeremy Bentham (1838-1843), Vol 6, p 143 et seq. and 
p 183 et seq. This edition of Bentham's Works shall hereafter 
be cited as "Works" preceded by the number of the volume. 
36. Locke's Essay, p 563. 
37. Id. 
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For this reason written evidence was seen by Gilbert as 
the best evidence in preference to unwritten evidence because 
it provides a view of the original matter and constantly preserved 
a record of it that it is ever permanent and obvious to the view. 38 
The justification of authenticity is a fiction in the case of Courts' 
. 39 . transact~ons, and a legal presumpt~on in the case of general 
40 Acts. And for the same reason private Acts were required to be 
d b h . f' 41 prove y t e test~mony 0 wltnesses. Meanwhile, we shall move 
on to consider another guarantee of demonstrative assent, viz., the 
absence of an interest on the part of witnesses. 
3. The Absence of Interest on the Part of Witnesses. 
We have already seen that the oath and the best evidence 
requirement were treated as two of the basic guarantees of 
d . 42 emonstrat~on. The absence of interestedness on the part of 
the source of evidence is, in Gilbert's view, another guarantee 
of its reliability. According to Locke and Gilbert there is a 
rule of probability that an interested person prefers his own 
interest to that of the public. We have already quoted Locke In 
43 
that regard. Gilbert on the other hand mentioned this rule of 
probability as a justification for the exclusion of unreliable 
and interested witnesses at different places in his book. The 
following reference is a case in point: 
Now where a Man who is interested ~n the Matter in 
Question, would also prove it, 'tis rather a Ground 
for Distrust than any just Cause of Belief; for Men 
38. Gilbert, Law of Evidence, p 6. 
39. I d. 
40. Ibid. P 8. 
41. Ibid. pp 9-10. 
42. See above, p.27. 
43. See ahove, n.23. 
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are generally so short-sighted; as to look at their 
own private Benefit which is near to them, rather 
than to the Good of the World that is more remote 
'44 
B. The limitation of Lockean philosophy in relation 
to Gilbert's theory. 
As we shall see Bentham questioned Gilbert's theory, and 
regarded it as both too narrow and false. 45 It is undoubtedly 
narrow since it left out most of what could be treated in a theory 
of judicial evidence, a criticism that will be elaborated 1n a 
1 . 46 ater sect10n. It 1S important here, however, to try to trace 
the narrowness of Gilbert's theory to the intellectual source of 
that theory (ie. the philosophy of John Locke). I have argued so 
far that Gilbert's main interest was to establish that judicial 
assent on probable grounds was demonstrative in its effect. He 
conceived of demonstration, in psychological terms, as something 
that occurred in the final stage of the deliberations of the fact-
finder. Though he stated the conditions and precautions which 
render that state of mind a demonstrative one he did not deal with 
many matters relating to it. For example, he did not discuss the 
concept of evidence itself; the grounds on which assent is or 
ought to be reached; and whether or not all the offered grounds 
(evidence) constitute proofs, and, if not, what aids the fact-finder 
1n sifting out proofs from non-proofs. In short he did not analyse 
the evidence or assert the inferences drawn from it in reaching one's 
conclusion. This is not meant to be a serious criticism of 
Gilbert because, in all fairness to him, most of these issues failed 
for one reason or another till very recently, to occupy 1n any 
44. Law of Evidence, p 87. 
45. See Bentham, 6 Works, pp 143 et seq and pp 183 et seq. 
46, See below p. 30 et seq. 
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useful way the attention of evidence scholars in the Anglo-American 
d .. 47 tra ~t~on. To use the words of Sir Richard Eggleston '[w]hether 
we agree with him or not, we owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. L. 
Jonathan Cohen for forcing us to think about the mental processes 
. I d' f f' d' . h ,48 ~nvo ve ~n act ~n ~ng ~n t e courts. In what follows I shall 
venture a few general remarks on the responsibility of Locke's 
philosophy for Gilbert's narrow concept of his theory of evidence. 
Such influence is not confined to Gilbert. The empirical 
philosophy of Locke, Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill constrained 
in general the theorising exercises of other outstanding evidence 
scholars in the rationalist tradition. Thayer alluded to this 
matter in criticising Gilbert, but did not articulate his criticism 
. h d' . 49 ~n t at ~rect~on. It is necessary, I think, to try to mention 
some of the main characteristics of that philosophy which are likely 
to be the causes of Gilbert's narrow conception of what constitutes 
a theory of evidence. 
One of the main reasons seems to me due to the atomistic 
nature of that philosophy and its concern with achieved cognition, 
and mental states and concepts which describe a result, rather than 
the way ID which that result ~s or should be reached. To create a 
clear understanding of this it ~s necessary to try to locate Gilbert's 
theory of evidence both on the intellectual map of the rationalist 
tradition and in relation to current thinking about evidence and 
47. See below 
48. R. Eggleston,"The Probability Debate", (198Qj Crim.L.R. 678. 
49. Thayer stated that 'Upon the whole, then, it may be said that the 
Best Evidence rule was originally, in days when the law of evidence 
had not yet taken definite shape, a common and useful phrase in 'the 
mouths of judges who were expressing a general maxim of justice, without 
thinking of formulating an exact rule; and that Gilbert, in his 
premature, ambitious, and inadequate attempt to adjust to the philosophy 
of John Locke the rude beginnings and tentative, unconcious efforts 
of the courts, in the direction of a body of rules of evidence, hurt 
rather than helped matters.' op.cit. p 506. 
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proof in that tradition. As we shall see, the ma~n concern of 
evidence scholars ~n that tradition was the devising of exclusionary 
rules for certain items or sources of evidence from being admitted 
for the consideration of the fact-finder. The exposition, 
qualification, rationalization and criticism of those rules, and 
their application in particular cases, constitute the great bulk 
of the rationalist writings about evidence. The main concerns 
of Gilbert, Bentham, Thayer, Stephen, Best, Wigmore and Cross were 
~n that area. Their interest and concern, (Wigmore and Stephen 
apart, and Bentham to some extent also), with the logical and 
epistemological problems raised by the admitted evidence, either 
as single items or as an aggregate mass in the mind of the fact-
finder and evidence theorist, were very limited and sketchy, as 
we s hall see. It is true that Stephen and Wigmore concerned 
themselves with the inferential nature of judicial fact finding. 
Wigmore, for instance, analysed, and emphasized the importance of, 
the inferential processing of the evidence at the level of the 
simple elements (ie. atoms). However, other attempts to do this 
offered little or no improvement on Wigmore's until Jonathan 
Cohen wrote his book The Probable and the Provable in 1977. That 
book, which we shall treat in a separate section, has thrown great 
light on most of the main problems of judicial fact finding and the 
fact finding process in general. It has provoked var~ous and 
. 50 h . f wh' h' th t f differing react~ons, t e most extens~ve 0 ~c ~s a 0 
Professor David Schum in his various writings on cascaded 
50 . See below. c h • 6. 
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. f 51 In erences. The attempts of Wigmore, Cohen, Schum and other 
participants in the current probability debates can be seen as 
attempts to provide ultimate prescriptive norms for the 
performance of the fact finding task, by pointing out its 
ingredients, and the methods and criteria by which those ingredients 
can be assessed and combined by the fact-finder in order to reach 
the final probability judgment. Gilbert's main concern was to 
represent this final judgment as a demonstrative one. To do th is 
he insisted on very strict rules of admissibility, which were both 
necessary to secure that result, and responsible for his very 
stringent exclusionary theory, which, in turn, was criticised by 
52 Bentham and Thayer. His concern with the problems of judicial 
51. See Schum and Du Charme, 'Comments on the Relationship between 
the Impact and Reliability of Evidence', (1971) 6 Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance, pIll, (herafter cited as Or.B.H.P.); 
Schum and Kelly, 'A Problem in Cascaded Inference: Determining 
the Inferential Impact of Confirming and Conflicting Reports from 
Several Unreliable Sources, '(1973), 10 Or.B.H.P., p 404; Schum 
'Contrast Effects In Inference: On the Conditioning of Current 
Evidence by Prior Evidence', (1977) 18 Or.B.H.P., p 217; Schum 
'A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and his Heirs' (1979), 
77 Mich. L. Rev. p 446; Schum 'Current Developments in Research on 
Cascaded Inference Processes', in T. Wellsten (ed.), Cognitive 
processes in Decision and Choice Behavior (19191; Schum, 'On 
the Behavioral Richness of Cascaded Inference Models: Examples 
in Jurisprudence', in N. Castellan (ed.), Cognitive Theory, p 149; 
Schum 'On Factors Which Influence the Redundancy and Corroborative 
Evidence', Dept. of Psychology, Rice University, Report No. 79-02, 
(hereafter cited as Rice's Report); Schum 'A Bayesian Account of 
Transitivity and other Order-Related Effects in Chains of Inferential 
Reasoning', Rice's Report No. 79-04; Schum and A. W. Martin, 
'Empirical Studies of Cascaded Inference In Jurisprudence: Methodological 
Considerations', Rice's Report No. 80-01; Schum and A. W. Martin, 
'Probabilistic Opinion Revision on the Basis of Evidence at Trial: 
A Baconian or a Pasca1ian process?', Rice's Report No. 80-02; Schum 
and A. W. Martin 'Assessing the Probative Value of Evidence In 
Various Inference Structures', Rice's Report No. 81-02; Schum 
'Formalizing The Process of Assessing The Probative Value of Alibi 
Testimony', Rice's Report No. 81-05. 
52. See above. n. 46. 
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proof was confined to showing that final assent when it was reached 
has a demonstrative effect. In the following section I shall try 
to show the contribution of the philosophy of Locke to the 
narrowness of Gilbert's conception of judicial proof. 
C. The constraints of Lockean Theory of Knowledge 
1. Probability and demonstration. 
The most important constraint on Gilbert's theorizing 
activity arises from his adoption of Lockean theory of knowledge, 
and the fact that Locke's theory of probability which he drew on was 
not developed independently of his theory of demonstration. Locke's 
theory of probability was just an appendix to his theory of 
demonstration; it not only has the same basis as his theory of 
demonstration, but cannot easily be comprehended or discussed except 
by comprehending his theory of ideas and their modes of combination 
to form general propositions. It 1S not an accident that Gilbert 
had to first discuss demonstration 1n order to get to probability. 
For him 'to come to the true Knowledge of the Nature of Probability, 
it is necessary to look a little higher, and see what Certainty 
. .., 53 1S, and whence 1t ar1ses .. Equating the problems of 
probability, 1n many important respects, with those of demonstration 
is, as we shall see, one of the main reasons for the failure of 
Gilbert and other evidence scholars to see the nature of many 
important problems arising from the judicial fact finding task. 
The main aspects of his theory of knowledge which produce an adverse 
effect on his treatment of probability can be briefly stated 1n 
the following points. 
2. The Mind 
The mind, which was the repository of knowledge according 
to Locke's theory of knowledge, is an abstract mind which he conceived 
53. Law of Evidence, p 2. 
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of, when discussing probability, as being 1n a state of achieved 
cognition, i.e., as having both its simple and complex ideas firmly 
lodged inside it. 54 That mind can always apprehend within itself 
its clear and distinct ideas, without the necessity of using words 
or names to help its thinking, as usually happens in the case of 
complex ideas. Locke refers to this when he says: 
And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental 
and verbal propositions separately, is, that most men, 
if not all, in their thinking and reasoning within them-
selves, make use of words instead of ideas, at least 
when the subject of their meditation contains in it 
complex ideas. Which is a great evidence of the 
imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind, 
and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a mark 
to show us what are those things we have clear and 
perfect established ideas of, and what not. For, if we 
will curiously observe the way our mind takes in thinking 
and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we 
make any propositions within our own thoughts about white 
or black, sweet or bitter, a triangle or a circle, we can 
and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves 
without reflecting on the names. But when we would 
consider or make propositions about the more complex 
ideas, as of a man, vitriol, fortitude, glory, we 
usually put the name for the idea: because, the ideas 
these names stand for being for the most part imperfect, 
confused, and undetermined, we reflect on the names 
themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and 
distinct, and readier occur to our thoughts, than the 
pure ideas: and so we make use of these words instead 
of the ideas themselves, even when we would meditate ~n~ 55 
reason within ourselves, and make tacit mental propos1t10ns.' 
The ideas and perceptions of a mind were viewed in isolation and 
treated by Locke as the contents of a solitary mind. As a matter 
of fact, communication and language were afterthoughts 1n his 
phi los ophy: 
I must confess, then, that when I first began this 
discourse of the understanding, and a good while after, 
I had not the least thought that any consideration of 
words was at all necessary to it. But when, having 
passed over the original and composition of our ideas, 
I began to examine the extent and certainty of our 
54. Locke's Essay, pp. 108 et seq. ; See also P. Edwards, (ed.), The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Tf9~1972) 
55. Ibid. P 492. 
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knowledge, I found it had so near a connexion with 
words, that unless their force and manner of signification 
were first well observed, there could be very little said 
clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which, 
being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with 
propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet 
it was for the most part so much by the intervention of 
words, that they seemed scarce separable from our 
general knowled ge. s6 
In what follows we shall consider some of the ma1n features of simple 
ideas which are necessary, according to Locke's account, for the 
formulation of general and certain propositions. 
3. Simple Ideas 
One of Locke's ma1n concerns 1n discussing simple ideas 
was to emphasize their origin in sensation and reflection, as opposed 
to the then firmly held view that they were innate. s7 However, what 
1S relevant here for our argument is his views on the question 
whether these ideas enter the mind as simple and particular ideas, 
or as complexes; and what types of simple ideas constitute general 
58 
and certain knowledge. For Locke ideas enter the mind and 
rema1n there as simple ideas. He stated this when he wrote: 
Though the qualities that effect our senses are, in the 
things themselves, so united and blended that there 1S 
no separation, no distance between them; yet it is 
plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the 
senses simple and unmixed. For though the sight and touch 
often take in from the same object at the same time 
different ideas - as a man sees at once motion and colour, 
the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of 
wax - yet the simple ideas thus united in the same 
subject are as perfectly distinct as those that come 1n by 
different senses; the coldness and hardness which a man 
feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the 
mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily, or as the taste 
of sugar and smell of a rose: and there is nothing can 
be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception 
he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in 
itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one 
uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not 
56. Ibid. P 395. 
57. Ibid. bk.l. passim. 
58. Id; see also Bentham, 8 l,vorks p 26, Gerald Postema, 'Facts, 
Fictions and Law: Bentham on the Foundations of Evidence', in 
William Twining (ed.), Facts in Law (1983), p 37 and pp 49 et seq; 
See also below ch. 9, p 216. 
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d · . . h b l' d' f f . 59 1st1ngu1s a e 1nto 1 erent 1deas. 
These simple ideas correspond to simple qualities 1n the objects 
outside the mind. 
Whatsoever the mind perce1ves 1n itself, or is the 
immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, 
that I call 'ideas'; and the power to produce any idea 
in our mind, I call 'quality' of the subject wherein 
that power is. Thus a snowball having the power to 
produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the 
powers to produce those in us as they are in the snowball, 
I call 'qualities'; and as they are sensations or 
perceptions in our understandings, I call them 'ideas'; 
which ideas, if I speak of them sometimes as 1n the things 
themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities 
in the objects which produce them 1n us' 60 
It is not necessary or important for our present purposes to go into 
any discussion of what constitutes these qualities. Locke stated 
that some perceptions enter the mind as obscure, indistinct, and 
d . d'd 61 b h' . f wh' h . d bl f un eterm1ne 1 eas, ut 1S V1ew 0 1C 1 eas are capa e 0 
forming general and certain knowledge is shown from the following 
passages: 
But if anyone will consider, he will (I guess) find that 
the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge, 
which men arrive to in these sciences was not owing to the 
influence of these principles, nor derived from any 
peculiar advantage they received from two or three general 
maxims laid down in the beginning; but from the clear, 
distinct, complete ideas their thoughts were employed 
about, and the relation of equality and excess so clear 
between some of them, that they had an intuitive knowledge, 
and by that a way to discover it in others, and this without 
the help of those maxims. 62 
Other ideas do not qualify to produce any clear or distinct 
knowledge: 
But ideas which by reason of their obscurity or otherwise 
are confused, cannot produce any clear or distinct 
knowledge; because as far as any ideas are confused, so 
far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree 
or disagree. Or, to express the same thing in a way 
59. Locke's Essay, pp 70-1. 
60. Ibid. P 85. 
61. Ibid. pp 436, 492, 544. 
62. Ibid. P 544. 
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less apt to be misunderstood, he that hath not determined the 
ideas to the words he uses cannot make propositions of 
them, of whose truth he can be certain. 63 
Another requirement is that the idea must be adequate; 
by that Locke meant that there should be a correspondence between 
the idea of the mind and the quality and object outside the mind. 
He regarded all simple ideas to be adequate: 
Because being nothing but the effects of certain powers 
in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce such 
sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and 
adequate to those powers: and we are sure they agree 
to the reality of things. For if sugar produce in us 
the ideas which we call 'whiteness', and 'sweetness', we 
are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those 
ideas in our minds, or else they could not have been 
produced by it. 64 
It is important to observe that the correspondence referred to 
throughout the philosophy of Locke is an archetypal correspondence. 
It does not mean more than that the idea which exists in the mind 
was once taken from a quality existing outside that mind. For 
this reason Locke treated ideas of substance as inadequate, 
b h h h 1n the m1·nd.65 ecause t ey ave no arc etypes Archetypal 
correspondence 1S a representative and a timeless correspondence, 
66 
and is true of abstract ideas only. In the words of Locke 
h imse I f [w]e mus t therefore, if we w ill proceed as reason advises, 
adapt our methods of inquiry to the nature of the ideas we 
examine, and the truth we search after. General and certain 
truths are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract 
. ,67 1deas. Very close to this requirement is that of consistency 
of truth. By this Locke meant that each idea agrees with itself 
and differs from all other ideas. The mind cannot fail to feel 
63. Ibid. P 439. 
64. Ibid. p 299. 
65. Ibid. P 483. 
66. Ibid. P 546 and pp 486-7. 
67 . Ibid. P 546. 
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and see the distinctness and separateness of its own ideas. 
'There can be nothing more certain, than that the idea we receive 
from an external object is ~n our mind; 68 this is intuitive knowledge.' 
When working on these ideas which have the qualities which we have 
just mentioned the mind is capable of constructing general knowledge. 
'Since the mind, ~n all its thoughts and reasons has no other 
immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can 
contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant 
69 
about them.' We shall now proceed to consider this aspect of 
Lockean theory of knowledge. 
D. General Knowledge and the Methods of its Discovery 
1. General Knowledge. 
The ingredients of Locke's theory of knowledge are simple, 
distinct and perfect ideas. The mind compares its own ideas 
in order to see their connection, agreement, disagreement or 
repugnancy. The inquiry into general knowledge can thus be seen 
to be an inquiry into the relationship between ideas which are 
already existing in the mind. It is not an inquiry into the 
nature, existence, truth or quality of any of these ideas. This 
introspective examination of the mind's ideas produces either 
intuitive or demonstrative knowledge. We are here concerned mainly 
with demonstrative knowledge. We have already seen what 
demonstrative knowledge means. The search for the necessary 
relations which are required for a demonstration according to Locke 
calls for: 
A sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts, 
for the finding out these relations, is the only way 
to discover all that can be put, with truth and certainty, 
concerning them, into general propositions. By what 
steps we are to proceed in these, is to be learned in the 
68. Ibid. P 438. 
69. Locke's Essay, p 424. 
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schools of mathematicians, who, from very plain and easy 
beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continued chain of 
reasonings, proceed to discovery and demonstration of 
truths that appear at first sight beyond human capacity. 
The art of finding proofs, and the admirable methods they 
have invented for the singling out and laying in order 
those intermediate ideas that demonstratively show the 
equality or inequality of unapplicable quantities, is that 
which has carried them so far, and produced such wonderful 
and unexpected discoveries: but whether something like 
this, in respect of other ideas, as well as those of 
magnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not 
determine·
70 
Though this passage may be interpreted as one in which Locke 
~s interested in the process of discovery prior to the finding out 
of the proofs and the perception of their necessary connections, 
he, however, did not go beyond that level of generality. In the 
following passage he seems to refer to a post-discovery process of 
reason~ng which makes his position even more obscure: 
So that we may in reason consider these four degrees: the 
first and highest is the discovering and finding out of 
proofs; the second, the regular and methodical disposition 
of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order, to make 
their connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived; 
the third is the perceiving their connexion; and the 
fourth, a making a right conclusion. These several degrees 
may be observed in any mathematical demonstration: it being 
one thing, to perceive the connexion of each part as the 
demonstration is made by another; another, to perceive the 
dependence of the conclusion on all the parts; a third, 
to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; 
and something different from all these, to have first 
found out those intermediate ideas or proofs by which it 
is made' 7l 
2. Methods of discovery. 
In view of Locke's vague and obscure position ~n relation 
to the method of discovery it is relevant to try to see whether 
he modelled his account of probability on the final cognition of 
a demonstrative process, or on the process of discovery which takes 
place in the mind prior to the discovery of the proofs which, by 
70. See ibid. pp 546-7; 
71. Locke's Essay, p 568. 
40. 
necessity, involves a process ~n which a portion of the ideas 
inside the mind constituting likely proofs are looked into by 
that mind in search of proofs which are connected in such a manner 
as to provide certain knowledge. If he modelled probability on 
the final cognition at the end of the initial discovery process, 
then the process of reasoning based on that model would be a post-
discovery process in both demonstrative and probabilistic thinking. 
The reasoning task in such a case will be confined to the under-
standing, explanation, and application of what has already been 
discovered. It is a process in which at least the first three 
steps mentioned by Locke in the passage cited above have been 
achieved either by the same mind, or a different one. The initial 
discovery process, on the other hand, is different in many important 
respects from the post-discovery stage and reason~ng. It is true 
that the discovery of intermediate ideas, which necessarily prove 
a general proposition, rendered the initial process of that discovery 
for the most part an insignificant historical matter in relation to 
.. d' d . d f 72 Th , h d that propos~t~on an ~ts ~scovere proo s. ~s owever oes 
not alter the fact that the initial process ~s identifiable in terms 
of its different problems, the mental task involved ~n dealing with 
them, and the methods whereby that task is, or ought to be, carried 
out. To start with, it involves considering more ideas than the 
discovered intermediate ones. This poses a problem of relevance 
which calls for a criterion whereby the ideas which are likely to be 
intermediate proofs are isolated from the other numerous ideas ~n 
the mind. From that isolated portion of the mind proofs mayor may 
not be found. If they are found non-proofs must also be eliminated, 
and this is a task \vhich involves other problems, the solution of 
which may usefully be aided by suggesting a method, or prescriptive 
72. See below ch. 10 Section B. 
41. 
norms, to facilitate it. 73 
Of course it is equally possible to argue that Locke did 
not apply his mind to the problems of the reasoning process because 
he considered it an internal or psychological process known, or 
knowable, by 74 only one person. It is a fact that the analysis of 
the reasoning tasks involved in that process, and the problems 
they occasion, was first attempted by Wigmore, by simple analysis 
of the elements of the evidence, without recognising any possibility 
f " f" 1 75 o prescr~pt~ve norms or canons 0 reason~ng ~n comp ex cases. 
Prior to the current probability debate evidence scholars appreciated 
very little of the nature, extent, or complexity of the intellectual 
task involved in that process. This argument, however, lends more 
support to my thesis that Locke modelled his account of probability 
on demonstration as a final cognition. It would mean, however, 
that he did not concern himself seriously with the problems of 
inference; and that Gilbert did the same when he adapted Locke's 
theory to construct his own theory of evidence. This is obvious 
from the fact that Locke did not, apart from mentioning the scientific 
method of discovery, raise or discuss any process problems. His 
consc~ous, or unconsc~ous, failure to deal with these problems is 
sufficient evidence that he treated probability as a final cognition. 76 
It is approached and established in the same manner as a demonstration 
~s approached and established, except that a probability 'is 
. l' b ' 77 l~ke ~nes s to e true. . Many citations from Locke in support of 
this view have already been g~ven. Like a discovered demonstrated 
proposition a probability is a general proposition which can be 
73. See below ch. 10. 
74. Locke's Essay, pp 567-8 
75. See Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof, p 8. 
76. 'An Achieved Cognition' is the equivalent of what ~s commonly referred 
to in current writings on the philosophy of science as 'a finished research 
report'. See below, ch. 10 Section B. 
77. Locke's Ess3Y, P 556. 
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established and detached from its proofs when men: 
[HJave once with care and fairness sifted the matter as far 
as they could; and that they have searched into all the 
particulars that they could imagine to give any light to the 
question, and with the best of their skill cast up the 
account upon the whole evidence: and thus, having once found 
on which side the probability appeared to them after as full 
and exact an inquiry as they can make, they lay up the 
conclusion in their memories as a truth they have discovered; 
and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony 
of their memories, that this is the opinion that, by the 
proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a 
degree of their assent as they afford it'
78 
Implicit in this attitude of Locke is the assumption that the process 
of discovery in probability is similar to the process of discovery 
~n establishing a demonstration. It is important here to point 
out that our ma~n concern with the process either of demonstration 
or probability is confined to the problems which are raised in either 
of these processes. It has got nothing to do with the psychological 
nature of that process. It ~s not an ~nqu~ry into what takes place 
in a particular mind or minds. It ought to be an inquiry into what 
sorts of problems face anyone engaged in the process of discovery. 
If the problems of the initial process of discovery of a demonstrated 
proposition are different from those which arise in a probabilistic 
discovery process, then the modelling of probability on demonstration 
79 
can be seen to face serious problems. 
E. The atomistic Nature of Lockean apalysis. 
As we have already seen, in Locke's account the ingredients 
on which a mind works initially to discover the proofs of a proposition 
have certain distinct qualities, (simplicity, distinctness, 
adequacy, abstractness, and truth). We have also seen that s~nce 
all these ideas are open to introspection they require no evidence 
78 Ibid. pp 558-9 
79. See below, chs. 5 and 10. 
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of their existence. The probabilistic ingredients on the other hand 
are markedly different. Whereas knowledge, on Locke's account 1S 
constituted by relations between ideas, probability 1S a relation 
between propositions. Locke referred to this when he stated: 
'Probability, then, being to supply the defect of our knowledge, and 
to guide us where that fails is always conversant about propositions 
whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive 
BO them for true.' This is so whenever someone receives the report 
of a cognition from someone else. In such a case the recipient 
mind is often cut off from the subject of the reported cognition, 
whether that subject be a sense-datum in a reported perception, or 
proofs in the case of a general proposition. This fact renders the 
ingredients of a probabilisticprocess, completely distinct from 
those of demonstration; they are not simple, nor distinct and they 
have no archetypes in the recipient's mind. Loc.ke however avoided 
the whole issue when he moved away from the subject matter of 
cognition to the source of its reporting. He stated this as follows: 
That which makes me believe, 1S something extraneous to 
the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on 
both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement 
or disagreement, of those ideas that are under consideration· Bl 
He referred to this as the grounds of probability. And he stated 
that these grounds are 
First, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge, 
observation and experience· B2 
Secondly, the testimony of others, vouching their observation 
and experience. In the testimony of others, is to be 
considered, (1.) The number. (2.) The integrity. (3.) The 
skill of the witnesses. (4.) The design of the author, 
where it is a testimony out of a book cited. (5.) The 
BO. Locke's Essay, p 557. 
B1. Ibid. P 556. 
B2. Ibid. P 557. 
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consistency of the parts and circumstances of the 
relation. (6.) Contrary testimonies.
83 
The first ground does not regard the correspondence of the report 
with the reported occurrence of the event reported. It only 
means that it is impossible that it should have happened, or that 
it has, as a type, happened before. His following example makes 
this abundantly clear: 
If I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past 
probability, it is knowledge. But if another tells 
me he saw a man in England, in the midst of a sharp 
winter, walk upon water hardened with cold; this has so 
great conformi ty wi th '>II hat is usually observed to happen, 
that I am disposed, by the nature of the thing itself, 
to assent to it, unless some manifest suspicion attend 
the relation of that matter-of-fact. But if the same 
thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never 
saw nor heard any such thing before, there the whole 
probability relies on testimony: and as the relators are 
more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest 
to speak contrary to the truth; so that matter-of-fact 
is like to find more or less belief; though to a man 
whose experience has been always quite contrary, and has 
never heard of anything like it, the most untainted credit 
of a witness will scarce be able to find belief: as it 
happened to a Dutch Ambassador, who, entertaining the 
King of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he 
was inquisitive after, amongst other things, told him, 
'that the water in his country would sometimes in cold 
weather be so hard that men walked upon it, and that it 
would bear an elephant if he were there.' To which the 
King rep 1 ied, 'Hi therto I have be 1 ieved the strange 
things you have told me, because I look upon you as a 
sober, fair .man; but now I am sure you lie.' ·84 
In this light it can be seen that the main ground of probability 
~s that of credibility. This has very serious consequences for 
Gilbert's theory and for evidence theorizing in general. It 
deflected the attention of evidence writers from evidence-conceived-
of-as-facts to evidence-as-propositions about facts; with the 
inevitable result that facts as the materials of proof, the problems 
83. Id. 
84. Id.; Bentham made various references to this story in his 
writings on evidence, see 6 Works, pp 95, 96, 99-100. 
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they pose to the fact-finder, and the role they play in helping 
him to achieve his task, received very little attention in the 
rationalist tradition. It is true that the immediate object of 
the recipient's mind when another person tells him something is 
'the reported psychological state of the mind of that person. 
That report, logically speaking, does not prove a fact; all that 
1't does 1'S to assert .. b ., 85 a propos1t10n a out 1t .. The proposition 
may be true or false insofar as it 1S a true or false report of what 
happened or did not happen. While the credibility of the report 
is an important factor, its treatment as the only or even the main 
indicator of truth tends at least to play down the role of facts in 
judicial proof. This, so far, has resulted in purely abstract and 
logical discourse about the problems of judicial fact finding. 
Most of these problems are process problems which were not posed or 
discussed by the empiricist philosophers. The individual case 
and its problems are completely ignored; the treatment of the 
problems of judicial proof is abstract and general; and the tradition 
aspires generally to construct a general deductive system, instead 
of offering a method for the solution of particular problems 1n 
particular circumstances. The reconstructed model of the 
particular case as a paradigm of the alleged occurrence in a 
particular fact finding situation is probably the most appropriate 
. 86 
standard of compar1son. This will require a shift of emphasis 
from ideas 1n the mind to happenings outside the mind. It is 
surpr1s1ng that Locke recognised this in the case of substance, but 
did not extend it to probabilities, when he stated; 
In our search after the knowledge of substances, our want 
of ideas that are suitable to such a way of proceeding 
85. See below ch. 2 Section D. 
86. See below ch. 10. 
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obliges us to a quite different method. We advance 
not here, as in the other, (where our abstract ideas 
are real as well as nominal essences,) by contemplating 
our ideas, and considering their relations and 
correspondencies; that helps us very little, for the 
reasons that in another place we have at large set down. 
By which, I think, it is evident that substances afford 
matter of very little general knowledge; and the bare 
contemplation of their abstract ideas will carry us but 
a very little way in the search of truth and certainty. 
What then are we to do for the improvement of our 
knowledge in substantial beings. Here we are to take a 
quite contrary course; the want of ideas of their real 
essences sends us from our own thoughts to the things 
themselves as they exist. Experience here must teach 
me what reason cannot: and it is by trying alone that 
I can certainly know what other qualities co-exist with 
those of my complex ideas, v.g., whether that yellow, 
heavy fusible body I call'gold' be malleable or no; 
which experience (which way ever it prove in that 
particular body I examine) makes me not certain that 
it is so in all or any other yellow, heavy, fusible 
bodies, but that which I have tried. 87 
For both Locke and Gilbert the grounds of probability 
are inducements to accept a proposition as true. This position 
creates a number of process problems of which it is sufficient to 
mention the following at this stage. The first problem relates 
to the question of what grounds should lead the fact-finder to 
accept the proposition in question. I have argued before that 
Gilbert appealed to the fact that the witness was on oath as a 
guarantee of his credibility, and probably the truth of his report. 
However, this avoids, without solving, the problem of the truth 
of these reports. The task of the fact-finder according to the 
Gilbertian view is the ascertainment of relations of agreements 
. .d 88 
and disagreements between the d1fferent 1 eas. Gilbert 
probably had this in mind when he stated 'probability arises 
from the Agreement of any Thing with a Man's own Thoughts and 
Observations from the Testimony of others who have seen and heard 
. ,89 
1t. . Thus an assumption he makes uncritically is that witnesses 
87. Locke's Essay, pp 547-8 
88. Ibid. P 42~ et seq. 
89. Law of Evidence, p 104. 
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on oath are credible. As we shall see, Bentham assumed that all 
witnesses are prima facie credib1e;90 and the positions of Stephen91 and 
. 92 W~gmore are not different. 
Another pr0blem, relates to the point of time ~n the process 
when the report of a witness ~s assessed as true or false. Is it, 
for example, assessed sequentially, when first made, or only when 
related to other propositions at the end of the trial process? 
A third problem relates to the question whether all the admitted 
items of evidence constitute 'proofs'. We shall deal with this 
problem again ~n parts two and three of this thesis. Meanwhile 
it ~s logical to state here that David Schum treats each and every 
93 item of relevant evidence as a 'proof'. Jonathan Cohen on the 
other hand presents the fact-finding process as an eliminative 
process, but he does not offer any guidance as to how the elimination 
takes, or ought to take, place. 
In conclusion it can be asserted that whatever the intention 
of Gilbert may have been he did not deal with process problems, 
including the 'role of facts' in proof, and from this it can be 
concluded that he, like Locke, treated both demonstration and 
probability as achieved cognitions. Since I am arguing that the 
ma~n problems of judicial proof are process problems, it follows 
that Gilbert and the rationalists generally either fail to see those 
problems, or ignore them, or approach them in an atomistic or 
sequential manner, as will be argued in this thesis. 
90 . See below, c h . 2 p p. 74 e t seq 
91. See below, ch. 3 p. 93. 
92. See below, c~. 3 p. 106. 
93. See below, ch. 7, n. 3 and above ch.1, n. 51. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BENTHAM AND THE SUBJECT MATTER OF EVIDENCE 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall deal mainly with those parts of 
Bentham's writin~which relate to evidence conceived of as facts, 
and whatever pertains to it in that perspective. 1 This will 
include his notion of evidence and his treatment of problems the 
proof of facts poses for the fact-finder; the relationship of his 
2 treatment to his philosophical thought; and finally how he v~ews 
the task of the fact-finder, and what assistance his v~ews offer 
1. For Bentham, the primary end of adjudication in its relation to 
justice under the law is rectitude of decision, not involving preponderant 
expense, vexation or delay, see 7 Works, pp 7-12. Thus the duty of 
the Legislator, whom Bentham addressed, (ibid. p 12) is; (1.) to secure 
the 'existence' and forthcomingness of evidence, ibid. p 12, (this 
allowed Bentham to include extraction, ibid. bk. ~nd pre-appointed 
evidence, ibid. bk. 4.); (2.) to ensure its completeness: no evidence 
should be excluded except where the collateral ends of justice so 
demand, (this allowed him to discuss the technical system, ibid. bk.8, 
and attack its improper exclusions, ibid. bk. 9. and to offer-ind 
explain his natural system, ibid. bk~ ch. 2., and criticise the 
false ends and theories of the technical system, 6 Works, pp 10, 143 
et seq; (3) to ensure its correctness by giving it its due weight (so 
as to guard against deception). This allowed him to treat the various 
cases of correcness and incorrectness, see for example, 6 Works, bk. 1., 
the securities for correctness, ibid. bk. 2, the different classification 
of evidence into direct, circumstantial (7, Works, bk. 5), makeshift 
(ibid. bk. 6); the discussion of the persuasive force of evidence, 
(ibid. bk. 1, ch. 5.). To this last part he related his ontological, 
(s-wDrks, pp 195-211), logical (ibid. pp 215-293), and linguistic vie~s, 
(ibid. pp 294-338). Our present concern is with (3.). Secondary 
s~es as to (1) and (2) are, G. W. Keeton et aI, (eds.); Jeremy 
Bentham and the Law, (1948); W. Twining, Bentham on Evidence, (forthcoming); 
see also above; M. Mack, A Bentham Reader (1969) pp 209-239. 
2. For the influence of early empiricist philosophers on Bentham see 
M. Mack, Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideas 1748-92. (1962), ch. 3.; 
G. Postema 'Facts, Fictions, and Law: Bentham on the foundations of 
evidence', in W. Twining (ed.), Facts in Law, (1983), p 37 at pp 39, 
48, 49, 51; Ross Harrison, Bentham, (1983) chs. 3-4. 
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the fact-finder to carry out that task. 3 
A. Judicial Evidence 
Bentham saw evidence as a generic term of which judicial evidence 
is a sp~cies distinguishable only by the purpose to which it is put, 
and the subject matter to which it applies. 4 From the very beginning 
h h · d' l' 5 e emp as~ze 1ts re at10nal character and then defined it as follows: 
By the term evidence, considered according to the most 
extended application that is ever given to it, may be, and 
seems in general to be, understood, any matter of fact, the 
effect, tendency, or design of which, when presented to 
the mind, is to produce a persuasion concerning the 
existence of some other matter of fact - a persuasion 
either affirmative or disaffirmative of its existence' 6 
7 Evidence, thus, is a relation between two facts. Bentham termed 
the fact to be proved the 'principal' fact and the fact offered in 
8 proof of that principle fact the 'evidentiary' fact. Evidence 
in this sense, according to Bentham, is used in every day life, in 
domestic, social, philosophical and scientific inquiries. 9 What 
3. The study in this chapter is based primarily on Bentham's original 
sources. However great assistance has been derived from the following 
secondary sources: C. K. Ogden, Bentham's Theory of Fictions, (1932); 
Mary Mack (1962) op.cit. chaps. 1, 3, 4 and 6; H. L. A. Hart, Essays on 
Bentham, (1982); G. Postema, o~.cit.; W. Twining 'The Rationalist 
Tradition of Evidence Scholarsh1p', in Waller and Campbell (eds.), Well 
and Truly Tried (1982); W. Twining 'Rule-Scepticism and Fact-Scepticism 
in Bentham's Theory of Evidence', in W. Twining (ed.) Facts in Law, (1983) 
p 65; W. Twining Bentham on Evidence (forthcoming); E. Halevy, The 
Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, (1966); R. Harrison, Bentha~ (1983). 
For a biographical account see W. Twining 'The Rationalist Tra ~tion', 
op.cit. pp 218 et seq; P. Edwards (ed.) ,Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
(1967-1972). Simpson, Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law (1984); 
Bentham's MSS on evidence and procedure add nothing significant to the 
published works on the subject of this thesis. 
4. 6 Works, pp 209-210. 
5. Ibid. P 208. 
6. Id. 
7. 6 Works, p 214. 
8. Ibid. p 215. 
9. Ibid. pp 208-9. 
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makes judicial evidence distinguishable from every other species of 
evidence is its relation to principal facts. These principal facts 
are 
[Tlhose facts, which, on the occasion of each individual 
suit, are the facts sought, for the purpose of their 
constituting the immediate basis or ground of the decision: 
insomuch that, when a mass of facts of this description, 
having been sought, is deemed to have been found, the 
decision follows of course, whether any other facts be 
considered as found or not. lO 
The principal facts are defined and determined by the substantive 
law. The relationship between principal facts and evidentiary 
facts is now known as relevance. Bentham did not refer to it as 
such simply because he did not express any opinion on what constitutes 
that relationship. For Bentham 
[TJo trace the connexion between the several principal 
facts (whether individual facts be meant, or species of 
facts,) and the several evidentiary facts respectively 
related to them in that character, would be, practically 
speaking, if not strictly and literally, an endless task: 
at any rate, it will not be attempted here. ll 
It is important to observe here that though Bentham did not 
define or mention relevance he implies that it had to do with weight, 
because what he thought he had avoided is an investigation and 
discussion of the operation of weighing and jUdging the degree and 
closeness of connection which 
[HJas been an operation of the instinctive class: an 
operation which has never been attempted to be subjected 
to rule, or at least to any other rules than what have 
been completely arbitrary and irrational. To take the 
business out of the hands of instinct, to subject it to 
rules, is a task which, if it lies within the reach of 
human faculties, must at any rate be reserved, I think, 
for the improved powers of some mature age. 12 
10. Ibid. p 215 for a different meaning of 'principal facts' see 
n.13 below. 
11. Ibid. P 216; but see his v~ews on proper exclusion of irrelevant 
evidence, 7 Works, p 362. 
12. 6 Works, p 216. 
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This, as we shall see, is similar to Wigmore's and other 
evidence scholars viewing of relevance as probative force, a view 
which poses some serious problems for the analysis of the examination 
and combination of evidence. As we shall see such a view is not 
warranted by, and 1S indeed inconsistent with, Bentham's abstract 
analysis of facts as seen in general experience, and not in any 
particular context or relations. His abstract analysis of facts 
can best be seen in his treatment of direct and circumstantial 
evidence. To that treatment we shall now turn. 
B. Facts as Evidence 
1. Classification of Evidence. 
Bentham distinguishes between two types of evidentiary facts 
and their relation to principal or ultimate principal facts. The 
type of facts which have direct relationships to the ultimate principal 
f h d d · . d 13 acts e terme 1rect eV1 ence. The other type of facts whose 
relationship to the principal or ultimate facts is indirect or 
circumstantial he termed circumstantial evidence. Bentham's treatment 
f d · . d f h' f . . 1 . d 14 o 1rect eV1 ence was part 0 1S treatment 0 C1rcumstant1a eV1 ence. 
His interest in direct evidence was threefold; one was to distinguish 
13. See 7 Works, p 2 when he stated with reference to chaimof inferences 
in circumstantial evidence 'In this way, a chain of facts, of any length, 
may be easily conceived, and chains of different lengths will be 
frequently exemplified: each such link being, at the same time, with 
reference to a preceding link, a principal fact, and with reference to a 
succeeding one, an evidentiary fact •••. In a chain of this sort, it 
becomes necessary to distinguish the several precedentia1 or introductory 
facts (principal and evidentiary) from the ultimate principal fact. The 
ultimate principal fact occupies that situation only: it is the very 
fact sought: it is not viewed for the purpose of inducing a persuasion 
of the existence or non-existence of any other fact.'. 
14. Ibid. pp 2-3. 
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it from circumstantial evidence, whilst the other was to argue that 
most types of direct evidence involved some elements of circumstantial 
evidence, the third was to show that direct evidence has more probative 
force than circumstantial evidence. The discussion of direct and 
circumstantial evidence contains some of Bentham's most advanced and 
interesting views about facts as evidence. 
Bentham saw the distinguishing feature between the two types 
of evidence in the reasoning steps the mind takes from the evidentiary 
fact to the principal fact. In direct evidence the mind moves from 
the evidentiary fact directly to the principal fact. In circumstantial 
evidence on the other hand it takes more steps to reach the principal 
or ultimate fact. No reasoning from any item of circumstantial evidence 
can be done in less than two moves from the evidentiary fact to the 
ul timate fact. The mind moves from an evidentiary fact (factum 
probans) to a principal fact (factum probandum), and from that to the 
ultimate fact i.e. the fact in issue. Bentham treated this reasoning 
chain as the distinguishing feature of circumstantial evidence and 
he referred to it as special inference. 
When all the evidence is of that sort which is termed 
direct, no part of it of the nature of circumstantial, 
the case is such as affords not room for any special 
inference - for any other inference than that general 
one, by which, from the discourse by which the existence 
of this or that fact is asserted, the existence of that 
fact is inferred, and credited. 1S 
That is, in direct evidence the only inference involved is that 
whereby one infers the existence of something from the testimony of 
its existence. So, as Bentham says, direct evidence does not require 
any chain of reasons, or a special inference, because 
IS. 7 Works, p 1. 
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rIJn the case of direct evidence, the evidentiary fact is 
throughout of an uniform description. It consists in the 
e~istence of a,person appeari~g in the character of a deposing 
w1tness, and, 1n the way of d1scourse, asserting the existence 
of the principal fact in question, on the ground of its 
having, in some way or other, come within the congnizance 
of his perceptive faculties. 
16 
After stating this clear distinction Bentham went on to make 
important observations about evidence. He maintained first that it 
is hard to find a case in which the evidence consists entirely of 
d · 'd 17 1rect eV1 ence. As an example he gave the issue of intention 1n 
criminal trials: 
In a case regarded as criminal, the body of evidence (unless 
it consists of confessorial evidence) cannot, if complete, be 
composed solely of direct evidence: how satisfactory soever, 
it cannot but include a mixture of circumstantial evidence. 
For, to constitute a criminal act, one or more facts of the 
psychological kind are indespensably requisite: in most 
instances, the sentiment of consciousness, with relation to 
the existence of divers exterior facts; in all cases, 
intentionality, viz. the intention of bringing about the 
obnoxious event, or at least of doing the physical act by 
which it is produced or endeavoured to be produced' 18 
Bentham also saw perception as normally an inferential process of 
. d 19 JU gment. 
Simple perception is the operation of sense; inference is 
the operation of the judgment. But, by the most constantly 
in exercise of all the senses, viz. sight, it is seldom that 
any belief of any matter of fact is produced, but that the 
judgment has been more or less at work in the production of 
it· 20 
Bentham made this important observation and left it at that 
without trying to show whether or not it is consistent with his clear-
cut distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Nor did 
16. Ibid. P 2. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Bentham referred to Berkeley's Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision 
(1709), see 8 Works, n.p.3. His reference to Berkeley seems problematic 
since Berkeley argued that real perception involved no inference. Of 
course much of what we call perception is not perception for him, see G. 
Berkeley, A New Theory of Vision and Other Writings, (1709, 1910-39) pp 13-86. 
20. 7 Works, p 3. 
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he relate it to his discussion of the sufficiency of direct evidence. 
The most important category of facts mentioned by Bentham in 
this respect relate to the numerous facts which are assumed or pre-
supposed, by anyone when perceiving jUdging or communicating with 
someone else, or when perceiving, interpreting, believing, or acting 
h .. . f . 21 on any suc commun1cat1ons, 1e., acts of exper1ence. Accordingly 
all the facts constituting the basis of the background and supporting 
beliefs for action are, according to Bentham, circumstantial evidence 
of the basis of every assertion of direct evidence. Bentham made 
this observation in relation to testimony when he stated 
The evidence afforded by any given mass of testimony 1S 
either direct or circumstantial, according to the relation 
it bears to the fact to which it is considered as applying. 
It is direct, in respect of any and every fact expressly 
narrated by it; and, in particular, every fact of which 
the witness represents himself as having been a percipient 
witness. It is circumstantial, in respect of any and every 
fact not thus expressly narrated by it; in particular, 
every fact of which the witness does not represent himself 
as having been a percipient witness, and the existence of 
which, therefore, is matter of inference, being left to 
be concluded from its supposed connexion with the facts 
spoken to by the testimony in its character of direct 
evidence' 22 
His conception of background knowledge as evidence was clearly and 
vividly stated in relation to what he considers to be improbable or 
impossible. 
The direct evidence, from which this inference of the 
non-existence of the affirmed fact is deduced, is composed 
of the several supposed reports or relations (added to the 
several supposed perceptions of the deposing witness himself) 
whereby the existence of the several supposed analogous facts 
of which the course of nature in this behalf is composed, has 
been supposed to be affirmed' 23 
Bentham referred to general experience in that respect as general 
21. Ibid, p 4. for a reference to these facts as 'evidence' see Thayer, 
op.ci~ 270. 
22. 7 Works, p 3. 
23. Ibid. P 98. 
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counter-evidence, and to the direct testimony as special counter-
evidence. 
Certain facts are considered as disaffirmed, certain 
negative facts in infinite multitude are considered 
as affirmed, by the perceptions and reports (extra-
judicial reports indeed) of mankind in general, without 
any known exception: and from all these facts put together, 
in the character of evidentiary facts, the non-existence of 
the individual fact in question in the character of 
principal fact is inferred' 24 
Again Bentham made the same observation in relation to 
what he terms infirmative supposition when this concerns circumstantial 
evidence. He stated this in the following passage: 'it will often 
happen, that, by the bare consideration of some other fact, which is 
not proved, nor so much as attempted to be proved, the principal fact 
will be considered as being, in a greater or less degree disprobabilized. ,25 
The next matter considered by Bentham was the effect of both 
direct and circumstantial evidence. According to Bentham when any 
item of direct evidence is believed by the fact finder then 
The persuasion generated by it in the mind of the judge is 
of sufficient strength to give birth to a decision on his 
part; together with such acts of power, to which, on the 
occasion in question, a decision to the effect in question 
is in the habit of giving birth' 26 
The same is not true of a single item of circumstantial evidence. 
By some greater number of such lots of circumstantial evidence, 
taken together, the fact may be said to be proved. Of the 
probative force of anyone of them, taken by itself, the utmost 
that can be said is, that by means of it the fact is 
probabilized:- rendered, in a greater or less degree, probable' 27 
Though Bentham considered evidence as facts and discussed it, 
the facts he looked into and considered are facts in general human 
24. rd. 
25. 7 Works, p 4, See W. Twining, Bentham on Evidence, op.cit., 
26. 7 Works, p 4. 
27. rd. 
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. 28 
exper1ence, seen and analysed in that general context. In that 
general context judicial evidence was distinguishable only by the 
judicial purpose to which it is put (i.e. the connection of evidentiary 
facts with the determinable principal facts).29 He talked about 
the properties of judicial evidence in relation to the ends of justice 
30 (i.e. correctness and completeness). He also talked in general about 
what causes correctness and incorrectness in evidence, and what is 
necessary for securing the completeness of evidence. 31 By adopting 
so general an approach to the analysis of evidence Bentham, as we have 
seen, did not attempt to relate his analysis to what is involved in 
the performance of any fact finding task in relation to a typical 
type of situation in which that task is performed. Had he done that 
he would have treated such issues as relevance; probative value; 
the credibility of witnesses; the weighing of conflicting and mixed 
evidence; the question of whether the reasoning process is eliminative 
or combinatory; and numerous other issues, in the context of the 
judicial fact finding type of situation. 32 
Probably Bentham saw that such treatment would be inconsistent 
33 
with his scientific approach, and his purpose of addressing the 
legislator on the design of a rational system of procedure that should 
28. 6 Works, pp 208-215, 217-219, 286-287, 278. 
29. Ibid. p 215. 
30. Ibid. P 211. 
31. Ibid. pp 205, 213, 211. 
32. See below ch. 10, Section A. 
33. 6 Works, pp 204-205; and 209 when he stated: 'In the map of 
science, the department of judicial evidence remains to this hour a 
perfect blank. Power has hitherto kept it in a state of wilderness: 
reason has never visited it .... The present work is the result of an 
attempt to fill up this blank, and to fill it up with some approach 
towards completeness.'. 
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be given by the legislator for the guidance of the judge. 34 His 
position in relation to relevance as we have seen, 1S a case in point. 
Before we proceed any further into these matters and other 
aspects of Bentham's writing on evidence, especially his views on 
probative force and probability, it is important to try to seek an 
explanation for his rather unusual and problematic reference to facts 
and his treatment of them. Such an inquiry will carry us into 
Bentham's writing on ontology and epistemology. 
c. The Intellectual Foundations of Bentham's Writings 
On Evidence. 
1. General. 
Bentham referred to facts in various and differing senses. 
Facts are physical or psychological, general or especial, real or 
fictional, facts of existence or facts in discourse, mental facts or 
material facts. His most striking and interesting reference to 
facts, as we have seen, is when he treated as facts what is currently 
known as common sense generalizat~nsor beliefs and opinions about 
the course of nature. His following definition of fact can be taken 
as a starting point for our inquiry: 'The existence of any expressable 
state of things, or of persons, or of both, whether it be quiescent, 
or motional, or both, at any given point or portion of time, is what 
35 is called a fact, or ~ matter of fact. t. The two words existence 
and expressable are the key words in this passage. As I shall argue 
Bentham viewed existence in different relations but his 'expressable 
existence' is linguistic. This position renders Bentham's views on 
the relationship between reality, thought and language a relevant 
34. See 7 Works, p 64; 6 Works, pp 209 et seq; W. Twining 'Rule-
Scepticism and Fact-Scepticism', op.cit., p 65 at 69. 
35. 8 Works, op.cit. p 300. 
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consideration for our present purposes. 
2. Reality. 
Bentham unlike Hume and very much like Locke36 adopted a 
pragmatic and a commonsense view of the existence of the material 
37 
world. He expressed this in the following: 
I assume in a word the existence of what is called the 
material world ... and that without scruple: notwithstanding 
~t has been the subject of so much controversy. I assume 
1t boldly for this reason: because in point of practice, 
no bad consequences can as everyone is ready to acknowledge 
possibly arise from supposing it to be true, and the worst 
consequences cannot but arise from supposing it to be false .... 
38 
As a practical justification of this stance, Bentham invoked his 
, '1 f 'I' 39 pr1nc1p e 0 ut1 1ty. 'Suppose the non existence of corporeal 
substances, of any hard corporeal substances that stand opposite to 
you, make this supposition, and as soon as you have made it, act upon 
it, pa1n, the perception of pain, will at once bear witness against 
you: and that by your punishment, your condign punishment. '.40 
36. See Mary Mack, op.cit. p 205, 
37. See Locke's Essay, p 537 where he stated 'The notice we have by our 
senses of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether 
so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reason 
employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an 
assurance that deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves 
that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of 
those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded 
confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to 
be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels. 
At least, he that can doubt so far, (whatever he may have with his own 
thoughts,) will never have any controversy with me: since he can never 
be sure I say any thing contrary to his opinion. As to myself, I think 
God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me; 
since, by their different application, I can produce in myself both 
pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present state. 
This is certain, the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive 
us is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence 
of material things. '. 
38. See University College Collection Box 69, p 52. 
39. For the same justification by Locke see, Locke's Essay, p 537. 
40. 8 Works, p 197. 
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From this confident and uncompromising assumption Bentham proceeded 
to state his ontological, logical and epistemological views. Through 
that assumption he could see the material world as independent of the 
mind, any mind, and from language. In this way he conceived the 
material world as an aggregate of concrete objects or substances. 
The substance or an object is not, according to Bentham, matter, form, 
quality or relation. None of these exists in what Bentham termed the 
material world. O 1 b h 1 . l' 41 n y su stances ave rea mater1a eX1stence. 
3. Mental Existence. 
Bentham saw the material world as a cause or source of another 
type of existence, i.e. mental existence. When a mind comes into 
contact with a substance or a thing in nature it has an impression or 
idea of that thing. According to Bentham, and unlike Locke, these 
ideas and impressions enter the mind in a composite form. By 
reflection the faculties of the mind de-compose that sensory manifold 
into simple ideas. Bentham referred to both the composite and 
de-composed ideas as real mental entities. He referred to this 1n the 
following 
Under the head of perceptible real entities may be placed, 
without difficulty, individual perceptions of all sorts: 
the impressions produced in groups by the application of 
sensible objects to the organs of sense: the ideas brought 
to view by the recollection of those same objects; the new 
ideas produced under the influence of the imagination, by 
the decomposition and recomposition of those groups; - to 
none of these can the character, the denomination, of 
real entities be refused' 42 
Reality here is simply the consciousness of the mind of its 
own contents. The mind when reflecting on its own ideas can identify 
each of its ideas and be aware of its existence. For Bentham 
, I' 43 permanence and solidity are not essent1al for rea 1ty. His 
41. Ibid. pp 199 et. seq. 
42. 8 Works, p 196. 
43. Id. 
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definition of real propositions as intellectual or volitional expressing 
propositions lends support to this view. 44 In the light of the 
preceding discussion, it can be maintained that the recent presentation 
by Professor Gerald Postema of what constitutes real entities is 
inaccurate. According to Professor Postema 'All real entities, ~n 
Bentham's view, fall into one or two classes: (i) concrete material 
substances, and (ii) mental entities which, following Hume, he 
distinguishes into impressions and ideas. All other entities to 
h · I' f'" 45 w ~c anguage seems to comm~t us are ~ct~ons .. Professor Postema 
expressly excluded decomposed simple ideas from the realm of real 
entities. For Bentham both the contents of a person's mind and the 
physical world are real. No problem of the correspondence of what 
existsin someone's mind in relation to what exists outside it is raised 
as far as that person is concerned. The assumption that the mind has 
all it's ideas lodged inside it disposes of any need for communication. 
In short it is not a communicating mind. When Bentham considers 
communication he enters upon one of his greatest contributions to 
human though t . By this I do not intend to be understood to ignore 
or undermine the importance accorded by Bentham to the intransitive 
use of language in the formation and improvement of thought. My main 
concern here is to make a distinction between what really exists mentally 
and physically in order to make the further distinction between these 
two and what exists in language. My main argument so far can be 
restated as follows: for Bentham when material reality is perceived 
by someone he treats his perceptions as ones of real things, and when 
he communicates what he has perceived (logically speaking, expresses a wish 
. 
to be understood as communicating that reality) the only way he can 
carry out that communication is by means of signs. 
44. 8 '-lorks, p 333. 
45. G. Postema, op.cit. p 46. 
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The treatment of the problem of communication will take us through 
a section in which we have to consider Bentham's theory of fictions 
in relation to language, thought and reality. 
4. Reality, thought and language. 
We have already seen that Bentham made a distinction between 
material and mental entities; a distinction by which he contrasted 
what exists in a percipient mind with what exists in the material 
world. ~fuen he turned to the problem of communication he made a 
further distinction between real and fictitious entities, for this 
distinction the real archetype was material or physical entities, 
Le. sensible objects. According to this V1ew the only real entities 
are sensible material objects; all other entities are fictitious. 
By a real entity, understand a substance, - an object, 
the existence of which is made known to us by one or 
more of our five senses. A real entity is either a 
person or a thing, a substance rational, or a substance 
not rational. 46 
These substances provide the mind with a composite bundle of ideas. 
No portions of matter ever presents itself to sense, 
without presenting, at one and the same time, a multitude 
of simple ideas, of all which taken together, the concrete 
one, in a state more or less correct and complete, is 
composed. At the same time, though initially all these 
ideas present themselves together, the mind has it in its 
power to detach, as above, anyone or more of them from 
the rest, and either keep it in view in this detached state, 
or make it up into a compound with other simple ideas, 
detached in like manner from other sources. 47 
The mind operates on these composite images to make simple abstract 
ideas; ideas which have no physical or material existence in nature: 
such as matter, form, shape, colour, quality, quantity and relation. 
All these ideas are decomposed by mental analysis from the composite 
46. A Works, p 325. 
47. Ibid. p 26; See also G, Postema, op.cit. p 49. 
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1mages received from the material world by the passive faculties 
of the mind. Bentham did not seem to view these ideas as states 
1n any particular mind, but as signs in language; for when he 
considered decomposed ideas from the point of view of the percipient 
mind he regarded them as real entities. 
Sensible physical objects stand in certain relations to 
each other. A real entity, for example, is either in a state of 
rest or motion. According to Bentham 'when a real entity is said 
to be at rest, it is said to be so with reference to some other 
t · 1 I . fl'" 48 par 1CU ar rea ent1ty or aggregate 0 rea ent1t1es ... Motion, 
rest, time and space though related to real entities are them-
selves all fictitious entities. All quantities and qualities are 
fictitious as well. 
Bentham emphasized the dependence of these non-real entities 
on concrete physical objects, not only to indicate their non-physical 
ontological status, but to show also that important logical and 
epistemological issues relating to fictitious entities can be 
resolved with reference to the real entities on which they depend. 
It is, however, important to point out that Bentham's distinction 
between what is real and what is fictitious in relation to language 
is based on a dic~otomy between what exists in the material world 
contrasted with what exists in discourse independent of any mind. 
For this reason, it seems that Bentham assigns the ontological 
existence of the fictitious entities to language when he states that 
'[t]o language, then - to language alone - it is, that fictitious 
entities owe their existence - their impossible, yet indispensible, 
. , 49 
eX1S tence. . 
48. 8 Works, p 197. 
49. Ibid. p 198. 
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This however does not mean that fictitious entities have no other 
non-physical existence besides their existence in language. We 
have already seen that Bentham regarded the mind as a seat of existence 
independent of language, and probably the material world. His 
treatment of physical and non-physical entities that are independent 
of any mind, enable him to contrast the names of objects with the 
f b · 50 names 0 non-o Jects. Bentham's idea of existence as a fictitious 
. 1 d h· . 51 ent1ty en s support to t 1S V1ew. Another dependence relationship 
between physical and fictitious entities is that the names of concrete 
sensible objects serve as the archetypes for those of fictitious 
.. 52 
ent1t1es. Fictitious entities being non-objects, cannot be 
designated or denominated in a direct way. 
Of one and the same thought, from mind to mind, by what 
means - through what channel can conveyance be made? To 
no other man's is the mind of any man immediately present. 
Matter, this or that portion of matter external to both, 
in this may be seen the only channel, the only medium, 
which the nature of the case admits of. Yonder stands a 
certain portion of matter. By that portion of matter 
feelings of a certain sort are produced in your mind: 
by that same portion of matter feelings of a sort, if not 
exactly the same, at least, with reference to the purpose 
in question, near enough to being the same, are produced, 
at the same time, in my mind. Here, then, is the channel 
of communication, and the only one. Of that channel 
language takes possession and employs it. S3 
According to Bentham the association between the idea of a name and 
the object to which it is applied created a natural propensity whereby 
reality is attributed to any object designated in that manner. 
Fictitious entities have no material existence yet they have names; 
a circumstance which forces us to speak of them as though they were 
real entities. For this reason Bentham thought that fictitious 
entities are easily confounded with real entities. To avoid that 
50. Ibid. pp 198-199. 
51. Ibid. P 206. 
--
52. Ibid. pp 331-332. 
53. Ibid. p 329. 
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ser10us consequence he made his distinction between real and fictitious 
entities. 
Unfortunate it is, howsoever necessary and indispensible, 
that for speaking of fictitious entities, there is no 
other possible mode than that of speaking of them as if 
they were so many real entities. This blameless falsehood 
being universally uttered, and remaining universally 
uncontradicted, is, to a considerable extent, taken for 
truth. With every name employed, an entity stands associated 
in the minds of the hearers, as well as speakers, and that, 
entity, though in one half of the whole number of instances, 
no other than a fictitious one, is, in all of them, apt to 
be taken for a real one. To speak of an object by its 
name, its universally known name, is to ascribe existence 
to it, - out of this, error, misconception, obscurity, 
ambiguity, confusion, doubts, disagreement, angry passions, 
discord and hostility have, to no inconsiderable amount, 
had place. 54 
To this long list of the dangers of confounding what is fictitious 
with what is real, Bentham added a serious defect inherent in language 
as a medium of communication. When language is used as a medium of 
communication, it expresses what the speaker wishes the hearer to 
take for his state of mind in relation to a matter of fact alleged 
to have past, present, or future existence in nature, or in the mind 
of the speaker. The object of communication itself cannot be 
mirrored by the speakers discourse. Bentham maintained that the 
only object of communication 1S the state of the communicator 
mind, i.e., of the volitional or the perceptive faculties of the 
mind. 
'{hen, as above, desire, (the state or act of the will,) 
and simple perception or sensation, (the state or act of 
the understanding,) are excepted, all that the mind of 
man is capable of containing is an act of the judicial 
faculty - an opinion, a judgment: an opinion entertained 
by himself, entertained in his own mind. This is the 
only immediate subject of any communication which, 
concerning the state of that faculty, can be made. Of no 
matter of fact, external to, of no matter other than that. 
which passes in his own mind, can any immediate communication 
be made by language. Opinion, an opinion entertained by 
the speaker, this is all of which, in any instance, 
54. Ibid. pp 327-8. 
i Ii I ' 
i 
I 
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communication can be made. Of an oplnlon thus expressed 
any imaginable matter of fact, real or supposed, may have 
been taken for the object. But that to which expression 
is given, that of which communication is made, is always 
the man's opinion, i.e. that which, in so far as the 
expression answers its intended purpose, that which he 
wishes should be taken for his opinion in relation to the 
subject in question, nor anything more' 55 
For Bentham the ascertainment of the import of any discourse, (not 
the discourse itself), involves a high degree of complexity which 
calls for going beyond the discourse itself to ascertain its meanlng 
or truth as the case may be. The making of the distinction between 
discourse and its import, together with Bentham's emphasis on the 
dependence of fictitious entities on real entities, are indicative 
of Bentham's intention to go beyond the location of the ontological 
status of fictitious entities to deal with the more important logical 
and epistemological questions relating to fictitious entities. 
Bentham's discourse on logic, though fragmentary and probably incomplete, 
contains some general remarks on what an investigator may look into 
additional to fictitious entities, or any discourse about any matter 
of fact, to ascertain the truth or falsity of any communication relating 
. h 56 to elt er. Bentham's views on the truth value and instructiveness 
of propositions about fictitious entities may be of some help here. 
He seems to regard the truth and instructiveness of propositions about 
fictitious entities to be the function of the real entities on which 
they depend. He stated this as follows 
Nothing has no properties. A fictitious entity being, as 
this its name imports, being, by the very SUpposltlon, a 
mere nothing, cannot of itself have any properties: no 
proposition by which any property is ascribed to it can, 
therefore, be in itself, and of itself, a true one, nor, 
55. Ibid. P 321. 
56. I have not looked at Bentham's MSS on logic because they are not 
edited and a search in them is beyond the scope of this work. 
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therefore, an instructive one. ~~atsoever of truth is 
capable of belonging to it cannot belong to it in any 
other character than that of the representative - of the 
intended and supposed equivalent and adequate succedaneum, 
of some proposition having for its subject some real 
entitY's7 
These real entities on which the import of fictitious entities 1S 
based were referred to by Bentham as the real source, efficient cause, 
. .. 1 58 connectlng pr1nClp es. The import of the real entity provides an 
emblem or archetypal lmage for the import of the fictitious entitY'59 
By the sort of proposition here in question, viz., a proposition 
which has for its subject some fictitious entity, and for 
its predicate the name of an attribute attributed to that 
fictitious entity, some sort of image - the image of some 
real action or a state of things, in every instance, is 
presented to the mind. This image may be termed the archetype, 
emblem, or archetypal image appertaining to the fictitious 
proposition, of which the name of the characteristic 
fictitious entity constitutes a part'60 
According to this view the truth of a fictitious proposition predicating 
a'quality' or 'property' of a fictitious entity can only be ascertained 
with reference to the archetypal image of that proposition, i.e., that 
which provides the archetype for the proposition about the fictitious 
, 61 
entlty. Bentham seems to suggest this when, in his section on 
invention, he states that 'If the subject of the physical class, insofar 
as the words employed in discoursing of it are names of fictitious 
entities, take the only course by which it is possible for a man to 
give a perfect clearness to the ideas of which they serve to constitute 
the design, viz., by searching out the real entities in which these 
, , , h . , 62 
names of fictltious entltles have t elr source .. In what follows 
57. Ibid. p 246. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. 8 Works, pp 333, 336. 
62. Ibid. p 277. 
--
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we shall consider generally the extent to which Bentham's Vlews on 
ontology, language, and logic influenced his writings on evidence. 
D. Evidence and probability 
1. TIle Irmnediate Obj ect of Evidence Reports and its Analysis 
Bentham in his writings on evidence maintained a clear 
63 distinction between reality, thought, and language. Real 
existence is always certain and absolute: 
Take any supposed past matter of fact whatever, glvlng 
to it its situation in respect of place and time. At 
the time in question, in the place in question, either 
it had existence, or it had not: there is no medium. 
Between existence and non-existence there is no medium, 
no other alternative. By probability - by improbability, -
by each of these a medium is supposed - an indefinite 
number of alternatives is supposed. 64 
When a witness testifies to the existence or non existence of a 
matter of fact he expresses a persuasion actual or assumed ln its 
. . 65 
eXlstence or non eXlstence. This persuasion is not an objective 
h h " h h "f" 66 property of t e fact to w lC e testl les. Unlike the objective 
fact the persuasion is susceptible of different degrees, ranging 
. . "b"l" 67 from certalnty to lmpossl 1 lty. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
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In and by the form of words thus employed for giving 
expression to that which is in truth nothing more than 
a psychological matter of fact, the scene of which lies 
in, and is confined to, his own breast, - a sort of 
quality is thus ascribed to the external phenomenon, 
or supposed phenomenon; viz. the matter of fact, or 
supposed matter of fact itself. Upon examination, 
this quality, it will be seen, is purely a fictitious 
one, a mere figment of the imagination; and neither 
improbability and impossibility on the one hand, nor 
their opposites, probability and certainty, on the other, 
have any real place in the nature of the things themselves· 68 
See above, p. 61. 
7 Works, p 78. 
Ibid. p 77. 
Ibid. pp 78-79. 
Ibid. P 78. 
ThirL n 77. 
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While the subject matter of evidence in a judicial trial is certain , 
the evidence in a judicial trial which is communicated by signs 
cannot in the nature of things mirror the object of that evidence. 69 
Bentham's theory of fictions and language allowed him to move 
gradually and systematically from facts to psychological states 
about those facts; to particular as well as to general and complex 
psychological facts. His concept of evidence is broad and general 
extending beyond the directly adduced evidence to general experience. 70 
Human experience, individual and general, is relevant to the evaluation 
71 
of opinions about facts. Probability, and its degrees and modes 
of expression, constitutes psychological facts about the course of 
72 
nature. Bentham viewed experience and the course of nature from 
both an absolute and a relative stand point. 73 It is absolute when 
viewed in general independently of any mind's knowledge about it. 
It is relative when an individual conception of the course of nature 
is taken into consideration. Though Bentham emphasized and stressed 
the importance of experience in the evaluation of probabilities and 
the reaching of probability judgments, his abstract and verbal analysis 
committed him to the most general V1ew of human experience as a source 
for decision-making. He used it as his inarticulate premiss without 
re1ativising it to the problems of evidence in an individual trial 
setting. These propositions about Bentham's writing on evidence 
requ1re an elaborate analysis for which I shall construct three 
hypothetical situations which, I hope, will clearly illustrate the 
69. Id. 
70. 7 Works, pp 4, 7, 98, 99. 
71. Ibid. p 83. 
--
72. Ibid. pp 77-78. 
73. Ibid. pp 84, 91-92. 
-
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the kind of issues which are usually raised in a judicial fact 
finding situation. The first situation will be referred to as the 
T - situation, the second as the M - situation, and the third as 
the N - situation. 
2. A Schematic presentation of Evidence 
Let 'F' be an act or action, a state of a thing or a person; 
F is an evidentiary fact having either direct or circumstantial 
connection with an ultimate fact ('U'). 'J' refers to the fact-
finder (judge or jury), and 'w' refers to a witness deposing before 
J in relation to F. 'ST*' refers to the possibility of a fact's 
existence in general. 'ST' with the subscript of the witness 
deposing to it (ie. WI' ST I ), refers to the time and place (co-existent 
or otherwise) connected with the occurence of F, (or its alleged 
occurence), as perceived, (or alleged to be perceived), by that witness. 
'P' refers to a persuasion, actual or assumed, on the part of W, 
which is caused or alleged to be caused by the perception of F at an 
ST co-existent or otherwise connected with F, Wand P. 'R' refers 
to a report or discourse about the co-existence of, or other relation 
between, Wand F at a specific ST made by that witness to J. The 
impact of R on the mind of (J) when positive shall be designated 
by 'B', (when J believes that R); when negative it will be designated 
by 'NB' (i.e.:- when J does not believe that R). 
Now let us assume that WI really does directly perceive F at 
STI' so that we can say that at ST I WI was in a position to determine 
whether F, and that he in fact perceived that F, and this is what he 
reports. It follows that WI was persuaded that F. R will entail 
that F. The assumption of the truth of these reports helps J to' 
d ·d th t W d ST co-existed or were otherwise related to each eCl e a I an I 
other as R described. It also helps him to decide further that WISTI 
70. 
co-existed, or were related to F, and that ~ ST F and P co-existed or 
I I ' 
were related together as R expresses. In aT-situation R expresses 
In an M-situation (mistaken situation) let us assume that 
W2 at ST 2 directly perceived E but mistook it for F. He had ST2FP. 
R will be W2ST2FP. If we assume the ability to look into the mind 
of W2 and see what it registers, we can see in that mind W2ST2FP. 
R also expresses the same image, but knowing that E was mistaken for 
F at ST2 we know that F did not exist at ST2 . Accordingly P exists 
in W2 's mind while F does not exist at ST 2 . The knowledge of F at 
ST* contributed to that result. 
In an N- situation (non-existent situation) 
(i) Assume W who either was not at ST3 or at any other place from 
which he could perceive what occurs at ST 3 made R before J in which 
he stated W3ST3FP, or 
(ii) While being at ST3 and no F took place at ST3 or any other place 
from which W could perceive the occurence of F from ST3 he made an R 
to J stating W3ST3FP. In this situation F 1S not only untrue it is 
non-existent at ST3 . P is non-existent at ST3 . There is neither 
an F nor a P to co-exist with or relate to ST3 . Another F and another 
P might have been acquired at ST* but not at ST3 . The co-existence 
or relatedness of ST3 with F and P is essential for the truth of 
This can be explained diagramatically as follows: 
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Assuming F to be actual, we might then have the following situation: 
(I) [WI] that F, who reports that F to [J] who 
\ 
P (pe~suaded) at ST (a particular time and 
place at which W is in a position 
to determine whether F). 
F is probative of U 
(II) [W2] that F*, who reports that F to [J] who 
P (persuaded) at ST2 (a particular time and place at which W is not in a 
position to determine whether F 
F* is not probative of U 
believes the 
P is genuine 
. JI S Belief 
is correct 
believes the 
report 
which does not 
correspond to F, 
JI S Belief is 
incorrect 
If we assume that there was not a genuine mistake, and that W3 
is testifying to something which he ought not to, we might have 
the following situation: 
FST* (from general experience) but 
reports FST3 (a fact he alleges to have perceived at the relevant 
probative time and place to J who 
P(persuaded) at ST* (not the particular relevant 
time and place where that F can 
be determined. 
F at SF* is not probative of U 
diag. (1). 
believed the 
report, on 
non-existent 
persuasion on the 
part of W3 of the 
existence of F at 
the relevant time 
and place 
:. J I S Belief is 
incorrect 
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The reason for his testifying in the above way could be: 
(i) He was not in a position (at the appropriate ST) to determine 
whether F, even if it was indeed the case that F 
(ii) He was in such a situation, but neither perceived that F nor 
perceived F* as F, nor was in any other way perceived that it 
was a fact that F. 
The three schematic situations, analysed in terms of their ingredients, 
are meant to provide examples which will aid the discussion of Bentham 
and other evidentiary scholars, in the hope that their use may be 
conducive to a better understanding of these scholars, and the views 
I express in interpreting their writings, or criticizing them. 
As we shall see Bentham's analysis concentrates on P as 
expressed in R, rather than F. In the three situations (I), (II), 
(III), the only one in which R correctly reports a reliable P and 
a genuine F is situation I. In the other situations either F did 
not exist at the relevant ST, or else it was not reliably perceived 
to exist, though W thought it was, or there was no perception or 
persuasion at all. 
3. The Evaluation of Bentham's Analysis. 
In a judicial trial where J is completely ignorant of the 
status of F, P and R, (which can be distinct facts) R may correctly 
report F and P, or mistake F for another fact, or falsely report F 
and P. J's concerns about F will be (i) to ascertain whether it 
occurred; (ii) to determine its probative value (a) as expressed in 
R, and (b) as i~. estimated by J independently of R. 
74 Ben tham' s views on these rna t ter ~ are rough and general. 
His effort was a pioneering effort, for his time, but it has never, 
as some would suggest, come close to capturing the complexity whether 
74. See G. Postema, op.cit. pp 38,43 and 62. 
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of direct or circumstantial evidence on the one hand, or on the 
other hand the further complexity of combining or otherwise making 
use of the mixed mass of evidence consisting of those items. Even 
when his system is viewed as a rough, general, tentative and 
incomplete system, we shall see that he was not wholly consistent. 
According to Bentham all that R (witnes~ report of F) proves 
is P (the witness' reported persuasion): R being discourse its 
immediate object is P not F (the evidentiary fact or fact reported). 
The immediate object of R of W is the persuasion of W. R cannot 
. F 75 mlrror . If this is meant to state that in every R there is a 
true P, which R mirror~ it is not correct as two out of the three 
situations mentioned above show. Again since P is a fact distinct 
from both F and R it is difficult to see how R can mirror P and not 
F. The reasons that lead us to question whether it mirrors F, 
should lead us to question whether it mirrors P. It is true that P 
h I f I , I d i W' b if i ' 76 as a psyc 0 ogical act may le concea ens reast t eXlsts, 
but it does not follow that W's discourse about P would in all cases 
mirror an actual persuasion on his part. For these reasons P 
(reported persuasion of the witness) for J ought to be as unknown as 
F (evidentiary fact) even after R (witness' report) is stated. 
However, Bentham assumed that if R (witness' report) is believed by 
J (fact-finder), the P (reported persuasion of the witness), and 
probably F (evidentiary fact) will also be believed by him. Before 
undertaking that task J (fact-finder), according to Bentham, should 
embark on an inquiry in which R (witness' report) is not necessarily 
used as evidence, that is J (fact-finder) must inquire into whether 
77 
or not F (evidentiary fact) is an impossible or incredible fact. 
75. 8 Works, p 329; 7 Works, p 77. 
76, 7 Works, p 77. 
77. Ibid. pp 76 et seq. 
---
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It is important to observe, here, that the inquiry relates to F 
(evidentiary fact), not as FST subscript (within a limited individual 
spatio-temporal region) but as FST* (existence of its type in general). 
In such an inquiry J's 'evidence' is the course of nature as understood 
by him. 
It has been seen, that in all cases without exception, in 
which any matter of fact is supposed by any person to be 
incredible, the ground of the supposition is a supposed 
disconformity between this matter of fact, and what is by 
the person in question considered to be the established course 
of nature. 78 
J's own knowledge of the course of nature may satisfy him that F is 
impossible in its own nature (e.g. witchcraft),79 or that though 
possible in its own nature its existence is 'incompatible' with the 
existence of another fact established by 'the testimony of a superior 
number of witnesses (e.g. alibi evidence). ,80 According to Bentham 
in the first case the impossibility is established by the repugnancy 
of F (evidentiary fact) to the established course of nature. In 
the second case it is established by the inconsistency of F with an 
established law of nature. 
In the first case, therefore, the impossibility being 
supposed, we immediately set it down that the testimony 
of the affirming witness is false: in the second place, 
we have to choose which of the two testimonies we shall 
disbelieve - that of the witnesses who affirm the one 
fact, or that of the witnesses who affirm the other 
fac t. 81 
As is clearly indicated in the above passage and in Bentham's section 
on factors which augment or diminish the probative force of R~2 
Bentham recognized situations in which R must be disbelieved if 
83 
another R is to be believed. 
78. Ibid. P 84. 
79. Ibid. P Ill. 
--
80. Id. 
81. 7 Works, p 112. 
82. 6 Works, pp 221-222, 224 
Despite this Bentham seems to maintain 
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the position that any R in any case ought to be credible84 and entitled 
at least when expressed by W to full probative value, or to the value 
assigned to it by W when it is direct testimonial evidence. 85 He 
based his assumption of the credibility of testimony (R) on experience 
and its uniformity, as established by testimony itself. 86 The 
conformity of general experience to testimony has in its turn established 
a general psychological fact in the form of an inclination or propensity 
87 to believe in testimony. For Bentham such a propensity exists as 'matter 
of fact - matter of universal experience He also considered 
it right to trust in such a propensity, as experience shows it to be 
89 trustworthy, and as utility demands. Of course he recognized instances 
90 in which lack of conformity is observable. As a result of this 
recognition he stated a general qualified rule which maintained that 
testimony is entitled to belief 'failing special and predominant reasons 
91 to the contrary'. The effect of this assumption is to assign to 
any R about an F which is not impossible or incredible in itself the 
f . I . 92 full force 0 pract1ca certa1nty. The initial impact of such an R 
would be B in J's mind. This is subject to revision based on the moral 
character of the witness, which may augment or diminish BJ; the form 
84. 6 Works, pp 235 et seq. 
85. Ibid. p 224. 
86. Ibid. p 235. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. 6 Works, p 236. 
91. Id. 
92. 6 Works, p 233. 
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in which R is presented, and its closeness to or remoteness from ~ 
~videntiarYfacB, are other factors which may augment or diminish BJ 
(fact-finder's belief) as based on WP (witness' reported persuasion) 
or WR (witness' report).93 Even when R is believed by J, because 
W is a credible witness, defects in W's perceptive powers may reduce 
the BJ (fact-finder's belief) based on WR (witness's report) or WP. 
The psychological fact BJ (fact-finder's belief) may relate to (1) 
the existence of F or its probability as ST* (possibility of its 
existence as a type), or (2) as ST subscript (its existence within 
a limited individual spatio-temporal region), or (3) the truth or 
probability of WPFST (reported persuasion alleged to be induced by the 
existence of a fact at a particular time and place) subscript, or 
(4) the impact of the proving force of F (evidentiary fact), P 
(reported persuasion), or R (witness' report) on J as to the truth 
of U (ultimate fact in issue) assuming F, P, or R, is true, (5) 
that BJ (fact-finder's belief) is a function of all four matters 
mentioned in (1), (2), (3) and (4). According to (5) J must inquire 
into the truth status of the source of his B (belief) before considering 
its probative force in (4). This means that in relation to any 
single item, whether that item be of direct or circumstantial evidence, 
J must perform at least two functions. His task becomes more complex 
when he performs comparative judgments involving more than one item. 
A logical consequence of (5) is that the real status of F, P, or R, 
as the case may be, must be ascertained by J and it should not be 
assumed. 
One difficulty about Bentham's assumption of the reliability 
of testimony is that each testimony is at the start entitled to f~ll 
practical certainty. One consequence of this is that BJ has dominance 
93. Ibid. P 224. 
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over NBJ. Another more serious consequence is that an R or P about 
an F is given full practical certainty, or the degree of certainty 
assigned to it by the witness deposing to it, while the same amount of 
certainty or degree could be given to the contradictory of F (this fact 
or reports about it). His process of revision on special and 
predominant reasons mayor may not eliminate the contradicition 
al together. Bentham does not seem to apply his mind to this question. 
However, he maintained a general position in which he implicitly 
accepted the possibility of J acquiring both Band NB as to evidentiary 
facts in proof of U, and evidentiary facts in disproof of it 
respectively. This position was maintained by Bentham throughout 
his discussion of probative force. The following passage however is 
of direct relevance to the present point. 
Suppose that - instead of operating all on one and the 
same side, viz. in proof of the fact in question the 
respective testimonies of a number of witnesses, all of 
the same level, are divided, some operating in proof of the 
fact, others in disproof of it: in this case, the mode 
of measuring the probative force will be nearly as simple, 
and altogether as certain, as in the former. In the 
former, it was the sum of the testimonies that was taken; 
in this, the differenceo 94 
Accordingly if party Y alleges U and called witnesses in proof 
of it while party X alleges not U and calls witnesses in disproof of 
it J could believe both Y's witnesses and X's witnesses though the 
one set may contradict the other set. For Bentham this conflict is 
resolvable either by the number of the witnesses, or when their degree 
95 
of persuasion is quantifiable, by the difference in the strength. 
This position both obscures and calls in question the significance of 
the role of J in deciding between Band NB in the case of a single 
item of evidence, whether direct or circumstantial; and its role ~n 
94. Ibid. p 221. 
95. Ibid. p 233. 
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the comparative judgment between belief for F and belief in not F. 
It also poses a question as to whether or not he provided any methods 
or procedure for carrying out such comparative judgments, and if he 
did provide such a prcedure whether it is eliminative or combinatory. 
For example if (1) above is observed by J with regard to the evidentiary 
facts, an item of evidence will not be considered as true or sufficiently 
probable to afford a probable inference to a principle or ultimate fact 
except when the judge inquires into and ascertains the truth or 
probability of that item. This would suggest that certain evidentiary 
items would be disbelieved and eliminated by J (the trier of facts) 
while others would be believed and then, and only then, their probative 
force will be determined in relation to a principle fact or an ultimate 
fact in issue. In such a case the method or procedure is bound to 
be an eliminative procedure or method with regard to single items of 
evidence. According to this method when two evidentiary facts are 
contradictory they cannot both be true or probable, one of them must 
be eliminated. It is of course possible to argue that while such an 
euminative process may attribute a high degree of certainty to the 
testimony it does not eliminate, nevertheless, it only affords a 
judgment of probability, which by definition must fall short of 
certainty. According to this argument whenever a fact is probable, 
its negation or contradictory must have some sort of probability 
however slight the degree of that probability may be. While the 
probability of an evidentiary fact is different from its probative 
force, both the positive and negative degrees of that probability 
must be taken into consideration as ingredients in the evaluation or 
calculation of the probative force of the evidentiary fact in proving 
the principle or ultimate fact as the case may be. Such a combinatory 
procedure would attract a Pascalian or Bayesian method. It is clear 
now that the inquiry into and the ascertainment of the truth or 
79. 
probability of an evidentiary fact, though distinct from the gradation 
of the probative force of that fact in proving or disproving a principle 
or ultimate fact, is essential for either method of gradation. For 
both the Baconian and the Pascalian a task of great complexity must be 
performed by J. As we have seen Bentham has not considered such a 
task nor analysed its complex ingredients. It can be assumed, therefore, 
that Bentham, as far as this point is concerned, was concerned with the 
degree of sufficiency of an evidentiary fact after assuming its truth 
or probability. It may be argued that since Bentham's concern is with 
P or R as psychological facts, and not with F or not-F, no conflict 
exists when FSTI is stated by WI and FST2 (its contradictory) is stated 
by W2 (a witness of the existence of a fact at a particular time and 
place) as FST2 • Bentham's theory of fiction5may be cited in support 
of this argument. Such a view is not tenable as far as his position 
with regard to alibi evidence is concerned. His theory of fictions as 
we have already seen transforms the inquiry into the reliability of P 
(the witness' persuasion) or the truth of his report, to an inquiry into 
the real existence of F subscript (the existence of that type of fact 
at any other time and place). The argument that Bentham was not 
concerned with the truth or probability of facts has support in 
his ordinary standard of the sufficiency of evidence. The relevance 
of that standard for the present purposes is that it was meant to be 
a standard to criticise and evaluate J's final determination as to U 
(the ultimate fact in issue), which means that what is evaluated is 
the achieved cognition of J (the fact finder) and not the process whereby 
he reaches that judgment. Secondly, the standard was a standard of 
sufficiency of a single item of direct evidence: 
To form for the purpose of discourse, a nominal standard 
of comparison; let us take a mass or lot of evidence, 
of such a description, as, in the judgment of the ordinary 
run of mankind, is found sufficient (if not contradicted 
or otherwise counter-evidenced,) to produce a belief of 
80, 
the existence of the matter of fact which it asserts: 
and this mass of evidence, let it be the deposition of 
an individual taken by lot, and unknown to the judge; 
the witness who thus deposes asserting, that, in the 
situation of percipient witness, the matter of fact 
presented itself, under the circumstances stated by him, 
to the cognizance of his senses' 96 
This argument has further support in the fact that Bentham's argument 
for the desirability of the quantification of the strength of probative 
force was based on the possibility of the existence of two sets of 
contradictory testimonies on both sides of the issue. It is because 
of his recognition of that possibility that he was able to see 
probative force as an infinite force, and the scale of its measurement 
. f' , 1 97 as an 1n 1n1te sea e. When the possibility of ideal types of 
testimony on each side of the scale can be assumed, and the possibility 
of additions on each side is possible, then because of these assumptions, 
the upper limit of the scale can be an infinite limit. He states that 
as follows: 
[A]n infinite scale (it has been already intimated) is the 
only sort of scale by which the truth of the case can be 
expressed. For what can that mass of evidence be, to the 
probative force of which no addition is made by the addition 
of a mass of evidence, exactly of the same composition in 
every respect, and twice as great?98 
According to Bentham the resolution of such conflict by reference to 
the number of witnesses would result in deception in many cases, 
because persuas10n exists in different degrees; that the orthodox 
mode of expressing the quality of probative force by a witness or 
a judge is not accurate. Their deplorably defective modes are : 
'I know - I believe - the fact happened so and so - I believe it 
96. Ibid. P 220. 
97. Ibid. P 232. 
98. Id. 
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h d d d h h d · , 99 appene so an so: an t ere t e gra at10n ends .. According 
to Bentham this mode of expression gives testimony a degree of effect 
greater tha 't tIt th' th . d f h' 100 n 1 s ac ua s reng 1n e m1n 0 t e w1tness, 
Bentham believed that the only adequate mode of expressing degrees 
101 
of persuasion is by numbers, He saw in the practice of wager and 
insurance a parallel which though in exact course its scale is finite, 
is harmless since '[hJappily, incorrect as it 1S, its incorrectness 
will not be found attended with any practical inconvenience; since, 
on each occasion, whatever degree of correctness can on that occasion 
be of any use, can always be attained.' .102 For this purpose Bentham 
d d h ' h f ,103 1 a vance 1S t ermometer 0 persuaS10n; a sea e for measurement 
of probative force. It has a positive and a negative side. The 
positive part was meant to be used for the expression of the degrees 
of persuasion affirming the existence of a fact, The negative part 
for expressing degrees of persuasion disaffirming or denying the 
existence of the same fact, The positive part consists of degrees 
from zero to ten. The negative part consists of degrees from zero 
to minus ten. The intensity of persuasion in favour of the existence 
of the fact can be calculated by adding the different expressions of 
probative force on the positive side of the scale. The total sum of 
the degrees of persuasion on the negative side of the scale represent 
the total calculated intensity of persuasion disaffirming or denying 
the existence of the same fact. The result of subtracting the total 
of the negative side from the total of the positive side determines 
99. 6 Works, p 224. 
100. Ibid. pp 229; see also Ibid. 232. 
10I. Ibid. pp 229, 224-225, 232-233. 
102. Ibid. P 224. 
103. Ibid. P 225. 
82. 
h th h f d d · 104 weer t e act 1S prove or 1sproved. 
The same scale can also be used by the judge in measuring 
and expressing his revised estimation of the probative force of the 
expressed degree of persuasion of the witness. While Bentham 
emphasized the feasibility of the use of the scale in principle he 
d t · b t' t 1 . .. . 105 rna e some reserva 10ns a ou 1 s app 1cat10n 1n pract1ce. He 
also pointed out the limited use to which it can be put when he 
stated 
The use, and only use, of the sort of scale in question, 
would be to enable the witness to give to his testimony, 
or the judge to his opinion, a less degree of effect in 
practice than what it is productive of without the 
employment of any such scale' 106 
Bentham's scale was criticised by almost all his commentators 
and critics. Some of them according to Professor William Twining 
are 'So dismissive •... that their grounds for dismissal are not always 
107 
clear. ' The gist of criticism was summarized by Professor Twining 
in the following passage. 
Bentham's proposal received a torrid reception at the hands 
of almost all commentators. One of the editors of Best on 
Evidence J. M. Lely, went so far as to cut out Best's 
Critique on the grounds that this 'fantastic suggestion' was 
'one of the few follies of a very wise man' ...• Dumont 
whose criticisms were adopted by several commentators (despite 
Mill's attempted rebuttal), was careful to base his objections 
on grounds of feasibility rather than principle. Apart from 
his rejection of the wagering analogy, mentioned above, he 
doubted whether accuracy and comparability would be feasible 
in practice and he argued that 'the authority of the testimony 
would vary inversely as the wisdom of the witness,' for the 
104. Id. 
105. 6 Works, p 226 also p 232. 
106. Ibid. P 232. 
107. Ibid. p 234. 
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reserved would understate the strength of their belief, 
while passionate men would overstate it. 
108 
According to Professor William Twining 'We need not here concern 
ourselves unduly' with these arguments about practical feasibility, 
which involve no rejection of the scale in principle, or point out 
any positive harm it may do. However it seems that the following 
argument involves more than an objection about feasibility.l09 
A witness who says, 'I am doubtful,' says nothing at all, 
insofar as the judge is concerned. It serves no purpose, 
I think, to inquire after the degrees of doubt. But 
these different states of belief, which, in my opinion, 
it is difficult to express in numbers, display themselves 
to the eyes of the judge by other signs. The readiness 
of the witness, the distinctness and certainty of his 
answers, the agreement of all the circumstances of his 
story with each other, - it is this which shows the 
confidence of the witness in himself. Hesitation, a 
painful searching for the details, successive connexions 
of his own testimony, - it is this which announces a 
witness who is not at the maximum of certaintY'110 
This argument by Dumont seems to object in principle to the applicability 
of the scale to the doubting witness. This is especially so in the 
case of direct testimonial evidence where F is a reported perception 
by W of the occurence of U. In such a situation the probability of 
F and its probative force to prove U are almost identical. A witness 
who admits the obscurity or indistinctness of his perception of U 
excludes his testimony by that admission. If this objection is valid 
then the scale will only apply to confident testimony about a direct 
or circumstantial fact. Since the degree of probative force of an 
item of circumstantial evidence according to Bentham is estimated by 
i it, lll the judge and not the witness introduc ng this leaves only 
108. See W Twining, Bentham on Evidence, op.cit. p 64 E. 
109. Ibid. p 64 F. 
110. See 6 Works, p 234. 
111. Ibid. p 224 and I Works, pp 64-65. 
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direct testimonial evidence for the witness to express his degree 
of persuasion about which must be ten (because he is confident). 
But we have already seen that by the assumption of the credibility 
of testimony J is bound to give that testimony full practical 
certainty which is also ten. This renders the scale as far as 
the witness is concerned otiose. Its use in this way by the judge 
will be criticized later. We shall now proceed to consider the 
probative force of circumstantial evidence and how it is measured. 
E. The Probative Force of Circumstantial Evidence. 
Unlike the case of direct testimonial evidence the truth or 
probability of an item of circumstantial evidence is distinct from 
its probative force. An item of circumstantial evidence by 
definition does not prove a perception by W of U, but a perception 
of another F, which even when proved to exist or not to exist does 
not conclusively establish the truth of U. Bentham's concern was 
with the probative force of a circumstantial F (its strength and 
sufficiency), and not with the existence or probability of F. 
Bentham assumed the circumstantial evidentiary facts to be genuine or 
112 probable. The examples he gave in illustration of them such as, 
e.g., the possession of the stolen article by the suspect, are examples 
113 
of circumstantial facts whose genuineness had already been established. 
This also seems to be the reason why they should receive the full 
measure of practical certainty from J. However, this should not be 
understood as stating that Bentham treated every received item of 
circumstantial evidence to be an affirmative item. According to this 
view an affirmative item of circumstantial evidence is an item the 
112. See 7 Works, pp 5-52. 
113. Ibid. pp 11 et seq. 
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genuineness of which has already been established b J Y . It 
follows from this that there are unaffirmed facts which Bentham 
did not consider, (a matter which may be regarded as belonging to 
the psychological process of deciding.). 
The probative force of an affirmative fact in relation to 
a principle or ultimate fact is liable to be infirmed or explained 
away by the existence of other facts which Bentham termed the 
infirmative facts or infirmative suPpositions.114 The existence 
or absence of infirmative facts in respect of an affirmative 
supposition is a real measure of the probative force and conclusive-
ness of that affirmative supposition. 115 This is so because the 
affirmative fact may exist in a number of situations one of which is 
the situation involving the act of delinquency in question. 116 
For this reason the existence of any of these situations other than 
the situation involving delinquency will tend to infirm or otherwise 
1 ° h b ° f f h ff ° ° f 117 exp aln away t e pro atlve orce 0 tea lrmatlve act. For 
example if X was tried for the theft of a watch which was found in his 
possession after it had been stolen, then, the fact of possession is 
the affirmative supposition to which any number of possible facts may 
be infirmative suppositions, e.g. the fact that the watch was bought 
in the market overt or that it was given as a birthday present. 
When J asserts an affirmative supposition he must look out for 
o fO 0 0 ° 118 ln lrmatlve SUpposltlons. If he cannot discern such an infirma-
tive supposition, the initial practical certainty of the affirmative 
114. Ibid. pp 4-5. 
115. Ibid. P 64. 
116. Ibid. P 5. 
117. Ibid. P 64. 
118. Id. 
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fact remains. 119 If he discerns one, or more than one infirmative 
suppositions to the same fact, then he must estimate the probative 
force of the infirmative suppositions and deduct the estimated 
probative force of the infirmative supposition or suppositions as 
the case may be from the ratio expressive of practical certainty of 
the affirmative fact, the remainder will be the net probative force. 120 
Bentham did not raise a number of questions pertaining to the 
estimation of infirmative suppositions in relation to affirmative 
suppositions both as single and mixed items. He failed also to raise 
similar questions concerning the problems which the difference between 
direct and circumstantial evidence may pose in respect of the 
estimation of single items of each, or the combination of the estimated 
single items. For instance, is the same scale applicable to both 
affirmative and infirmative suppositions? If it is, does this mean 
that all circumstantial facts, both affirmative and infirmative, have 
the same level of probative force? Assuming the scale applies to 
both, how much probative force is sufficient after the deduction of 
the estimated probative force of the infirmative supposition from that 
of the affirmative suppositions? Again as far as the relationship 
between direct and circumstantial evidence goes, it may be asked how 
does a ten awarded to motive compare with the ten or five awarded to 
alibi evidence in relation to the same matter? What is the standard 
required to prove a single item whether of direct or circumstantial 
evidence after the revision of B takes place? What is the standard 
of judgment for the case as a whole? 
The fact that Bentham failed to raise any of these questions 
is sufficient evidence to show that his system did not measure up to 
119. 7 Works. p 65. 
120. Id. 
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the complexity of the task of judicial fact finding, either at the 
level of the single items, or their combination, or dealing with them 
in any other manner as a total mass of mixed evidence. For this 
reason attempts to read his infirmative suppositions as providing a 
method or procedure for decision may be criticised for 'reading too 
much into what is best seen as a penetrating, but not very developed, 
121 pioneering effort.' 
F. Bentham and the current Probability Debate 
The current probability debate between the Baconians and the 
Pasca1ian (including the Bayesian) has, inter alia, revived interest 
in the study of leading evidence theorists like Bentham and Wigmore 
in general and within the context of that debate. One of the 
present interests of Bentham scholars is to pose, and to try to 
answer, the question whether Bentham's system of analysis of fact 
finding reveals a Pascalian or a Baconian kinship.122 Implicit in 
this is the awareness that Bentham's system is rough, incomplete and 
insufficiently complex for the requirements of both Baconians and 
P I " 123 asca 1ans. However his writings contain crude forms of both 
methods and probably, a non - Pascalian - Baconian method Le. a 
holistic method as I shall argue. Jonathan Cohen who has recently 
developed a version of Baconian inductive probability thought that 
Bentham's rejection of the doctrine of chances, and his failure to 
make out an alternative structure, was inconsistent with his 
acceptance of wagering practice because, in the words of Cohen, 
'it can be shown that fair betting odds within a suitably coherent 
system of wagers constitute a measure that conforms to the axioms 
121. See W. Twining, Bentham on Evidence, p 59. 
122. See G. Postema, op.cit. pp 38, 43 and 62; W. Twining, Bentham on 
Evidence, op.cit, pp 59-64 F; L. J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, 
op.cit. pp 54-55. 
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of mathematical probability 124 Cohen's arguments would, perhaps, 
be valid had Bentham used the analogy with wagering as a basis for a 
method of decision. However, according to Professor William Twining 
Bentham, 'is only using the analogy in connection with finding a 
terminology for expressing degrees of persuasion; he does not follow 
the path that leads some subjectivists to use the analogy with wagering 
as a basis for a procedure for decision ... ,125 
I agree with Professor Twining's views that Bentham did use 
wagering as a basis for a method for reaching a decision. However, 
Professor Gerald Postema seems to be inclined to regard Bentham as 
providing a method or procedure for decisio~ especially in relation 
to the role of infirmative suppositions.126 
[TIhemodel of rational assessment of probability and 
probative force which Bentham sketches, though 
admittedly rough and undefended, bears a certain 
kinship relation to the recently revived Baconian 
conception of probability. The method of 'infirmative 
suppositions' is at least Baconian in spirit. It is 
designed to assess the strength of inferences from 
a body of particular facts to another particular 
fact, all against the background of already established 
or accepted (though defeasible) causal generalizations. 127 
The opinion of Professor Postema was expressed in an article 
in which his analysis was based exclusively on circumstantial evidence. 
As I have already explained Bentham used infirmative suppositions to 
ascertain the probative force of a single item of circumstantial 
evidence ~.e. the affirmative fact which the infirmative suppositions 
124. See Jonathan Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, pp 54, 55. 
125. W. Twining, Bentham on Evidence, p 64 D. 
126. A view similar to that of G. Postema was expressed by William Twining 
in his draft of Bentham on Evidence. However, I brought this criticism 
to his notice and I learnt that he adjusted his text accordingly, see 
Bentham on Evidence, op.cit. 
127. G. Postema, op.cit. 'p 62. 
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infirm). He did not use it as a decision procedure in a complex case 
involving more than one affirmative supposition, or a number of 
affirmative suppositions in conjunction with direct testimonial 
evidence. To argue that his infirmative suppositions provide a 
method is to argue that he was ready to apply that method to both the 
evaluation of direct and circumstantial evidence as single items, and 
to the combination which involves addition on each side and subtraction 
of the total of the negative side of the scale from that of its 
positive side. But we have already seen that the scale, or the 
scales of measurement are bound to give the same value (numerical 
value) for facts whose probative force in relation to U is not the 
same (e.g. alibi and motive). This view would not appeal to Bentham 
who had no doubt about the lack of uniformity of probative force in 
direct and circumstantial evidence. Though he used addition and 
subtraction in the case of single items of both direct and circumstantial 
evidence, the fact that he did not relate, for the purpose of 
combination, different items of circumstantial evidence, or direct and 
circumstantial evidence, may suggest that he did not have in mind a 
method for the case as a whole. To suggest that he advanced infirma-
tive supposition as a method amounts to committing him to a system 
which omits most of the ingredients of the single items ~.g. the 
probability of evidentiary facts), or assumes them to be true, and then 
estimates those items in isolation from other items without regard to 
the complexity in which they should be seen. It would not be Baconian 
in spirit because it is not eliminative. It is combinatory in a 
crude way. Some of its assumptions, (such as the cascaded nature of 
circumstantial evidence, the subjective estimates of probative force 
by witnesses and judges as a basis for further numerical quantification, 
and the revision of opinion that follows the instinctive nature of 
inference), are similar to the assumption on which Professor David 
90. 
Schum has recently used a modified version of Bayesian theory in 
conjunction with other theories to decompose the probabilistic 
ingredients of each single item of evidence and calculate its 
probative force, and then combine the different calculated 
ingredients into a single calculation for the probability of the 
128 
case as a whole. One vital difference between Bentham and 
Professor Schum is that while Bentham's analysis starts at the level 
of true facts to the exclusion of unasserted or unaffirmed facts, 
Professor Schum, as we shall see, takes in all relevant facts for 
his calculations. 
If Bentham's Rationale on Judicial Evidence does not commit 
him to a method for the case as a whole, or commits him to a vague one, 
his logic, which was probably written after the Rationale, may be 
related to what I shall term the 'holistic method'. His concept 
of facts and his archetypal images indicate the possibility of such 
a method. Since the holistic method will be developed and discussed 
in a separate chapter I will refer to this point and expand it in 
that chapter. 
128. As to Schum see above, ch. 1, n. 51. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen 
and John Henry Wigmore 
A. Introductory Remarks 
One of Stephen's well known contributions is his attempt to 
provide an underlying explanatory principle to the law of evidence 
1 through the theory of relevance. However since the present study 
is not directly concerned with 'evidence' as a system of rules I 
shall, here, deal mainly with another of Stephen's concerns; 
namely his attempt to treat judicial inquiries analogously to 
scientific ones. Stephen's concern about the inferential nature 
of judicial proof and his discussion of its inferential structures 
was also shared by Wigmore. That common concern is the reason 
why they are dealt with together in this chapter. 
B. Stephen 
1. Application of Scientific Methods of Inquiry to Judicial 
Inquiries. 
Stephen's main object 1n his theory of judicial proof as 
expressed in his Introduction to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,2 
was to present judicial fact finding as a scientific inquiry to which 
Mill's logic of scientific discovery could be applied. 3 As we shall 
see his limited objectives and the constraints of the methods which 
1. For criticism of his theory see, Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on 
Evidence at the Common Law (1898), pp 266 et seq; W. Twining 'The 
Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship' in E. Campbell and L. 
Waller, (eds.), Well and Truly Tried (1982), p 211 at 234 and Wigmore on 
proof (forthcoming); For a biographical account of Stephen see, 
Radzinowicz, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen (1957); Simpson, Biographical 
Dictionary of the Common Law; Twining 'The Rationalist Tradition', 
op.cit. at p 234. 
2. Hereafter cited as IlEA. 
3. Ibid. ch. 2, esp. pp 18 et seq. 
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he intended to apply to the judicial fact-finding made his theory 
of judicial proof a very narrow and limited one. He did not concern 
himself with the ascertainment or investigation of the genuineness 
of evidentiary facts. Instead, he dealt with what inferences could 
be drawn from facts which are believed to exist. His starting 
point was an accepted fact, and his concern was with the inference 
which that fact affords. 4 For this reason it is not necessary to 
inquire into Stephen's intellectual sources beyond his reference to 
Mill's methods of scientific discovery. 
Sir James Stephen declared that '[tJhe law of evidence 1S 
nothing unless it is founded upon a rational conception of the manner 
in which truth as to all matters of fact whatever ought to be 
5 inves tiga ted. ' . The facts about which Stephen was concerned were 
facts in issue. He defined the facts in issue with reference to 
substantive law. They are the facts which 'may by themselves, or 
in connection with other facts, constitute such a state of things 
that the existence of the disputed right or liability would be a 
6 legal inference from them.'. The existence of the facts in issue 
can only be ascertained from the existence of other facts which 
'may affect the probability of the existence of facts in issue, 
7 
and be used as the foundation of inferences respecting them ••• ' 
Stephen termed these facts 8 relevant facts. He used the 
relationship of cause and effect between the fact in issue and the 
4. Ibid. p 10. 
5. Ibid. preface 
6. Ibid. p 9. 
--
7. Ibid. pp 9-10. 
-
8. Ibid. P 10. 
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relevant fact as the mark of his definition of relevant facts. 
A fact is relevant to another fact if it stands to it in the 
relation of cause or effect; On the assumption that a theory, 
according to which the alleged fact is the cause or effect of the 
9 fact in issue, is true. He used the types of relations recurring 
in judicial litigation as the basis of his definition of relevant 
facts in sections 6 to 11.10 While his concept of relevance 
indicates what facts may be received by a court, relevant evidence 
which affords an inference according to Stephen is the evidence 
believed by the court '[w]hether an alleged fact is a fact in issue 
or a relevant fact, the court can draw no inference from its 
existence till it believes it to exist ,11 The psychological 
state of the judge in believing or not believing a fact is a 
subjective matter according to Stephen: '[j]udges must deal with it 
as well as they can by the use of their natural faculties and acquired 
experience, and the miscarriages of justice in which they will be 
involved by reason of it must be set down to the imperfections of 
12 
our means of arriving at truth.! 
According to Stephen neither the rules of evidence nor those 
of probability are meant to enable the judges to perform that task. 
13 The only guidance a judge may get is from his own experience. 
When relevant evidence is admitted and believed by the judge 
to exist a further question arises: 'are the known facts inconsistent 
14 
with any other than the conclusion suggested'. According to 
9. Ibid. p 52. 
10. Ibid. p 55. 
11. Ibid. p 10. 
--
12. Ibid. p 41. 
13. Ibid. pp 41-2. 
14. Ibid. P 38. 
--
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Stephen the known facts are 'the evidence in the narrower sense 
of the word' ; they are the facts which are presented to the judge 
from which '[hJis task is to infer ..• the existence of facts which 
he neither sees nor hears. '.15 
By making this assumption about believing the facts to 
exist Stephen reduced his theory of judicial proof to inference 
from existing facts. It is a theory about the sufficiency of 
evidence not its truth, and about circumstantial evidence not 
direct evidence. This assumption also enabled him to consider 
the application of methods of scientific discovery to judicial 
inference: 16 
Inquiries into matters of fact, of whatever kind and 
with whatever object, are, in all cases whatever, 
inquiries from the known to the unknown, from our 
present perceptions or our present recollection (which 
is in itself a present perception) of past perceptions, 
to what we might perceive, or might have perceived, 
if we now were, or formerly had been, or hereafter 
should be, favourably situated for that purpose. 
They proceed upon the supposition that there is a 
general uniformity both in natural events and in 
human conduct; that all events are connected together 
as cause and effect; and that the process of applying 
this principle to particular cases, and of specifying 
the manner in which it works, though a difficult and 
delicate operation, can be performed' 17 
According to Stephen the knowledge of or belief in an 
evidentiary fact is essential for the application of Mills' logic 
of scientific discovery as he based it on the assumption of the 
uniformity of a fixed order in nature. 18 According to Stephen 
15. Ibid. p 39. 
16. Ibid. pp 13-14. 
17. Ibid. P 25. 
18. Ibid. P 18. 
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this uniformity can be discovered in general propositions about 
facts and not by the mere observation of facts. 19 Their arrange-
ment and comparison according to Mill's inductive methods is 
essential. 
Generally speaking, this problem is solved by comparing 
together different groups of facts resembling each 
other in some particulars, and differing in others, and 
the different inductive methods described by Mr. Mill 
are in reality no more than rules for arranging these 
comparisons. The methods which he enumerates are five, 
but the three last are little more than special 
applicationsof the other two, the method of agreement 
and the method of difference. Indeed the method of 
agreement is inconclusive, unless it is applied upon 
such a scale as to make it equivalent to the method 
of difference' 20 
These methods are meant to enable the inquirer to find 
out the true causes of events by eliminating all but one of the 
possible causes, and so it is by elimination that one establishes 
the real cause or causes. The methods of agreement and difference 
for example are employed by examining the group of events which 
precedean effect; if some are found to vary and one or more are 
found to be constant then the constant cause 'is probably the true 
cause, and the strength of this probability is measured by the 
persistency with which the one possible cause recurs, and the extent 
21 
to which the other possible causes vary.' 
The usefulness of this method depends mainly on the powers 
and means of the investigators to control the operations of the 
different events in the group, in order to trace their relation to 
the effect. This is possible in most physical inquiries, and its 
19. Ibid. P 19. 
20. Ibid. pp 19-20. 
21. Ibid. P 20. 
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utility is due mainly to that facility and the susceptibility of 
the subject matter of inquiry to observation and controlled 
experiments which yield visible results. In judicial inquiry, 
on the other hand, both the nature of the subject and the methods 
employed, are not conducive to such results. The same thing can 
be said about the method of difference. That method requires an 
experiment in which a set of events is made to produce an effect, 
and then by experiment and variation of the same events in relation 
to the same effect, those which co-exist without producing the 
effects are mere possible causes, while the one which is absent 
from such a co-existent set is the true cause. The rule itself is 
as follows 
If the effect occurs when a particular set of possible 
causes precedes its occurence, and does not occur when 
the same set of possible causes co-exist, one only being 
absent, the possible cause which was present when the 
effect was produced, and was absent when it was not 
produced, is a true cause of the effect' 22 
The dependence of this method on the availability of both 
effect and possible causes and the true cause for experimentation, 
both before the effect and after the effect, shows clearly its 
limitation as a method of constructing generalisations about human 
conduct. Stephen himself recognised this when he stated 
In inquiries into isolated events this great resource 
is not available. Where the object is to decide what 
happened on a particular occasion, we can hardly ever 
draw inferences of any value from what happened on 
similar occasions, because the groups of events which 
form the subject of historical or judicial inquiry are so 
intricate that it can scarcely ever be assumed that they 
will repeat, or that they have repeated themselves. 
If we wish to know what happened two thousand years 
ago, when specific quantities of oxygen and hydrogen 
were combined, under given circumstances, we can obtain 
complete certainty by repeating the experiment; but 
22. See J. S. Mill, A System of Inductive Logic, (1896) bk. III, ch. 8. 
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the whole course of human history must recur before 
we could witness a second assassination of Julius 
Ceasar' 23 
While recognizing the difference in nature, quality, objects, and 
methuds between scientific and judicial inquiries, and the 
inferiority of judicial inquiries as compared with scientific 
i . i 24 S h h nqulr es, tep en stated t at 
[TJhough the judge and the historian can derive no light 
from experiments; though, in a word, their apparatus 
for ascertaining the truth is far inferior to that of 
which physical inquiries dispose, the task which they 
have to perform is proportionally easier and less 
ambitious. It is attended, moreover, by some special 
facilities which are great helps in performing it 
satisfactorilY'25 
The task of the judge is easier and less ambitious than that of 
the scientist because unlike the scientist the judge is not called 
upon to establish general propositions about human conduct through 
26 
experiment. They are already established in and by human 
experience as approximate rules which are warranted by each man's 
27 
experience and confirmed by the experience of others. The judge 
in this sense is supposed to know the general propositions and their 
qualifications from his own personal experience. This circumstance 
according to Stephen renders the task of the judicial fact-finder 
easier than that of the scientist because 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
To these considerations it must be added that to inquire 
whether an isolated fact exists, is a far simpler problem 
than to ascertain and prove the rule according to which 
facts of a given class happen. The inquiry falls 
within a smaller compass. The process is generally 
See IlEA, pp 26-27. 
Ibid. pp 25-30 
--
Ibid. P 30. 
--
Ibid. P 17. 
--
Ibid. P 31. 
--
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deductive. The deductions depend upon previous 
inductions, of which the truth is generally 
recognized, and which (at least in judicial inquiries) 
generally share in the advantage just noticed of 
appealing directly to the personal experience and 
sympathy of the judge. The deductions, too, are, 
as a rule, of various kinds and so cross and check 
each other, and thus supply each other's deficiencies.
28 
In this regard an evidentiary fact can be seen as an inferential 
warrant for the application of a general proposition or any of 
its qualifications as the case may be. To perform that function 
the evidentiary fact 'must either be proved, or be so probable 
under the circumstances of the case that it may be presumed without 
proof .~9 According to this requirement a fact which warrants 
an inference mus~ if it is not judicially notice~ be strictly 
proved. By stipulating this condition of strict proof as a pre-
requisite for the application of the inferential process, Stephen 
avoided the treatment of most of the problems of judicial proof 
which relate to the credibility of witnesses, the task of the fact 
finder in relation to the evaluation of evidence and the combination 
of its different items, and the process problems of a judicial 
fact finding situation in general. Though Stephen's theory is 
extremely narrow and general its affinity with the recently developed 
Baconian inductive probability by Jonathan Cohen is not difficult 
to discern. His inference rules as inductively supported qualified 
general propositions and his emphasis on experience rather than 
'probability' as the only guide for the fact-finder renders that 
affinity a very close one. We have already considered his views 
on inference-rules. As regards probability Stephen has this to 
28. Ibid. P 32. 
29. Ibid. P 54. 
say: 
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The highest probability at which a court of justice can 
under ordinary circumstances arrive is the probability 
that a witness or a set of witnesses affirming the 
existence of a fact which they say they perceived by 
their own senses, and upon which they could not be 
mistaken, tell the truth. It is difficult to measure 
the value of such a probability against those which 
the theories of physical inquiries produce, nor would 
it serve any practical purpose to attempt to do sO.30 
The same opinion was expressed more forcefully in relation to the 
standard of proof. According to him proof beyond reasonable 
doubt: 
[M]eans nothing more than that in most cases the 
punishment of an innocent man is a great evil, and 
ought to be carefully avoided; but that, on the other 
hand, it is often impossible to eliminate an appreciable 
though undefinable degree of uncertainty from the 
decision that a man is guilty. The danger of 
punishing the innocent is marked by the use of the 
expression 'no doubt,' the necessity of running some 
degree of risk of doing so in certain cases is 
intimated by the word 'reasonable'. The question, 
what sort of doubt is 'reasonable' in criminal cases 
is a question of prudence' 3l 
Stephen's theory of evidence also provides a useful back-
ground for the discussion of the extensive and broader treatment 
by Wigmore of the inferential nature of judicial evidence in his 
Science of Judicial Proof. To that treatment we shall now turn. 
C. John Henry Wigmore 
1. The Science of Judicial Proof: Most legal scholars in the 
Anglo-American evidence tradition treated the problems of proof as 
part of the study of the rules and principles of evidence. Wigmore 
did this in his Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence 
30. Ibid. p 35. 
31. Ibid. P 36. 
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32 in Trials at Common Law. However his conviction concerning the 
importance of the subject, and its independence of the rules of 
admissibility, led him to treat judicial proof in a separate book, The 
Principles (later science) of judicial proof as founded on logic, 
33 psychology and general experience. He expressly stated his effort 
to be a tentative attempt at a science the 'chief service it aims to 
fulfill is to emphasize the subject as a science, and to stimulate 
its professional study.' .34 By the time Wigmore wrote his 
science the intellectual mainstream of the rationalist tradition 
has already crystallized in the form of assumptions and attitudes 
35 forming part of the tradition itself. As a leading figure of 
that tradition, Wigmore attempted to apply the scientific methods 
of analysis and synthesis to evidence. His effor~which interested 
36 
a handful of scholars, remained otherwise isolated until the recent 
probability debates have awakened further interest in the subject 
matter of the Science and its aims. As a matter of fact the most 
sophisticated, detailed and consistent atomistic analysis which has 
so far emerged has for its foundations and its starting points 
32. (1904-1940), see Tillers (rev.), vol. lA (1983); see W. Twining 
Wigmore on proof, op.cit, 'The Rationalist Tradition' op.cit. p 240; 
for a biographical account of Wigmore see Simpson, op.cit; W. Roalfe, 
John Henry Wigmore: Scholar and Reformer, (1977). 
33. (1913-1937). 
34. Ibid. P 5-6. 
35. See Twining 'The Rationalist tradition' op.cit. pp 244 et seq. 
36. W. Twining has been using Wigmore's analysis and charting for 
teaching his students in the UK. and USA; see Twining and Anderson, 
Analysis of Evidence, (forthcoming). 
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Wigmore's Science of Judicial Proof. 37 Judging by this alone, his 
present leading role as a theorist can still be recognized. In 
the words of Professor Twining 
Wigmore claimed that his was the first attempt in English 
since Bentham to deal with the principles of proof 'as 
a whole and as a system'. This was true when he wrote 
it and it is still true today. There has been valuable 
theoretical work by Gulson, Michael and Adler, Jonathan 
Cohen and others, but none of these has set out to 
produce comprehensive theories. Thus Bentham and Wigmore 
are still our two leading theorists of evidence'
38 
The aim of Wigmore was to study and analyse the persuasive 
effect of evidence in judicial trials. One of his remarkable 
contributions is his treatment of the effect of evidence on the 
mind of the judge in relation to the complexity of a judicial task, 
39 its process and contentious nature. His realization of the 
complexity of a judicial trial and the need for a method to aid 
the fact finder to analyse a mixed mass of evidence in order to 
assess it as a whole was frustrated by his awareness, at the time, 
of the failure of philosophy, logic, psychology, and jurisprudence 
to provide such a method 
Nobody seems yet to have ventured to offer a method, -
neither the logicians (strange to say), nor the 
psychologists, nor the jurists,nor the advocates. 
The logicians have furnished us in plenty with 
canons of reasoning for specific single inferences; 
but for a total mass of contentious evidence in judicial 
trials, they have offered no system. What is here 
put forward is a mere provisional attempt at method. 
One must have a working scheme. What is wanted is 
simple enough in purpose, - namely, some method which 
will enable us to lift into consciousness and to state 
in words the reasons why ~ total ~ of evidence does or 
should persuade ~ to ~ given conclusion .•. lf we can 
set down and work out a mathematical equation, why can 
we not set down and work out a mental probative 
equation?40 
37. See Schum et aI, above ch.l, n. 51. 
38. 'The Rationalist Tradition' op.cit. p 242. 
39. Wigmore, The Science of judicial proof, ch. 2. 
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Reading this and other similar passages in the Science the reader 
may wonder whether Wigmore's proposed scheme is a psychological 
one, offered to answer the question "what ought to be the effect 
of evidence 1n general or in a particular determination?'. This 
reading may be suggested by sentences such as "[wJhat we are aiming 
to analyze is the actual mind to mind process of persuasion and 
b I , f .. 41 e 1e . What is the psychological object of such scheme?42 
The object,of course, is to determine rationally the net persuasive 
effect of a mixed mass of evidence. 43 But neither the scheme nor 
these passages were meant to regulate or control the psychological 
process of the fact-finder in believing or not believing a 
particular inference. According to Wigmore that psychological 
process cannot be regulated by logic. The reasoning process itself 
as a psychological process is not logical. 
For example, assuming that the mind has accepted certain 
subordinate facts, A, B, C, D,and E; and that A, B, and 
C point to X, the defendant's doing of an act, while D 
and E point to not-X, i.e. his not doing it; there is no 
law (yet known) of logical thought which tells us that 
(A + B + C) + CD + E) must equal X, or must equal 
Not-X. We know only that our mind, reflecting upon the 
five evidential data, does come to the conclusion X, or 
Not-X, as the case may be. All that the scheme can do 
for us is to make plain the entirety and details of our 
actual mental process. It cannot reveal laws which should 
be consciously obeyed in that process. 44 
In this sense it is a method which aids a fact-finder to register 
and preserve his determinations about the impact of evidence on 
his mind throughout the trial process. For Wigmore: 
[T]o achieve this much would be a substantial gain, in 
the direction of correctness of belief. Each separate 
41. Ibid. P 7. 
42. Ibid. P 46. 
43. Id. 
44. Ibid. P 860-1 
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prof erred fact is tested in our consciousness and the 
, , 
result 1S recorded. Perhaps we cannot explain why 
we reach that result, but we know at least that we do 
reach it, And thus step by step we set down the 
separate units of actual belief, - connecting, subsuming, 
and generalizing, until the subfina1 grouping is 
reached; then dwelling in consciousness on that; until 
at last a belief (or disbelief) on the final fact evolves 
into our consciousness. 45 
This does not however mean that Wigmore did not provide any 
gddance to the fact-finder to help him perform that task. The 
science was also meant to indicate the problems of inference 1n 
relation to the complexities of a judicial trial, and offer 
appropriate steps which are necessary to be followed by the fact-
finder in order for him to apprehend and effectively tackle those 
46 problems, 
The method which Wigmore proposed to help the fact-finder 
1n performing his fact finding task takes for granted the inferential 
nature of the judicial fact finding process. It is meant to aid 
the trier of fact in making correct inferences with regard to individual 
, f 'd 47 1tems 0 eV1 ence, It describes what Wigmore considers to be the 
, , 1 48 logical nature of that task rather than 1tS psycho1og1ca aspects. 
The method aims at describing the logical forms of inference without 
49 laying any claim to describing how inferences are actually made. 
Wigmore made a clear distinction between the logical and psychological 
f ' d' k 50 aspects of the fact 1n 1ng tas . His method is an attempt at a 
45. Ibid. p 862 
46. See generally ibid. ch. 2 esp. pp 22-39, and ch. 30. 
47. Ibid. pp 7, 9-10 and 37. 
48. Ibid. pp 9, 35 and ch. 2 pp 18-39. 
49. Ibid. p 7. 
50. See ch. 3, pp 51 et seq, and his detailed account in parts II, III 
and V. 
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logic of proof as he understood it. It provides the abstract logical 
fOrQs of inference, its possibilities with regard to different kinds 
of evidence commonly encountered in judicial inquiries, the possible 
explanations and corroborations of such inferences, the mental 
processes involved in drawing, explaining away, or corroborating 
51 them. It also describes the manner in which, and the stages involved, 
in the valuation of such inferences. 52 Wigmore also provided a 
chart method for the fact finder to record and preserve his actual 
b I , f d' h 'd h ' 53 e 1e s regar 1ng t e eV1 ence t roughout the tr1al process. 
An underlying assumption which is central to his method and 
analysis is that the process of judicial proof is a scientific 
54 inferential process. since a scientific inferential process 
should have its nomological structures, Wigmore saw in common sense 
generalizations the appropriate nomological structures of inference 
, d' 'd l' f' d 55 for 1n 1V1 ua 1tems 0 eV1 ence. He doubted, as I have already 
noted, the ability of both experience and logic to provide a method 
'd 56 for a complex mass of eV1 ence. However, he noted a number 
of differences between inference in natural sciences and inference 
57 1n the science of judicial proof. One difference is that the link 
between a law of natural science and its initial condition is always 
58 direct and the inference is a necessary one, 
51. See chs. 1 and 2 and pp 310 et seq. 
52. Ibid. chs. 1 and 2. 
53. See chs. 30-31. 
54. See Ibid. pp 3-5 and 38-48. 
55. Ibid. pp 21-22 and 53-54. 
56. Ibid. p 8. 
57. Ibid pp 23 et seq, 27-28 and 310. 
58. Ibid. pp 13 et seq. 
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of judicial proof is different. The conjunction of an evidentiary 
item and its covering law does not provide a necessary conclusion 
because of the existence of other laws which are capable of explaining 
h d . f 59 away t e propose 1n erence. Again unlike in scientific inference 
where the evidentiary proposition can be directly subsumed under 
its covering law to yield the necessary conclusion the position in 
judicial inquiries is different, inferential process consists of a 
chain of inferences linking the evidentiary items with ultimate 
60 probandum. These two characteristics (the catenated nature of 
inference and the possibility of alternative explanations) enabled 
Wigmore to express the possibilities of various logical forms of 
inference available in the commonly encountered facts in litigation 
and the mental processes involved in drawing and explaining them. 
His Science is generally an abstract analysis of these forms and 
processes. 
Like Bentham, Wigmore provided 1n addition to his abstract 
analysis a prescriptive guide as to the manner and order in which the 
probative force of evidence should be determined. 61 He seems to 
regard the contentious nature of legal trials, the manner of presenting 
evidence piecemeal, the practise of hearing the whole evidence of one 
party before hearing that of the other, as important factors in shaping 
62 
the prescriptive standard for the determination of probative force. 
The determination of the probative force of the different items of 
evidence, according to Wigmore, follows the manner and order in which 
59. See Ibid. pp 23 et seq, and p 310. 
-
60. Ibid. 
--
pp 13 et seq. 
61. See ibid. ch. 2. 
62. See ibid. pp 24-5 and 47. 
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h 'd " 63 t e eV1 ence 1S 1ntroduced. Accordingly an assertion of an item 
of direct evidence should be assigned initially the full measure of 
certainty (100%).64 The original value of an inference 1S, however, 
liable to be reduced by the value of any explanation offered by the 
65 
opponent. When the original value of an inference is decreased, 
the proponent may introduce corroborative evidence to restore that 
66 
value. The same manner of evaluation applies to circumstantial 
evidence, except that an inference from circumstantial evidence 
should be assigned a value less than certainty.67 
This atomistic, sequential and timeless weighing of inferences 
and their explanations, and its underlying assumption that any 
assertion about any possible fact is necessarily followed by an 
, f h' h d 1 l' d 68 d' d W' , 1n erence w 1C must stan un ess exp a1ne away, 1verte 19more s 
attention from the most important questions about judicial proof. 
Wigmore's analysis assumes that each and every item of relevant and 
, d' '1 b' 69 adm1tte eV1dence 1S a so pro at1ve. His analysis, for this reason, 
contains no clear distinction between relevancy and weight. He did 
not consider the reliability of the evidentiary items as a condition 
for its use in an inferential mechanism. He did not stress the 
eliminative process involved in weighing the admitted evidence in the 
context of a legal trial. It is true that his analysis indicates 
a final selection by the fact-finder of either the inference or its 
63. Id. 
64. Ibid. p 310. 
65. Ibid. p 3ll. 
--
66. Id. 
67. See ibid. p 310. 
68. Ibid. pp 46 and 310 et seq. 
-
69. See ibid. p 46 where Wigmore stated 'Many data, perhaps multi-
farious, are thrust upon us as tending to produce belief or diSbelief, Each 
of them (bv hYnnth~sls) bRS some probative bearing.' See also ibid. p 25; 
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explanation. But this is possible only if the facts indicating the 
inference and those indicating its explanation are both genuine and 
the inferential nature of the task is conceeded. If, as most factual 
situations in jUdicial trials show, the two evidential items cannot 
both be genuine, then, probative force cannot provide the criterion 
for selection. As I will show in part III of this thesis there is 
a better standard for selection which takes into account the genuine-
ness of the evidence, its particular probative force in the trial 
context, and its sufficiency to establish the probandum to which it 
relates. 
The ma1n function of his chart method as he stated it is both 
to perform the logical (or psychological) process of consciously 
juxtaposing the detailed ideas, for the purpose of producing rationally 
f · 1 . 1 . d 70 a 1na s1ng e 1 ea. It represents the various logical forms 
of evidence and the mental processes involved in them, all the possible 
individual ideas which can be inferred from them, their relationship 
to one another and to the principal probandum, the actual beliefs and 
disbeliefs by the fact-finder of individual facts from which he can make 
his final judgment. 71 
If it can be assumed that a rational fact-finder proceeds in 
accordance with the Wigmorean analysis of evidence (which is atomistic, 
sequential and timeless), then, his chart provides a prescriptive as 
well as a descriptive record of the performance of any particular task. 
It 1S descriptive from the point of view of the fact-finder. However, 
as we shall see, atomistic analysis and the tradition in which it 
originated failed to capture some important features of evidence and its 
70. Ibid. p 48. 
71. Ibid. pp 859-860. 
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structure in a trial context which calls for a significantly 
different approach to the matter. 
109. 
PART II 
THE PROBABILITY DEBATES 
Introduction 
The main object of this part of the thesis is threefold: 
(i) it attempts a simple exposition of probability theory, its basic 
concepts as well as its different interpretations and formal structures; 
this is meant to provide the necessary background knowledge for the 
understanding and assessment of the technical account about the use of 
probability theory and its formal structures for the presentation and 
analysis of evidence in Judicial Inquiries; (ii) an expository 
account of Cohen's philosophical argument against mathematical 
probability together with a summary of his alternative inductive 
probability and its basic formal structures; (iii) and finally an 
account of the objections which Jonathan Cohen urges against mathe-
matical probability and his suggested resolutions of these objections 
under the inductive probability system. While chapters 4 and 5 are 
basically expository, chapter 6 attempts a critique of Cohen and 
some of his critics with the object of emphasizing that both of them 
subscribe to the same basic atomistic assumptions. 
CHAPTER FOUR - Probabilities 
A. Judicial Probability 
As we have already seen evidence scholars refer to 
individual items of evidence as grounds of probability, and to the 
judgment on each item or the final judgment on the evidence as a 
whole as a probability judgment. 1 The civil standard of proof 
which fact-finders are required to observe is expressed in 
1. See above. chs. 1, 2 and 3. 
110. 
probabilistic terms (eg. proof on the balance of probability), 
together with other comparative probability statements and concepts 
(eg. probabilities, values, scale of values, probative force, more 
probable than ... , less probable than ... etc.). Almost all these 
concepts and expressions were first used at a time when symbolic 
logic was unknown. 2 But even after symbolic logic was developed 
no lawyer, up to this day, has argued seriously that judicial proof 
in practice employs mathematical probabilities other than in 
exceptional cases. The issue however has recently attracted the 
attention of both lawyers and non-lawyers in what is known currently 
as the probability debates. 3 In these debates the assumption is 
made that the judicial fact finding task is probabilistic; according 
to one view its formal structure conforms to the calculus of 
chances, and according to another view that calculus is inapplicable, 
in part, because of its incompatibility with certain legal standards 
4 
and principles in the Anglo-American legal systems. According to 
this latter view judicial fact finding employs a completely different 
system of probability, which is termed inductive or Baconian 
probability. There is a third view that, though unrelated to the 
current probability debate, is relevant to them. This provides an 
unprobabilistic structural model for the analysis of the judicial 
5 fact finding task based on the structure of the story. This last 
view will, in due course, be contrasted with the two models at 1ssue 
2. See E. Nagel and R. Newman, Godel's proof, (1958) pp. 40-41, where it 
is stated that 'symbolic logic was invented in the middle of the 19th century 
by the English mathematician G. Boole (1847). '; P. Edwards, (ed~), 
Encyclopeadia of Philosophy, (1967, 1972), (History of Modern Logic.) 
3. See above, n 122, p. 87. 
4. J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable (1977), p 
5. W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality 1n 
the Courtroom, (1981); see also below ch. 8, n. 10. 
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in the probability debates. 
Since I am going to argue that judicial fact finding, in 
the sense in which I am using it, is not probabilistic, I regard 
the second and third views as relevant to my thesis in a rather 
negative way. The second, because of its attempts to exclude 
mathematical probability, the third, since it provides a model 
which is non-probabilistic. I shall, however, argue against the 
claims of each of the three views to provide an adequate theoretical 
basis for the analysis and explanation of the task of judicial fact 
finding. By this I do not mean to say that they have no role to 
play in the task, but whatever role they have it is not a fact 
finding role. This point will be discussed further in due course; 
but first it is necessary to explicate what is meant by mathematical 
probabilities; the mathematical calculus of probabilities and its 
basic properties; 6 and some of its philosophical interpretations. 
B. Mathematical Probability 
As we shall see shortly a mathematical probability is 
different from the mathematical theory of probability, the mathe-
matical calculus and its interpretations, and the pre-suppositions 
of an interpreted system of probability. In short, the Mp(A) is the 
possibility of A's happening, and hence falls between impossibility 
6. For a very simple account see R. Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and 
Probability, (1978, 1983) ch. r-8nd 2; for a lucid and very useful 
presentation see D. Schum 'A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal 
and his Heirs-'-,-(1979) 77 Mich. L. Rev. 446; see also D Kaye, 'The 
Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land', (1979) 47, U. Chi. L. Rev. 
34; Brilmayer and Kornhauser, 'Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions', 
(1978) 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 116; M. Finkelstein, Quantitative Methods in 
Law, (1978); an elaborate and difficult account can be found in T. Fine, 
Theories of Probability, (1973); A highly technical and extremely 
difficult source is A. N. Kolmogorov, Foundations of The Theory of 
Probability (1950); see also K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, (1938), 1872) appendix *ii p 318. 
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and certainty. In mathematical terms the calculation is done within 
the interval of zero to one inclusive. This interval is known as the 
probability scale. Though there are various interpretations of the 
mathematical calculus, we shall consider at this stage only two of 
7 
these interpretations. The first of these is the classical inter-
pretation of the calculus. The second is the statistical or frequency 
interpretation of the calculus. The classical interpretation is an 
a priori interpretation, based on knowledge of a class and its members 
and assumptions about them; from that knowledge and assumptions 
the chances of the several outcomes can be numerically calculated, and 
combined in different ways. When, for example, we determine the 
probability of a tossed coin landing heads to be .5 we do this (a) on the 
basis of the assumption that coin can land either heads or tails (landing 
on an edge being excluded), (b) the assumption that the coin is a fair 
coin by which we assume that either outcome is equally possible, (c) 
the assumption that the two equi-possible outcomes are mutually 
exclusive, ie. they cannot both happen at the same time. These 
assumptions, about the cOin, together with the assumption that the 
probabilities of all possible outcomes sum to one enable us to calculate 
exactly the probability of each outcome We have in this case only 
two possible outcomes which are mutually exclusive: the probability 
of each outcome is the ratio of the number of cases it embraces to the 
total number of possible cases. In other words, as certainty, 
~.e. 1), is represented by the disjunction of the two outcomes, (heads 
or tails), then the probability of either disjunct is .5. Impossibility 
7. The following specialized sources on the philosophical problems of 
probability have been consulted for the purpose of this chapter: R 
Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, (1950, 1962) esp. chs. 2 and 
4; K. Popper, op.cit. ch. 8 pp 146 et seq.; W. Salmon, The Foundations 
of Scientific Inference (1969, 1971), pp 56 et seq., L. J. Cohen, The 
Probable and the Provable, op.cit. chs. 3 and 9; F. C. Benenson, 
Probability, objectivity and Evidence, (1984); see also P. Edwards, (ed.) 
EncyclopaErlea of Philosophy, (1967-1972). 
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on the other hand (i~. zero), is represented by the conjunction of 
the two outcomes (heads and tails happening together at the same time). 
If, however, we have no reason to assume the fairness of the 
coin, an assumption that is obviously necessary for the ascertainment 
of the probabilities of the binary outcomes, or if the outcomes are 
infinite in number, the probability of an event would have to be 
ascertained empirically, and this can be done provided that the process 
is repetitive. This, however, leads to different interpretations, 
Le. the frequency interpretation. For example, if we want to ascertain 
the probability of heads in a toss of a particular coin we perform 
an experiment in which we toss the coin in a finite sequence of tosses, 
and then observe the frequency of heads in that sequence. The 
probability of heads is then said to be the limit of the relative 
frequency of heads in a long run of tosses. The frequency interpre-
tation would postulate that if the probability of heads was 0.5, then 
in an infinite run of tosses the number of tails would tend to be equal 
to the number of heads. Evidence that this is so would be the fact that 
in a trial of one thousand tosses there were say four hundred and ninety-
nine heads and five hundred and one tails. It is important to note at 
this stage that according to these two interpretations the principle 
according to which the probabilities of known ascertainable outcomes 
is determined either a priori (classical probability), or empirically 
ascertainable prior to their occurrence. This seems to be one of the 
main explanations of the general agreement among the 'mathematicists' 
that these interpretations are not suitable for the determination of 
judicial probabilities. Fo~ the first interpretation is normally 
rejected as relevant to judicial probability precisely because it is 
~ priori, and we can give no meaning to 'equi-possible' considered 
in the contexts in trials. Whilst the second interpretation is 
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rejected because though sensitive to empirical evidence, it seems that 
often in a trial there are no relevant frequencies, d i an more mportantly, 
the interpretation cannot apply to a single case. 8 
Another philosophical interpretation of the mathematical calculus 
is the personalist or subjective interpretation. Strictly speaking the 
personalist or subjectivist interpretation of probabilities provides no 
criteria for the determination of probabilities. According to that 
interpretation a probability is the quantification by the subject of his 
degree of belief in the outcome in question. It is the actual degree 
9 
of belief according to one version, and rational degree of belief 
according to another. 10 
The simple example of a random process involving two finite 
outcomes which are independent and mutually exclusive (heads and tails) 
has so far been used for the purpose of elucidating how probabilities 
are determined, and also for the introduction of the different 
philosophical interpretations of the mathematical calculus. the 
probabilities thus determined are known as fundamental probabilities. 
The fundamental probability of a head on a toss of a fair coin is 
.5. In symbolic terms it is written PM (A). 
8. See below ch. 9 p. 226. 
9. See W. Salmon, op.cit. p 68; see also n. 15 below. 
10. There is a vast body of literature on the meaning and criteria of 
measurement of 'rational' estimates of subjective probabilities. The 
following sources, however, are adquate for our purposes, H. E. Kyburg, 
and H. E. SmokIer, (eds.), §,tnQ..17s ip 5-1.1~iq_cti17Q -f"~~_~~~ (1964); 
L. J. Good, Probability and the Weighing of Evidnece, (1950); L. J. Savage, 
Foundations of Scientific Inference, (1954); B. de Finetti, Probabilitl, 
Induction, and Statistics, (1972); F. C. Benenson, op.cit. pp 43 et seq; 
see generally, R. Carnap, op.cit. p 238; K. Popper, op.cit p 48; for 
legal literature discussing the use of subjective probabilities in estimating 
evidence see, for example, D. Schum, 'Empirical Studies of Cascaded Inference 
in Jurisprudehce' , op cit. pp 3-5; M. Finkelstein, op.cit. 
Brilmayer, and Kornhauser, op.cit~ p. 116 D. Kaye, op.cit. p 41. 
115. 
It is now time to turn to two important concepts; independence, 
and conditional probability. Although these concepts are not relevant. 
to the determination of fundamental or prior probabilities, they are 
relev~nt to the derivation of further probabilities when fundamental 
probabilities are given. Their introduction at this stage seems 
necessary for the proper understanding of some important properties 
of the probability calculus and their operation which we shall consider 
in the next section. 
To illustrate the discussion of the last two mentioned 
probability concepts we shall select a standard pack of cards as our ~ 
reference class. The selection or choice of a standard pack of cards 
has important epistemological significance for our purposes. For 
instance we know that a standard pack of cards contains 52 cards, sub-
divided into four suits (spades, diamonds, clubs and hearts). Each 
suit contains 13 cards which are distinguishable from the others by a 
different combination of colours, shapes and numbers. Accordingly 
each card has a property which distinguishes it from every other card; 
while it has certain properties which are shared by some or all other 
cards. Anyone of these properties, or the combination of some of 
them, are all possible outcomes in any random draw when each card has 
an equal chance of being drawn. The assumption of equi-possibility 
is reinforced by assuming that the pack is well shuffled. The outcome 
of a draw whose probability we may want to determine may relate to a 
property which distinguishes a card from every other card ~.g. The 
Queen of Spades), or a property which is shared by some other members 
(e.g A Queen, any Queen), or by all members ~.g. the property of being 
a card). The fundamental probability involving a property, which 
distinguishes a card from every other card is its ratio in relation to 
the reference class as a whole, in our example 1/52. When, on the 
other hand the desired outcome involves a property shared by the other , 
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members of the reference class, then the probability becomes higher. 
The reason is obvious: in the case of the distinguishing property of 
a card we allow for the draw of the equally possible distinct cards , 
which are in our case 51. In the latter case we take into account not 
only the total number of the reference class into account, but the more 
the number shares that property, the less becomes the possible cases we 
have to exclude. This is why the probability of drawing a red Queen 
is 1/26 while the probability of drawing a red card is 1/2. 
It will now be easy to explain the concepts of independence 
and conditional probability. As we shall see, these two concepts 
have assumed a great importance in the debate about the application 
of mathematical probability to the judicial fact finding task. It 
is important, therefore, at this stage to explicate briefly what we 
mean by independence and conditional probability. An event is said 
to be independent of another when the happening of either of them 
does not change the probability of the other. The point is generally 
illustrated by reference to an experiment involving two mutually 
exclusive outcomes like the toss of a coin. For instance if a fair 
coin is tossed and the outcome of the toss is heads, the probability 
of the next toss is still .5 for both heads and tails. If on the 
other hand the assumed occurrence or truth of an event affects or 
changes the evaluation of the probability of either, it is said that 
the two events are dependent, or that they condition one another. 
This situation arises, for instance, when the conditioning event 
reduces either the membership of the reference class, or the 
attribute class, or both. An example of such situation is when 
we try to determine the probability of drawing two successive cards 
from the same suit without replacing the card drawn. The first 
draw, whatever its outcome may be, reduces the membership of the 
reference class. If it also happens to be the desired outcome it 
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also reduces the membership of the attribute class by one card. 
Accordingly while the probability of the first draw is 13/52 the 
probability of the second draw is either 13/51 or 12/51 as the case 
may be. When conditional probability is expressed in symbols then 
it is written MP(A,B) Meaning the probability of A given the truth 
or occurrence of B. 
C. The Formal Structure of Mathematical Probability 
In the foregoing discussion I tried to explicate some 
probability concepts and show how probabilities as simple numerical 
values are determined, and how these values can change or remain the 
same under certain conditions. I attempted also to explain and 
justify in ordinary words some operations of mathematical probability 
with the intention of excluding formal or symbolic content as much 
as I could. I meant by that general survey to introduce, in ordinary 
language, most of the ideas from which formal representation is given, 
and the formal structure of the calculus of probability. As we shall 
see one of the main objections to the application of mathematical 
probability as a formal structure for the judicial fact ,finding task 
is that some of its principles produce certain paradoxes which offend 
against certain rules and standards of the common law. The two 
principles objected to are the negation and the multiplication principles. 
The objection has been raised by Mr. Jonathan Cohen in his book, The 
Probable and the Provable~l However, the critics of Mr. Cohen have 
resorted to other properties and rules of mathematical probability for 
the purpose of criticizing Mr. Cohen's book, and in support of the 
thesis that judicial fact finding is a function of mathematical 
probability. Professor David Schum who wrote one of the best reviews 
11. (1977). 
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of The Probable and the Provable mentioned in his review seven 
properties of mathematical probability. These properties included 
in addition to the properties objected to by Mr. Cohen some basic 
axioms, as well as a form of Bayes theorem which is very important 
for our purposes. Schum's list is as follows: 12 
(i) 
(ii) 
For any event E, P (E) ~ 0; for any events E and F 
where PM(F) ~ 0, P~(EIF) ~ 0. 
Let S be the 'sure' event; one that is certain to occur. 
Then, PM(S) = 1, and for any E where PM(E);r: 0, PM(SI E) = 1. 
(iii) Suppose events E and F are mutually exclusive, then 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
PM (E u F) = PM(E) + PM(F). Assuming PM(G);r: O,PM(E u EJ G) = 
PM(EI G) + PM(FIG). This is the so-called additivity 
property 
Let EC be the complement of event E (i.e., EC = 'not E'). 
c c----Since E U E = Sand E and E are mutually exclusive, 
PM(E) + PM(Ec ) = 1. Assuming PM(F) ;r: 0, PM(EIF) + 
c PM(E IF) = 1. This is the negation rule. 
For any two events E and F, PM(E n F) = PM(E) x PM(FIE) 
where PM(E) ;r: 0. If PM(G) ;r: 0, PM(E n FIG) = PM(EIG) x 
PM(FIE n G). This is the conjunction or product rule. 
Suppose event E fails to condition or change opinion about 
the likeliness of F; ~ PM(FIE) = PM(F). In this case, 
events E and F are said to be independent and PM(E n F) = 
PM(E) PM(F). Suppose PM (FIE n G) = PM(FIG); this asserts 
that events E and F are independent conditional upon the 
occurrence of G. In this case the product rule for 
conditionally independent events is PM (E n FIG) = PM (EIG) x 
PM (FIG), provided PM (G) ~ 0. 
(vii) Let HI and H2 be mutually exclusive events where PM (HI) ~ 
0, PM (H2) ~ 0. For any event E where PM(E) ;r: 0, PM(EIH2) 
= 0, and 
PM (H2IE) ~ 0, 
PM(HlIE) PM(Hl ) PM(EIHl ) 
= x -------- This is the 
'odds-liklihood ratio' form of Bayes's rule, a der~ved 
property of conditional or dyadic probabilities. The 
12. D. Schum, 'A Review of a Case Against' Blaise Pascal and his Heirs ," 
op.cit. p 453. 
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left-hand term represents the posterior odds of HI 
to H2 given E. The first term on the right is called 
the prior odds of HI to H2• The second term on the right 
is called the likelihood ratio of event E. 
Those who argue that judicial fact finding can in principle be 
. 11 'f' d13 h numerlca y quantl le argue t at one of the interpretations of the 
calculus or a combination of them is, or can be, applicable to the 
determination of the numerical values of evidentiary items, and, 
further that the probability calculus can be employed for the further 
combination and calculation of such values. 14 Some of the supporters 
of mathematical probability argue simply that all probabilities are 
mathematical, including judicial probabilities though they can not be 
15 quantified in practice. According to this view judicial 
probabilities are non-numerical theoretical probabilities. 16 
13. See, for example, G. Williams, 'The Mathematics of Proof I-II:~ Ki9~91 
Crim. L.R. 297, 340; R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate', ~~98~, 
Crim. L.R. 678. 
14. See n. 13 above; see also D. Schum 'A Review of the Case Against 
Blaise Pascal and his Heirs', op.cit. p 452; D. Kaye, op.cit. pp 41 
et seq.; P. Tillers, Modern Theories of Relevancy', op.cit. section 37.6 
the uncritical assumption of the probabilistic and inferential nature 
of judicial fact finding by most writers has generated three different 
yet broadly related concerns in probability theory: (a) a general 
theoretical concern in (i) identifying the probability system which governs 
the judicial reasoning processes (mathematical or non-mathematical 
'Cohen et all), (ii) a search for legal authority to support a claim that 
one probability system rather than an other is applicable, (iii) the 
introduction of such a system, the explanation of its principles and 
formal structures, (iv) the criticism of (iii) above; (b) identifying 
the formal structures which can be employed (i) to analyse and assess 
statistical evidence (e.g. Finkelstein, Fairly and Tribe, (ii) to combine 
statistically derived values with ordinary evidence (I. Hacking, Ekelof and 
Stening), (iii) to analyse and combine all types of evidence for a 
case as a whole (Schum et al); (c) to provide a prescriptive standard 
for judging the accuracy-and/or consistency of fact finding (Schum et al.) . 
. 
15. See G. Williams, op.cit. p 297 at p ~i~ ; M. C. Ockelton, op.cit. 
pp 66-69; R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate', op.cit. at p 687, 
and Evidence, proof and probability, op.cit. p 207. 
16. G. Williams, op.cit. p 299. 
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According to another extreme view, judicial probabilities can be 
quantified as subjective probabilities and can be combined by use of 
17 
a modified Bayesian theorem. The former view is maintained on the 
assumption that Mr. Jonathan Cohen failed to make a prima facia case 
against mathematical probability.18 The latter view is based on the 
assumption that Mr. Cohen's argument did not exclude completely the 
19 application of mathematical probability to judicial fact-finding. 
Both views will be considered later on. In the next chapter I shall 
consider Mr. Cohen's arguments against the application of mathematical 
probability to judicial fact-finding. 
17. D. Schum, 'Empirical Studies of Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence: 
Methodological Considerations', op.cit. 
18. See G. Williams, op.cit at p 354; 
19. D. Schum, 'A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and his Heirs', 
op.cit. p 477. 
, 
f . 
l 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Cohen's arguments against 
mathematical probability. 
A. Introductory Remarks. 
Mr. Jonathan Cohen, who assumed the probabilistic and 
inferential nature of the judicial fact finding task, argued that 
none of the existing criteria is applicable to the determination of 
1 the probabilities involved, and that even if anyone of them is 
applicable some of the formal principles of the calculus are 
2 
contradicted by judicial standards, and generate paradoxes. Mr. 
Cohen maintained two lines of attack against the system of 
mathematical probability. One attack seems to attempt to expose 
the inappropriateness of the calculus, and its several interpretations 
to deal with certain tasks which fall outside the scope of their 
inference rules. The other is based on the incompatibility of 
certain principles of mathematical probability with legal prescriptions. 
For some reason known to Mr. Cohan alone, he expressly made the 
acceptability of his thesis against mathematical probability 
3 
conditional upon the validity of his legal arguments. Not 
surprisingly his opponents, being mostly lawyers took him by his 
4 
admissions and dismissed his claim on that ground. Since his 
1. See, The Probable and the Provable, (1977), Chs. 1, 2, 3 and 9. 
2. Ibid. Chs. 4-8. 
3. Ibid. p 118; see also, 'The Logic of Proof' ~980J Crim. L.R., p 91. 
4. See G. Williams 'The Mathematics of Proof I -II' ~979J Crim. L.R. 
297 and 340 at p 354; R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate' .op.cit. 
pp 687-8; see also R. Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability 
(2nd ed.), ~cit. p 44; see C. M. Ocke1ton 'The use of Mathematical 
Probabilities in Assessing Corroborative or Convergent Testimonies', 
(1982) Ratio XXIV, I. pp 61 and 69; but see J. Cohen, 'The Problem of 
Prior Probabilities in Forensic Proof', ibid. p 71. 
first line of attack is at least as important as his second, I shall 
deal with both. I shall refer to the first line of attack as the 
'philosophical argument', to the second as the 'legal argument'. In 
this chapter I shall deal with the philosophical argument. 
B. The philosophical Argument. 
1. Probability and provability 
Mr Cohen seems to concentrate in the first two chapters of 
his book, The Probable and the Provable on establishing his poly-
criterial account of probability through the hypothesis that probability 
is a generalization on the notion of provability. However, the same 
arguments are relevant in showing that the various probability criteria 
are inappropriate to the determination of the type of probabilities 
involved in law courts. The inappropriateness of some of them is due 
to the fact that probabilities are predicated collectively, while 
individual events require criteria which predicate probabilities 
distributively, and take fully formed sentences as fillers of their 
argument places. Other criteria which predicate distributively and 
assign values to individual events are excluded, because the conditions 
for their applicability are generally not satisfied in judicial fact 
finding contexts and for other reasons to be stated below. Another 
important argument is that one of the basic principles of mathematical 
probability is a property of what Mr Cohen referred to as a complete 
deductive system. The mathematical principle in question is the com-
plementational principle for negation. Mr Cohen argued further that 
this principle does not apply to what he referred to as an incomplete 
deductive system. If judicial proof counts as an example of an 
incomplete deductive system, and the two arguments of Mr Cohen are valid, 
then these arguments can be seen as providing a strong argument against 
mathematical probability, and one that is independent of his legal 
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arguments. In what follows I shall consider his main arguments in 
support of these points. 
a. Criteria problems. Cohen accepted the proposition that the 
mathematical calculus is a purely formal system which does not count 
5 
as a theory. From that position he viewed the rival interpretations 
of the calculus and their claim to provide a monocriteria1 interpretation 
as misconceived. 6 He argues that a po1y-criteria1 account of 
probability is possible if probability is to be regarded as a gradation 
of provability, and thus as a degree of inferential soundness. The 
main force of his argument was intended to establish a po1y-criteria1 
7 
account of probability. However, the same argument can support the 
two above mentioned claims against mathematical probability; namely 
that its various philosophical interpretations are inappropriate for 
the determination of judicial probabilities; the complementation 
principle for negation is a characteristic of complete deductive systems, 
whereas the complement of provability is disprovabi1ity. On this 
argument, judicial proof belongs to an incomplete deductive system 
according to Cohen. Since a complete deductive system is a paradigmatic 
model of probability he started with that model in order to categorise 
different types of provability and point out their probabilistic 
8 
analogues: 
In any artifica1 language-system one formula B is said 
to be provable from another A if and only if there is a 
primitive or derivable syntactic rule that licenses the 
immediate derivation of B from A. But the kind of 
provability that conerns us in the present inquiry is 
not purely syntactic. So, to avoid confusion, let 
us speak of a (primitive or derivable) syntactic proof-
rule as being inferentially sound, in an interpreted 
5. J. Cohen, The Probable and The Provable; op.cit. pp 7-8. 
6. Id. 
7. Ibid. P 14. 
8. Compare above ch. 1, Section Cj see also B Shapiro, Probability 
and Certainty in Seventeenth Century England, 1983. 
I ' 
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system S, if and only if the conclusion of any derivation 
which it licenses is true whnever the premiss or premisses 
are. Then the hypothesis to be considered is that 
probability is degree of inferential soundness. To grade 
the probability of B on A is to talk qualitatively, 
comparatively, ordinal1y or quantitatively about the degree 
of inferential soundness of a primitive or derivable rule 
that would entitle one to infer B immediately from A. And, 
just as demonstrative provability, when philosophically 
reconstructed, is always relative to the primitive 
derivation-rules of some particular deductive system, so 
too degree of probability is always relative to some 
particular criterion. 9 
Since Cohen assumes that different types of provability in a complete 
deductive system have similar probabilistic analogues, he argues that the 
characterisation of this type of provability is made by asking three 
questions about provability in complete deductive systems, which can 
also be asked 'as a step towards disambiguating the comparative 
sentence-schema of natural language ( ..• is more probable than 
-.-.-. on the assumption ---), or towards determining the variety of 
meanings available for a functor 'P[ .•• ,---]' that maps probabilities 
10 
on to numbers'. 
These questions are as follows: 'ti]s a typical statement about 
such provability general or singular? Is its truth necessary or 
contingent? Is it extensional or non-extensional? ,11 
A proper understanding of these six concepts used in these 
three binary questions requires a fair knowledge of propositional 
logic. For this reason the very curt explanatory statements of them 
given by Mr. Cohen are of very little use to a reader without a back-
ground in propositional 12 logic. However, the probabilistic context 
in which they are applied provides a useful contextual indication of 
what they refer to. The appended list of some of the terms may also 
help (see appendix I). 
9. J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, op.cit. pp 14-15 
10. Ibid. P 16 
11. Ibid. p 15. 
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(i) The probabilistic analogue of a demonstrative rule which 
is general, necessary, and extensional is the rule that legitimates 
inference according to the classical criteria of probability.13 
An example of such a statement is 'the probability of a number's 
being prime, if greater than 10 and less than 20 may be said -
informally - to be .5, ..• '.14 In this statement we have two 
predicables which are 'is prime' and 'is greater than 10 and less 
than 20'. When predicables such as these are used as fillers of 
the argument places of the probability functor, then the statement 
about provability is said to be general. What is mapped by the 
probability functor is an ordered pair of sets on to a number. The 
statement is necessarily true of the ratio of one set membership to 
another, but it has no application to any specific member of either set. 
Since any description of a prime number as a type of number is 
substitutable for any other description of a prime number within both 
the reference and attribute classes, the truth of the statement is 
preserved when such substitution takes place and the statement is 
referred to as extensional. The soundness of the rule which entitles 
us to state the probability of a number within the class of numbers 
which are greater than 10 and less than 20 being prime is .5, is 
assessed by reference to the rate of success of that rule. The rate 
of success of the rule is .5 because out of the 8 members of the 
f 1 4 . b 15 re erence c ass are prlme num ers. 
It is generally agreed that the classical criterion, on account 
of its a priori nature and the requirement of randomness for its 
application, for which the absence of empirical evidence is at least 
13. Ibid. p 16. 
14. Ibid. P 18. 
15. Id. 
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initially a necessary condition, has no application to findings in 
b th t 1 d '1' 16 o na ura an SOC1a SC1ences. Cohen excluded it for these 
reasons and 
[BJecause this criterion is concerned with the extensions 
of predicables, what it makes probability-functions map 
on to numbers are ordered pairs of sets, So the criterion 
assigns probability-values collectively, not distributively, 
and it cannot guarantee application of the collective 
value to individual outcomes. There is a .5 probability 
that any number you choose which is greater than 10 and 
less than 20 will be a prime, but there is certainly not 
a .5 probability that the number 15 is a prime'17 
(ii) Another criterion that authorises the derivation of inference 
rules which are general, extensional and non-contingent is the 
18 frequency interpretation of mathematical probability. Such 
criterion authorises the derivation of inference rules to solve such 
problems as: 'from a man's being a lorry driver, infer his survival till 
19 
age seventy.' The soundness of such a rule may be empirically 
assessed as a ratio or a limit of frequency as we have already seen. 
But as in the case of classical criteria, and for the reasons we have 
already given, the probabilities in both cases are assigned collectively 
not distributively. The point made by Cohen against this criterion is 
as follows: 
So this conception, if strictly construed, has the 
disadvantage of not indicating any simple, direct and 
trouble-free method for assessing the probabilities of 
mere individual events. If in these terms we speak of 
the probability that John Smith, qua lorry driver, will 
survive till seventy, we are not so much speaking about 
John Smith tout court as about any randomly picked 
lorry-driver:-and we are still not speaking specifically 
about John Smith tout court if we get nearer to identifying 
the intersection of relevant sets to which he belongs and 
speak of him. qua fifty-year-old, British, diabetic, father 
of four children, living next to an asbestos factory, son 
of a suicide, and so on. We are grading a probability for 
16. Ibid. pp 18-19. 
17. Ibid. p 19. 
18. Ibid. p 20. 
19. Id. 
(iii) 
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a certain type of person, not for the individual, John 
Smith. Also since this conception of probability applies 
to predicables, not to complete sentence~ it does not 
indicate any obviously plausible way to assess the strength 
of scientific hypotheses in relation to experimental 
evidence. 20 
The probabilistic analogue of rules of demonstrative inference 
which are general, contingent and non-extensional is the propensity 
criterion of probability.21 That criterion envisages probability 
as a physical connection between two characteristics or properties. 22 
Though predicables are used to fill the argument places of the 
probability functor, what is predicated is a characteristic, not a 
relation between extensions. One of the two examples he gave 
involved the explanation of two co-extensive properties in two 
different kinds of objects. He stated this as follows: 
For example the property of elasticity can be defined 
(for macroscopic objects) in non-chemical terms. But 
to explain why a particular kind of thing has such 
elasticity might conceivably involve reference to the 
fact that that kind of thing has a certain molecular 
structure which is coexistensive with the property of 
elasticity. So the explanation would be essentially 
non-extensional. 23 
However, according to Mr. Cohen since the inferential soundness of 
such rules depends on the strength of the physical connection between 
the characteristics when the connection must be 'immune to inter-
24 ference by other causal factors', the propensity conception of 
probability is applicable only under these conditions or 'only 
when some actual or possible scientific theory is supposed, as perhaps 
ideally in atomic physics, to predict or explain the precise strength 
of the particular connection involved, quite apart from sample-based 
25 
estimates of that strength.'. 
20. Ibid. pp 20-21. 
21. Ibid. P 22. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24_ Ih;n_ n 21_ 
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(iv) The conceptions of probability so far considered provide 
criteria of inferential soundness which are general. Mr. Cohen 
considered next another type of inference rule which is singular, 
and which is either necessary or contingent, together with analogous 
b b "l" f " 26 pro a 1 1ty unct10ns. Since these functions take as fillers of 
their argument places fully formed sentences they can provide for 
individual events. 27 He gave as an example of the criterion of such 
rules the logical interpretation of probability which allowed the 
assignment of probabilities to propositions reporting events rather 
28 than the events themselves. Carnap's programme of inductive 
logic provides an example where inferences are necessarily true 
according to the range measurements that exist between an evidential 
report and a hypothesis 'where the range of a sentence ~ in a 
language-system L is the class of those state-descriptions in L -
teo descriptions of possible worlds - in which s holds true.,.29 
Though this conception of probability provides for individual 
propositions about individual events, one of its main shortcomings 
is that: 
But even if such a conception can be adapted, as is 
notoriously difficult, to languages of richer structure 
than monadic first-order predicate calculus, it seems 
inevitably to confront its users with the need to make some 
evidentially unsupported decision, like the choice of 
a preferred Carnapian range-measure out of an infinity 
of available ones. Such a decision might sometimes be 
a matter of considered policy as regards the degree to 
which prior probabilities should be allowed to influence 
our calculations. But there seems no way in which the 
decision can be appraised for truth or falsity in the 
light of empirically discoverable facts. So, as a 
philosophical reconstruction of how people actually 
26. Ibid. P 24. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
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reason with one another, the logical theory of probability 
is applicable only where some such a priori decision may 
legitimately be imputed. 30 
(v) Finally Mr. Cohen considered probability statements as 
psychological or epistemological ones analogous to single inference 
rules which are empirically validated and their inferential soundness 
is determined by asking: 
[H]ow strongly a rational man does, or should, believe in 
the truth of the conclusion when the truth of the premiss 
is given him. The inferential soundness of a rule deriving 
B from A might thus be calibrated in terms of the lowest odds 
at which a man who distributes all his wagers coherently 
might bet on B if given A, where at least a necessary 
condition for coherence is that the bettor should not 
distribute his bets in such a way as to ensure an over-all 
loss of moneY.31 
He dismissed this criterion on account of its irrationality, because: 
[I]t is not easy to become so rational, well-informed and 
conventionally motivated and because, with wins being 
undiscoverable, betting on open-ended generalisations is 
hardly an appropriate activity for rational men, few 
researchers in the natural or social sciences have in fact 
adopted this personalist approach. 32 
Since the issue of criteria is essential for any argument 
for or against mathematical probability, it is essential for Mr. Cohen 
to argue that none of the existing criteria are applicable to the 
quantification of judicial probability, and the fact that his claim 
is conceded in this respect does not detract from the force of his 
33 
argument. However, while Mr. Cohen's analysis is relevant insofar 
as it argues that the existing criteria of mathematical probability do 
not deal with individual and unique events, either because their rules 
30. Ibid P 25. 
31. Ibid. pp 25-26 
32. Ibid. p 27 
33. For a review of Cohen's book by a philosopher, see, Isaac Levi: 
'Support and Surprize: L. J. Cohen's view of Inductive Support', (1979) 
30 Brit. J. Phil. Sci. p 279; 
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of inference predicate generally or their inapplicability to types 
of events about which judicial fact finding inquiries are concerned , 
that analysis is also relevant for a different purpose. It supports, 
in my opinion, the point I have made earlier that the modelling of 
probabilistic reasoning on demonstrative models of reasoning, based on 
the assumption that probability 'is likeliness to be true', has 
resulted in theories of probability which conceived of truth in a time-
less context of predicables and properties, which are appropriate to 
34 
such treatment. However, when the main subject matter of judicial 
proof is seen as the investigation of co-existences and co-occurrences 
which are not timeless, then the limitations of such reasoning to deal 
35 
with these problems are obvious. When this point is developed 
further later, it will be urged against both Mr. Cohen and his opponents. 
b. Another of Mr. Cohen's arguments concerns the complementation 
principle for negation. The thrust of that argument is that the 
mathematical complementation principle for negation is a property of 
complete deductive systems. It does not apply to what he termed 
incomplete systems which deal with the weight of evidence. The 
argument is important because if it is valid, it excludes not only 
mathematical probability, on account of the absence of reliable criteria 
for the quantification of judicial probabilities and the alleged 
incompatibilities of the properties of the mathematical calculus with 
legal standards and prescriptions, but also the calculus as a formal 
structure for judicial fact-finding tasks. Since this argument is the 
only direct argument made by Mr. Cohen against the calculus of mathe-
matical probability, and in view of the fact that the argument received 
no serious attention from his critics, I shall state it and try to 
elaborate it and illustrate it with some examples. 
34. See above, ch. 1, Section C. 
35. See below ch. 10. , 
I 
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(i) What systems are complete? For Mr. Cohen a system 'is 
complete just so long as any formula B is provable from the axioms 
if and only if not-B is not provable.' .36 The demonstrative provability 
of A on B in such a system is one, ego P[A,BJ equals 1 is the limiting 
case of probability. Accordingly the probability of not-B equals zero, 
37 
which means that not-B is not provable from A. While the use of the 
undefined term 'not provable' can be understood as narrowing the concept 
of a complete deductive system to a system affording demonstrative 
provability, as in the example he gave: 
(ii) 
Hence,if we conceive this limiting-case as an instance of 
provability in a complete system, we may take P[not-B, AJ 
= 0 to state that not-B is not provable from A; and, in 
general, the probability of B on A should be expected to 
vary inversely with the probability of not-B on A. For 
we cannot, in such a complete system, assert anything about 
the non-probability or non-provability of B except in terms 
that imply asserting something about the probability or 
provability of not-B. What emerges is the familiar 
complementational principle for negation: P[B,AJ = 1 -
P[not-B,AJ. Completeness,as a property of certain 
deductive systems, may thus be viewed as a limiting-case 
of probabilistic complementationalitY.38 
Negation in incomplete systems. Mr. Cohen deduced from the 
above argument two further arguments. One of them is that incomplete 
39 
systems whose probabilistic analogue has much in common with Keynes 
'weight of evidence' have no complementational negation. The second 
argument is that the gradation of evidence for proving a proposition 
B does not count as a gradation of the inferability or non-inferability 
of not-B in the case of incomplete deductive systems and their 
40 probabilistic analogues. Since the author seems to regard the second 
36. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, op.cit. p 34 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Ibid. P 36. 
40. Ibid. P 37. 
--
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argument as a corollary of the first argument, while it is not, and 
did not explain each of them separately, I shall try to explain each 
of them separatetly by means of illustrations. 
The first argument refers to a situation where both Band 
not-B are irrelevant under A. If one may add another horrible 
example to those provided by Wesley Salmon one can provide a vivid 
illustration of Mr. Cohen's argument~l Let us, for example, inquire 
as to what is the probability of getting an ace on a toss of a coin? 
In the light of our knowledge of the world the definite answer is 
zero. Now let us further ask what is the probability of no ace on the 
same toss. At first it may be thought to be one which, if true, would 
exclude our illustration. This is possible only if we construe no 
ace to mean the absence of an ace on an outcome of a toss of a coin, 
and since that absence is a sure event then the probability would be 
one. According to this reasoning what we negate is the concept of 
an ace or its non-occurrence. However, when our referent is an entity 
other than an ace then the complement of no ace must be something other 
than an ace. In that sense it may be any object you choose which is 
not an ace. It may be determinable, as is usually the case, with 
reference to an inference rule which does not only determine the 
probability of an ace but the probability of no-ace. If the meaning 
of the expression 'no-ace' is to be understood in this last context, 
then it should mean any card in a pack of cards other than an ace. 
The probability of no ace can therefore be seen to be zero. Since A 
proves neither B nor not-B I shall refer to this situation as one of 
non-provability. In this case the non-complementation principle holds: 
but only because A is irrelevant to both B and not-B. 
According to the second argument the gradation of the inferability 
of B in an incomplete system depends on the amount of evidence in 
favour of B. The positive evidence which entitles us to infer B does 
not provide inferability for not-B. Acccordingly the inferability of 
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not-B is possible only on positive evidence favouring that conclusion. 
Only if the evidence were, on balance, in favour of not-B, 
would we instead, by grading the amount of relevant evidence 
we have, obtain a positive gradation of inferabi1ity for not-B. 
So, when we obtain a positive gradation of inferabi1ity for 
a proposition from possible evidence, we obtain none for its 
negation. In other words,where the truth of A is not itself 
disprovable, if P[B,A] > 0, , then P[not-B, A] = 0. But 
the converse does not hold -the negation principle is non-
comp1ementationa1 - since A might be indecisive or wholly 
irrelevant in regard to B. The evidence might neither favour 
B on balance nor not-B. We should then have both P[B,A] = 0 
and P[not-B,A] = O. And this is like saying that in an 
incomplete deductive system it does not hold that, if not-B 
is not provable from A, then B is so provable, since it might 
be the case that neither B nor not-B is provab1e. 42 
It is clear from the above quotation that Cohen's second argument applies 
to situations where his first argument holds (eg. where A might be 
indecisive or wholly irrelevant in regard to B). However, I think 
that the second argument is capable of being applied to other contexts 
as well, (ie. where both Band not-B are provable, but not-B is not a 
determinate logical complement of B). The point can be clarified 
by contrasting the nature of comp1ementationa1ity in a complete system 
with negation within incomplete systems. 
C. Inductive Probability 
1. Its distinctive features 
Mr Cohen concluded from the argument in the previous discussion 
that a concept of probability different from mathematical probability 
exists. He refers to such a concept as inductive or Baconian 
43 probability. 
44 His concept has a different structure from that of 
mathematical probability and grades probabilities in a comparative 
42. The Probable and the Provable, p. 37. 
43. Ibid. P 43, pp 121 et seq. 
44. Ibid. P 41, p 217 et seq. 
45 
or ordinal manner. 
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My point will be that alongside the various concepts of 
mathematical probability - i.e. the concepts which conform 
to the familiar principles of the mathematical calculus -
there is at least one other kind of concept which has a 
rather different structure. This other kind of concept, 
which I shall call 'inductive probability', is not just 
a loose and popular form of mathematical probability. 
It differs from mathematical probability as a square 
differs from a circle rather than as a chalk - on -
blackboard circle differs from a geometically perfect 
circle. For example, it has quite different principles 
for negation and conjunction. Moreover, it involves a 
comparative or ordinal gradation of probability rather 
than a quantitative and measurable one. So it lends 
itself particularly well to use in areas of reasoning 
where it is not possible to count or measure the evidence. 46 
a. Inference Rules: The inference rules for inductive probability 
are universally quantified and suitably qualified conditionals. 47 
The quantification and qualification of these conditionals is the 
48 function of his concept of inductive support. Inductive support 
is obtained for a generalisation or a hypothesis by testing it with 
proper controls under experimentally varied conditions anyone of 
49 
which may operate unfavourably against the generalisation. The 
support of a generalisation depends on the number and complexity 
of the tests it passes without falsification, and the number of 
50 qualifications in respect of those tests which it fails to pass. 
The concept of inductive support is itself a developed version of the 
eliminative induction of Bacon and Mill. 5l Though Mr. Cohen devoted 
45. Ibid. pp 41, 122. 
46. Ibid. pp 40-41. 
47. Ibid. P 40, pp 202 et seq. 
48. Ibid. pp 129 et seq 
49. Ibid. ch. 13. 
50. Ibid. chs. 13 and 14. 
51. Ibid. pp 42 and 144 ~ seq. 
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a considerable part of his book to the grading of inductive support,52 
53 
its logical syntax and its relation to both inductive and mathematical 
probabilities,54 yet the type of generalisations invoked in the law 
courts, according to Cohen, to warrant inferences are not the product 
of such rigorous techniques. According to Cohen these common-place 
generalisations and their necessary qualifications are always part of 
the stock of knowledge of the fact-finder. 
The main commonplace generalizations themselves are for the 
most part too essential a part of our culture for there to 
be any serious disagreement about them. They are learned 
from shared experiences, or taught by proverb, myth, legend, 
history, literature, drama, parental advice, and the mass 
media· 55 
Mr Cohen gave many examples of these rough generalisations together 
with some of the conditions which are either normal or abnormal for 
56 their application. It is sufficient, however, to give an example 
here. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
Perhaps a policeman swears, and defending counsel accepts, 
that the accused was found at 3 a.m. in the garden of a 
house which had just been burgled, and also that the stolen 
jewels where then in his pocket. The conclusion proposed by 
the prosecution is that the accused was the burglar. The 
rough generalization tacitly invoked as a licence for this 
inference might be that normally, if an object has been moved 
from its usual place and a man is found nearby immediately 
afterwards in possession of the object, then he deliberately 
removed it himself. So the defence has to try to prove, 
in effect, that this generalization is inapplicable to the 
situation in question. Perhaps, for example, the defence 
can produce testimony alleging that some other stranger 
also was in the garden immediately after the burglary and 
that the defendant merely picked up, with the intention of 
returning, what the other man had dropped. Clearly the 
presence of one or more other people is one relevant variable 
for such generalizations as that tacitly invoked by the 
Ibid. ch. 13. 
--
Ibid. ch. 14. 
--
Ibid. ch. 15. 
Ibid. p 275. 
--
See for example, Ibid. pp 5, 19-20, 40, 122, 169, 248-251, 202-203. 
. 57 prosecutlon. 
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Since all rough generalizations are qualified in many respects, all 
that the evidence invoked by the generalisation assumes is that if 
all other conditions are normal then the generalisation applies. 58 
It is open to the other party to prove any of the various other facts 
which are abnormal or unfavourable to the generalisation and tend to 
59 
explain it away. He can also establish another fact or facts which 
support a different conclusion from that proposed by his opponent 
under a generalisation which may be consistent with the facts proposed 
60 by his opponent, or by denying those facts altogether. 
b. Formal Structures: It has already been mentioned that 
inductive probability differs basically from mathematical probability 
in certain important respects. It is important to mention here 
some of the structutaldifferences before discussing Cohen's legal 
arguments against mathematical probability. 
differences can be summarized as follows: 6l 
The main relevant 
(i) The first difference relates to the scale properties of the two 
probabilities. The gradation of inductive probability is ordinal 
or comparative, it cannot be quantified. It is a scale which has 
no discrete degrees of quantification like the fixed numerical interval 
of the mathematical scale. For example, the inductive probability of 
A on B may be equal to, greater than, or less than the inductive 
probability of A on not-B. It follows from this property that 
57. Ibid. P 248. 
58. Ibid. P 247. 
59. Id. 
60. Ibid. P 249. 
61. For other differences see ibid. pp 217-220. 
-----
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the inductive probabilities cannot be quantified. 62 
(ii) The negation principle for inductive probability is not 
complementational, i.e. if the inductive probability of H is greater 
than 0 then the inductive probability of not-H equals o. Cohen 
refers to the probability of Hand no-H as their monadic probability. 
For conditional probabilities he used the term dyadic probabilities, 
i.e. if the inductive probability of H given E is greater than 0, 
then the inductive probability of not-H given E must equal 0. 63 . 
(iii) The conjunction principle for inductive probability is not 
multiplicative, the monadic conjunction of two or more conjuncts 
equals the probability of either of them if they are equal or that 
of the less probable conjunct if they are not. The same rule applies 
to dyadic probabilities, i.e. if the inductive probability of HI on E 
is equal or greater than the inductive probability of H2 on E then the 
inductive probability of HI and H2 on E is equal to the inductive 
probability of H2 on E. 64 . 
Cohen argues further that his inductive probability faces 
none of the paradoxes which the application of mathematical probability 
to judicial proof generates. Cohen's arguments in that regard are the 
subject of the next chapter. 
62. Ibid. pp 74 et seq; see a10s pp 221 and 270. 
63. Ibid. pp 58,61, 220-221, 265-268. 
64. Ibid. P 221. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Cohen's Legal Arguments Against Mathematical 
Probability 
A. The Difficulties 
We have already seen some of Cohen's objections against the 
mathematical calculus as a formal structure for judicial proof. In 
what follows we shall consider five of the six paradoxes which he 
claims that the mathematicist has to face. The five difficulties 
to be considered are ones about, conjunction, inference upon inference, 
negation, proof beyond reasonable doubt, corroboration and convergence. 
According to Mr Cohen the seriousness of his arguments against the 
mathematical analysis of judicial probability is not only derived from 
the number of these paradoxes but also 'from the accumulation of 
1 
at least six widely different paradoxes.'. 
1. The difficulty about conjunction: 
The first difficulty relates to the conjunction of co-ordinate 
2 
component issues in a civil suit. If, for example, a plaintiff 
has to prove both the making of a contract and its breach, the standard 
of proof in civil cases requires him to prove his overall case on the 
balance of probabilities. This means that the probability of the 
case as a whole must be greater than that of his opponent. On a 
mathematical probability scale the balance of probability in favour of 
a successful plaintiff must be more than .5. On a mathematical 
analysis, the objection proceeds, the plaintiff may fail to prove his 
overall case on a balance of probability even when he succeeds in 
proving each component issue on a balance of probability. This is 
1. J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, p 117. 
2. Ibid. pp. 58, et seq 
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so because of the multiplicative nature of the conjunction principle 
for the mathematical probability. If the plaintiff in the example 
just given succeeds in proving each component issue at a .7 level 
of probability the product of the two probabilities will still be 
less than .5. This problem worsens progressively with the increase 
in the number of a party's component issues. 
No similar problem arises for inductive probability because 
3 the conjunction principle of that probability is not multiplicative. 
The inductivist analysis, however, has no difficulty in 
dealing with complex civil cases. Either the probabilities 
of the component elements are incommensurable, in which case 
no probability-value can plausibly be assigned to their 
conjunction and separate assignments to each must suffice. 
Or alternatively the conjunction principle for inductive 
probability gives a quite satisfactory and paradox-free 
result. The conjunction of two or more propositions about 
the same category of subject-matter, •.• has the same 
inductive probability on given evidence as each conjunct, 
if the conjuncts are equally probable on that evidence, or 
as the least probable of them, if they are not. 4 
This objection by Cohen is probably valid against certain 
suggested uses of mathematical probability in which prior probabilities 
are assigned to the ultimate legal conclusions justified by the 
satisfaction, in a particular case, of the initial conditions for 
the application of the substantive rule or rules which govern that 
particular case for the purpose of conjoining and assessing values 
of all relevant items of evidence to the legal conclusion. This 
type of analysis is objectionable because it assumes wrongly the 
transitivity of each and every item of relevant evidence to that 
conclusion. In most types of legal case many items of relevant 
evidence do not, as is fully explained in chapter 10 below, satisfy 
3. Ibid. pp 265-266. 
4. Ibid. P 266. 
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the requirement of transitivity to the legal conclusion in question. 
The analysis is also objectionable since it assumes incorrectly that 
all component issues (i.e. ultimate facts in issue), are commensurable 
and hence combinable in accordance with the multiplication rule for 
mathematical probability. 
Whilst most mathematicists seem to commit themselves to, and 
defend, the type of analysis objected to by Cohen, it is however, 
arguable that there are other possible mathematical uses to which his 
objection does not apply. One argument is that prior probability 
must only be assigned to a conclusion if and only if the requirement 
of transitivity between the relevant value in question and that 
conclusion is satisfied. However this argument is open to the 
criticism in part III, i.e. that the test of relevancy does not ensure 
in all cases a proper test of transitivity. The other argument which 
is acceptable to Cohen is that component issues (facts in issue) are 
not combinable on account of their incommensurability; they are in 
most cases distinct and independent requirements which must all be 
individually established as true or highly probable if the substantive 
legal rule prescribing them is to be applicable in the particular 
inquiry involving them. In other words their 'combined' existence 
consists in their conjugation together rather than the multiplication 
of their individual numerical probabilities. 
I agree with Cohen's result that the multiplication of the 
values of component issues in judicial proof is inappropriate, and 
that the uses of the mathematical analysis he criticised are not fit 
for the analysis of evidence in judicial contexts. Having said that, 
I would like to state that while his solution scored a point against 
the specific uses of mathematical analysis he considered, it has no 
significance for judicial fact finding. The reason for their non-
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combinabi1ity is simple. They are the initial conditions for the 
requirement of the applicability of a substantive legal rule which 
should not be satisfied unless each component issue is individually 
esta~lished as true or highly probable. It follows from this, and 
from Cohen's argument about the incommensurability of component issues 
in judicial inquiries, that component issues when proved to exist pose 
no problem for the fact-finder. It is true that they should be further 
'combined' for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of the 
applicability of the legal rule for which they are the necessary initial 
conditions, but they are combined in the sense of being ascertained, 
and not in the mathematical sense of being multiplied. The genuine 
problems that fact finding poses in judicial inquiries relate to the 
determination of various significant issues connected with evidentiary 
facts and reports about them; whether they can be used to support 
inferences as stated or only when validated by the fact-finder; 
whether all validated evidence reports are probative to the spatio-
temporal contexts of the issues involved in a judicial trial; 
whether some of them may be probative while others are not; and if 
it is true that not all relevant evidence is necessarily transitive 
to the issues to which it is related, then what criteria aid the 
fact-finder in determining which items are probable and which are not? 
It is submitted that Cohen's account is silent on the most 
important issues which confront a judicial fact-finder in real 
situations. He also made a very weak case for the uses of mathema-
tical probability by concentrating on obviously inappropriate uses of 
mathematical analysis to criticize the use of the theory as a whole. 
It is unfortunate that most of his opponents chose to defend the uses 
he attacked as if they were legitimate uses of mathematical analysis 
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5 of which judicial proof is susceptible. For example, Professor 
Glanville Williams has this to say about it 
It seems obvious that common sense must be accepted and 
that the proof should be regarded as sufficient. We have 
to choose between two solutions, each of which involves 
an element of paradox: that the plaintiff fails on the 
case as a whole, although he has succeeded on each issue, 
or that he succeeds on the case as a whole, although he 
has not proved the case as a whole on the balance of 
probability, whereas the legal rule seems to require 
this. The legal rule must be modified, that's all. 
The Plaintiff need only give the necessary quantum of 
proof in respect of each issue. Were it otherwise, 
a defendant could assist himself by mUltiplying the 
issues and submitting that if some issues are proved 
against him to a degree falling short of certainty by 
as little as 0.05, the deficiency must operate by 
multiplication to reduce the probability of the plaintiff's 
case overall. . .• Simi1ar1y, in a criminal case it is 
enough if each issue is proved against the defendant 
beyond reasonable doubt' 6 
It is also urged against Cohen that in some cases the component 
issues are not independent, and that to those case~the multiplication 
7 
rule for mathematical probability does not apply. The formal 
structure for A and B which are dependent has to consider both the 
probability of A and the probability of B given A. 
2. 8 The difficulty about inference upon inference. 
A second difficulty relates to what Wigmore long ago termed 
catenated inference and has recently been referred to as cascaded 
9 inference by Professor David Schum. An inference is catenated or 
5. See for example, ~ Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate', op.cit pp 682-
683; G. Williams, 'The Mathematics of Proof - I - II' [1979J Crim. L.R. 
pp 297 and 340 at 341 and 346; D. Schum, 'A Review of a Case Against 
Blaise Pascal and his Heirs', op.cit p 480. 
6. G. Williams, op.cit pp 340-341. 
7. See for example, R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate' op.cit 
pp 678-679, 681-684. 
8. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, op.cit pp 68-73 
9. See Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof, op.cit pp 13 et seq; ~ Schum, 
Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and his Heirs', op cit p 466. 
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cascaded when the evidence does not point directly to the conclusion 
and a 'chain' of inference is required to link the evidence with the 
conclusion. The issues of credibility, opportunity and motive are 
good examples of the type of evidence under consideration. For 
example the issue of motive in any criminal case involves at least 
three reasoning stages with each stage depending for its proof on the 
stage preceeding it. However since Mr Cohen made his objections 
specifically with reference to civil suits we shall confine our 
discussion to that area of litigation. lO Such a proof according to 
Mr Cohen 
[CJontains, say, a proof of R from Q and then a proof of 
S from R, rather than proofs of Rand S directly from Q. 
For example, the testimony of a witnesses might establish 
a certain probability that A's finger infection was caused 
by accident, and perhaps this causation might in turn 
establish a certain probability that A's death was caused 
by accident. A question then arises about how high the 
probability must be at each stage of the proof - from 
Q to R and from R to S, respectively - if the conclusion 
S is to be established on the balance of probabilities' ll 
He argues that the multiplication rule for mathematical probability 
12 
allows transitivity from Q to R and from Q and R to S while 'the 
courts and textbooks do not normally accept transitivity of proof on 
13 the balance of probability.'. The judgment of Lockwood, J. in 
New York Life Assurance Company v. McNeely, and its approval by 
14 Wigmore was cited as an authority for this rule. 
10. J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, op.cit. p 267. 
11. Ibid. p 69. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. 79 pac. 2d 948 (1938); see Wigmore on Evidence, (1940) Vol. I, 
p 438; see now Tiller's (rev.) Vol. 1A (1983). 
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Mr Cohen's interpretation of this rule is that every stage 
prior to the final conclusion must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 
Because 'a judicial proof on the balance of probability sets out 
to show that the ultimate derived conclusion is probable on known 
15 facts, not to show that it is knowable from probable facts.' For 
Cohen both this rule and its requirement of intransitivity of proof 
on the balance of probability can be easily explained in terms of 
inductive probability. Each stage in a many-stage proof on the 
balance of probability requires an independent category of covering 
generalization to determine its inductive probability according to 
h f ' f h 1" 16 t e support unct~on 0 t e genera ~zat~on. 
This objection is closely related to Stephen's argument that 
for an inference from an evidentiary fact to be valid the existence 
of that fact must be proved or established at a high level of 
probability. This seems to be a sound argument which can support 
a valid objection to any inferential system which does not requ~re, 
as a condition of a valid inference, the 'correspondence' of the 
evidence reports to the reality reported. Assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that the reasoning process in judicial fact finding is 
inferential, atomistic and sequential, then, the following conditions 
must be satisfied for an inference to be valid; the facts which form 
the basic empirical warrant for the inference must be established 
(as 'found' to exist); the inference-rule or generalization from which 
the inference can be made on that 'established' empirical warrant 
must be sound. As has already been noted certain uses of mathematical 
analysis assume the transitivity of all relevant items of evidence to 
the ultimate legal conclusion. These uses violate the commonsense 
15. See The Probable and the Provable, op.cit p 269. 
16. Ibid. p 268. 
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requirement of establishing the facts on which the inference is 
based. Cohen, however, used transitivity in a very narrow sense 
by confining it to a legal requirement which he attempts to support 
by citing legal authorities and made the validity of an otherwise 
sound common sense requirement dependent on the existence or absence 
of legal decisions supporting or undermining it. Again Cohen did 
not use the argument in question against the uses of mathematical 
analysis which assume the transitivity of all relevant evidence 
to the final legal conclusion on the 'whole evidence'. 
not resist the impression that Cohen's main concern was to score 
points against the use of mathematical analysis on the assumption 
that judicial fact £inding, which he assumes to involve an atomistic 
inferential reasoning process, uses either mathematical or inductive 
analytical structures, and that once the mathematical structures are 
assailed the inductive structures should re1n. 
It is interesting to note that while Cohen's attack on the 
uses of mathematical analysis in relation to inference upon inference 
is based on a claim that such analysis tends to disregard the requirement 
of a sufficient empirical warrant for the chain of inference and 
hence assumes the transitivity of proof on a balance of probability 
where more than one stage of proof is involved, his suggested 
solution is not related to these premisses. It is based, instead, 
on the claim that inductive probability has a structure different 
from that of mathematical probability where proof on the balance of 
probability can not be assumed to be transitive. 
But, if the standards of judicial proof are interpreted ~n 
terms of inductive probability, a reason is immediately 
apparent why proof on the balance of probability cannot 
be assumed to be transitive. More than one stage of proof 
would not be needed if more than one type of connection 
were not involved. But, if more than one type of connection 
is involved, more than one category of covering genera~izati~n 
determines the inductive probabilities. A different lnductlve 
support-function is therefore applicable to the covering 
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generalization for each stage; and, as different support-
functions are incommensurable with one another except in 
respect of their limiting values ... so too are the 
probability-functions they generate
17 
Even if it is accepted that the inductive solution offered 
by Cohen avoids the difficulties generated by mathematical analysis, 
it can be seen that the resultant inductive analysis 1S atomistic 
and inferential. Since covering generalization can be used to make 
single inference only, the integration of these inferences into a 
consistent whole seems to pose a problem for the inductive probability. 
This is more so when it is realized that no complex covering 
generalization under which more than one single inference can be 
subsumed is available. 
Cohen's critics pointed out that the authorities cited by him 
18 
are not universally accepted and that there is no authority for 
his claim that in a many-stage proof each stage must be established 
19 beyond reasonable doubt. 
Another objection raised against his analysis is that it does 
not include all the necessary probabilistic ingredients of the issues, 
ie. likelihood ratios~O 
3. The difficulty about negation 
This difficulty relates to the operation of the negation 
principle on the interpretation of the standards of proof in civil 
cases. The negation principle for mathematical probability is 
complementational, ie. probability X equals one minus probability 
17. Id. 
18. See for example, R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate', or· cit . 
p 683; Evidence, Proof and Probability, (2nd ed.), pp 39 et seq. 
19. R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate', op.cit. pp 682-683, :vidence, 
Proof and Probability; (2nd ed.) op.cit. pp 39 et seq. and appendlx II. 
20. D. Schum, 'Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and his Heirs', 
op.cit. p 476. 
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not-X. If for example the standard of proof in a civil case is 
interpreted to be .501 then a party may lose while his case may be 
as high as .499. The difficulty involved here is that 'the 
probability that the unsuccessful litigant deserved to succeed 
b .. ,21 may be y no means neg11g1ble • To illustrate the injustice of 
this rule Mr. Cohen devised what he termed the paradox of the 
gatecrasher. . 22 It 1S 
Consider, for example, a case in which it is common 
ground that 499 people paid for admission to a rodeo, 
and that 1,000 are counted on the seats, of whom A is 
one. Suppose no tickets were issued and there can be 
no testimony as to whether A paid for admission or climbed 
over the fence. So by any plausible criterion of 
mathematical probability there is a .501 probability, on 
the admitted facts, that he did not pay. The mathematicist 
theory would apparently imply that in such circumstances 
the rodeo organizers are entitled to judgment against A 
for the admission-money, since the balance of probability 
(and also the difference between prior and posterior 
probabilities) would lie in their favour. But it seems 
manifestly unjust that A should lose his case when there 
is an agreed mathematical probability of as high as .499 
that he in fact paid for admission' 23 
The objection that the difficulty may be superseded by raising 
the threshold of proof in civil cases to a level much higher than 
.501 was considered by Cohen and rejected. The reasons given 
.. f 11 24 for that reJect10n were as 0 ows: 
I. It will worsen the difficulties about conjunction. 
II. A higher level is incompatible with the meaning of the phrase 
21. Ibid. p 75. 
22. Id.; for further discussion of this and other similar par~dox~; 
see D. Kaye, 'the P~radox of the Gatecrasher and other stories',~197~ 
Ariz. St.L.J. 101; d\- Nesson, 'Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: 
The Value of Complexity', (1979), 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1187; L. J. Cohen, 
'Subjective Probability and the paradox of The Gatecrasher', [1981J, 
Ariz. St. L. J. 627. 
23. !he Probable and the Provable, p 75. 
24. Ibid. p 76. 
148. 
'the balance of probabilities'. And if it is high enough it will 
cause the difference between the standard in civil cases and in 
25 
criminal cases to disappear altogether. 
III. '[E]ven if the threshold is put as high as a mathematical 
probability of .8, this still seems to represent a scandalously 
high level of admissible doubt for a legal system to endorse 
. ,26 de Jure. 
The inductive probability meets no such difficulty because 
. .. I . 27 1ts negat10n 1S not comp ementat10nal. If the probability of 
a proposition is greater than zero then the probability of its 
negation must be zero. This means 
On the inductivist interpretation litigants take part in 
a contest of case weight, as befits the Anglo-American 
adversary system of procedure, rather than in the division 
of a determinate quantity of case merit. The plaintiff 
may win by a greater or lesser margin, but if he wins on 
all the facts in court the defendant just loses. Hence 
no injustice is officially countenanced by allowing proof 
on the balance of probability. 28 
The inductivist analysis solved the paradox of the gatecrasher 
by saying that there is no specific evidence against him which 
evidence is necessary to bring him under an inductively supported 
generalization. 29 The difficulty about negation is one of the 
most criticised arguments of Mr. Cohen, especially by those of his 
critics who deny his claim that an inductive probability exists 
alongside and independently of mathematical probability 
. I 30 
assumption that all probabilities are mathemat1ca . 
25. Id. 
26. Ibid. pp 76-77. 
27. Ibid. p 270. 
28. Id. 
29. Ibid. p 271. 
30. G. \villiams, °E·cit. p 297 and p 340. 
on the 
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The objection involves a policy argument similar to that 
advanced by Professor Tribe against the use of mathematical analysis.3l 
When numerical values are assigned to a proposition and its negation 
the requirement of proof on a balance of probability can be satisfied 
at the level of .501. This means that a party who has a .499 
probability in his favour will lose. It follows, according to Cohen, that the 
legal system which employs the probability for the analysis of 
evidence officially countenance injustice. Neither the objection 
nor the suggested inductive solution, which tries to avoid the 
difficulty by proposing a probability system which does not quantify 
a probabilitY,and its negation is not complementational (i.e. when 
peA) >- 0, PC-A) = 0), is related to the judicial fact finding task 
~n a legal context. However the crucial question for both 
probability systems is whether the atomistic and inferential 
analysis they employ is appropriate in judicial fact finding 
processes? This question is dealt with in part III of this thesis. 
As far as the gatecrasher paradox ~s concerned its analysis 
by Cohen attributes to the mathematicists a tendency to treat 
every item of statistical evidence as relevant irrespective of the 
issues involved. Cohen's own analysis of the situation concludes 
that the statistical evidence in that paradox is not relevant. 
It is not at all clear why it should be relevant for the mathematicists 
and irrelevant for the inductivist. There is one concept of 
relevancy in law and any item of evidence which does not satisfy the 
test of relevancy is excluded. However since some of Cohen's 
opponents regard the statistical evidence in the gatecrasher to be 
relevant it is important to go at some length into those arguments. 
Cohen claims, not without justification, that his main thesis was 
31. L. H. Tribe, 'Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the 
Legal Process', (1971), 84. Harv. L. Rev., p. 1329. 
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'h' d" d 32 elt er mlsrepresente or mlsconcelve • A criticism advanced by 
Professor Glanville Williams in general, and against the negation 
argument in particular is a case in point. Professor Williams 
seems to conceive the basic thesis of Mr Cohen as a thesis against 
numerical quantification or the fixing of the threshold of the 
civil standard at a level as low as .51 or even .501. His 
argument that the raising of the standard to a level much higher 
than .51 would cause injustice to plaintiffs is not an answer to 
f C h ' b' , 33 any 0 0 en s 0 Jectlons. It is the argument of Cohen that if 
judicial proof were a function of mathematical probability then .51 
or even .501 could be its proper threshold. He never considered 
its raising above that level as a proper solution of the problem. 
In fact he viewed the raising of the level as generating more 
34 problems than solving the problem he posed. He found the 
condonation of injustice by the system accepting mathematical 
principles, whether the injustice is to plaintiffs or defendants, 
, b' , bl 35 qUlte 0 Jectlona e, For this reason, and because the mathematical 
principle generates other problems which are equally serious he 
36 proposed an alternative system which he claims to be paradox free. 
Again it is not an answer to Cohen's argument to say, as Professor 
Williams said: 
Whatever our principles of proof are, they are bound to 
produce a certain probability of a miscarriage of justice 
32, See 'Logic of Proof' [1980J, Crim.L.R. pp 91, 94 and, 'The Problems 
of Prior Probabilities in Forensic Proof', op.cit. 
33. G. Williams, op.cit. p 303. 
34 The Probable and the Provable, op.cit. pp 76-77. 
35. Ibid. P 76; see also 'The Logic of Proof' op.cit. pp 98-99. 
36. The Probable and the Provable, op.cit. pp 244 et seq., pp 265 
et seq. 
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which might be different if the rules were different. 
It is a fallacy to suppose that by abandoning the notion 
of numerical probability for legal proof we escape having 
to consider whether we prefer to have a miscarriage of 
justice in a possibly wrong judgment for the plaintiff or 
a miscarriage of justice in a possibly wrong judgment for 
the defendant. That problem will always be with uS'
37 
As regard the paradox of the gatecrashers Professor Williams concedes 
that the statistical evidence is inadmissible against the defendant 
since 'it does not sufficiently mark out the defendant from others.' .38 
His justification of this rule is that 'our sense of justice 
requ1res evidence to be given singling out the defendant from other 
possible culprits. This requirement that evidence should focus on 
the defendant must be taken to be a rule of law relating to proof, 
.. f h 1 1 f ' 39 d1st1nct rom t e genera ru e govern1ng quantum of proo . . 
This view of Professor Williams, as we shall shortly see, has been 
criticised by Sir Richard Eggleston who seems to interpret the concept 
of the standard of proof in an extremely restrictive manner (eg. as 
a mathematical standard of 'more probable than not') which 1S 
40 
sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof. He argued 
that Mr Cohen applied the concept wrongly because he failed to 
distinguish between two classes of case. The first class of case 
arises when the task of the court is 'to decide whether the case 
made for the plaintiff is sufficient to sustain his burden of proof, 
the defendant either having called no evidence, or having submitted 
41 
that there is no case to answer.'. The other class of case ar1ses 
37. 'The Mathematics of Proof' op.cit. pp 303-304. 
38. Ibid. P 305. 
39. Id. 
40. 'The Probability Debate' op.cit. p 678 
41. Ibid. P 678. 
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when the defendant enters upon his defence and calls evidence in 
rebuttal. He stated that Mr Cohen's description is apposite 
in the latter kind of case, not the former and concluded 
But this approach is only appropriate when the defendant 
seeks to prove an alternative version of the facts. When 
he cannot do so, or rests on the weakness of the plaintiff's 
case, the only test that the tribunal can apply is whether 
the plaintiff has made it appear 'more probable than not' 
that the facts are as he has alleged' 42 
If Sir Richard is ready, as he seems to be, to accept the proposition 
that the standard of proof is Baconian and not Pascalian when 'the 
, " 43 I h h k h part1es are at 1ssue , cannot see ow e can ta e t e standard 
to be Pascalian when the parties are not at issue. All that the 
Baconian's require is that if the probability of A is greater than 
zero then the probability of its negation must be zero, But it is 
possible, however, to argue that Sir Richard's distinction between 
the two classes of case 1S meant to show that Mr Cohen's objection 
has got nothing to do with the standard of proof. The following 
may be cited in support: 
In dealing with the standard of proof in civil cases, 
therefore, we are not normally concerned with those cases 
in which the defendant has gone into evidence; though 
even there, it is possible for the judge in the last resort 
to solve the problem of conflicting evidence by saying that 
he does not know which party to believe, and that the 
plaintiff, having the burden of establishing a balance of 
probability in his favour, must therefore fail. Where the 
standard of proof usually comes into play is in cases 1n 
which the defendant claims that the plaintiff's case has 
failed to come up to the required standard'44 
The suggested interpretation is untenable for two reasons. First, 
it has the consequence of ruling out the existence of any standard 
42. Ibid. P 680. 
43. Id. 
44, Id. 
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of proof in all civil suits where parties take issue. Second, 
the interpretation is inconsistent with Sir Richard's reference 
in the same passage to the belief of the court as a standard of 
decision which is incompatible with his suggested mathematical 
standard where the defendant calls no evidence in rebuttal. 
Sir Richard's position on the paradox of the gatecrashers 
is even more problematic. He distinguishes between the 
possibility of the plaintiff suing all the defendants jointly, 
45 
and that of suing them individually. The admissibility of the 
statistical evidence, the extent of that admissibility, and its 
probability to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof is made to 
depend on which of the two courses the plaintiff chooses to take. 
When he sues all the defendants 
[T]he court will not dismiss any defendant from the case 
at the end of the plaintiff's evidence merely because 
there is at that stage no evidence against him. If he 
sued the defendants individually, he could only raise 
a prima facie case against a defendant if he had not 
already recovered payment from two other defendants, 
since there would then be 499 payers out of 998'46 
He considered this view to express the correct legal position and 
for that reason he could not understand the rejection by Professor 
Williams of the proposition; 
That a plaintiff could not even make a prima facie case 
by proving that the defendant was one of 1,000 people 
45. Ibid. P 681; Evidence, Proof and Probability', (2nd ed.) op.cit 
pp 40-42; for the difficulties involved in dealing with statistical 
evidence see, Sir D. Nap1ey, 'Lawyers and Statisticians', (1982) 145 
J.R. Statist. Soc. A. 422; F. Downton 'Legal Probability and Statistics' 
ibid. p 395; D. Newell, 'The Role of the Statistician as an Expert 
lvitness', ibid p 403; S. Fienberg and M. Straf, 'Statistical Assessments 
as Evidence, ibid. p 410. 
46. Id. 
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only 499 of whom had paid The view that the 
evidence must in some way 'focus on the defendant' 
is not in my view supported by the authorities, and 
is in fact inconsistent with the practice of the 
courts in cases in which the plaintiff knows that 
one of several persons is liable, but does not know 
which one' 47 
The argument advanced is that in so far as the statistical evidence 
proves at 'a more probable than not' standard it is sufficient to 
make a prima facie case against any randomly chosen defendant. 48 
Of course, he recognized a situation in which the seriousness of the 
allegation demands a standard of proof higher than the 'more probable 
49 than not' standard. Accordingly he concluded 
The injustice of the plaintiff recovering more than he 
was owed would not in practice arise, and the injustice 
which troubles Mr Cohen, of giving judgment against a 
man whose case has a probability of 0.499 of being true, 
exists in every case in which the plaintiff makes a 
prima facie case on the balance of probability, and the 
defendant, for one reason or another, is unable to rebut 
it. It does not outweigh the injustice of refusing a 
remedy in those cases in which the plaintiff has the 
odds in his favour. SO 
The weakness of this argument is obvious. It makes the 
admissibility of the statistical evidence depend upon factors 
which are extraneous to its potential persuasive force, (i.e. the 
number of defendants sued). While it is admissible and sufficient 
if the plaintiff sues any two randomly chosen defendants, the 
same evidence is inadmissible against any of the remaining 998 
defendants, because it is not sufficient to meet 'the more probable 
than not' standard. On the other hand if the plaintiff chooses to 
sue all the defendants in one action and if we assume that all the 
defendants join in a plea of no case to answer, then on Sir Richard's 
47. The Probability Debate' op cit. p 681. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Ibid. pp 681-682. 
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argument the plaintiff will recover against all of them: This is 
so since the allegation against each defendant (i.e. that the 
defendant belongs to a class of 1,000 spectators out of whom only 
499 paid and therefore there is a probability of .51 that he did 
not pay) is the same allegation which the plaintiff makes against 
each and every other defendant. What makes any defendant liable 
can equally make every other defendant liable. To limit liability 
to 501 out of the 1,000 defendants requires a criterion of 
selection other than the evidence and the standard of proof. The 
statistical evidence is only relevant to show the ratio of one 
class to another (e.g. those who pay to those who did not); and 
for this reason it does not single out anyone of the defendants 
as a member of this or that class. 
4. The difficulty about proof beyond reasonable doubt 
The objection under consideration relates to the difficulty 
of quantifying the standard of proof in criminal cases which 
51 
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. One difficulty relates 
to the fixing of the level the satisfaction of which indicates 
the absence of reasonable doubt. The other difficulty relates to 
the inability of the mathematical probability to specify reasons 
for doubt. 52 The mathematical standard is satisfied when there is 
some very high level of mathematical probability falling short of 
certainty. The mathematical account of the standard does not show 
how high the standard is. It also does not explain what amounts 
to reasonable doubt. 
Even if a scale of mathematical probability were to be used 
for assessing how close a particular conclusion was to 
certainty, the crucial reason for doubting the conclusion 
would very often not be the fact that the probability was 
no higher than, say, .95, but rather the specific item 
in, or feature of, the evidence that prevented this 
51. The Probable and the Provable, op.cit. pp 82 et seq. 
52. Ibid. P 83. 
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53 probability from rising any higher. 
Mr. Cohen argued that it is easy to express and explain the criminal 
standards of proof in terms of Baconian probability. 
What seems to be needed in practice for assessment of proof 
in a criminal trial is a list of the various points that 
all have to be established, and of the various let-outs 
that all have to be barred, in relation to each element 
in the crime, if guilt is to be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt. Wherever we have or assume such a list a scale 
of mathematical probability seems altogether otiose. 
The strength of the proof depends just on the extent to 
which the list has been covered. 54 
The inductivist analysis, he argued, shows clearly the dependence 
between reason for doubt and the absence of certainty. If the 
inductive probability of S given R is not maximal 
53. Id. 
[TJhis must be because the generalization under which 
the desired conclusion, S,is derivable from R has less 
than full inductive support. And this in turn implies 
that the generalization is not qualified in relation to 
every relevant variable in a way that ensures its 
avoiding falsification. 55 
54. Id.; for statistical evidence see n. 4~ above; See 
also J. Kaplan, 'Decision Theory and the Fact-finding process, (1968) 
20 Stan. L. Rev. 1065; A. Cullison, 'Identification by probabilities 
and Trial by Arithmetic', (1969) 6 Hous. L. Rev. 471; M. o. Frankelstein 
and W. B. Fairley, 'A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 
(1970) 83 Harv. L. Rev. 498 and, 'A Comment on Trial by Mathematics', 
(1971) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1801, and 'A Conversation about Collins, (1974) 
41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 242; W. B. Fairley, 'Probabilistic Analysis of 
Identification evidence', (1973) 2 Jour. of Leg. Stud. 493; L. Tribe 
'A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof', (1971) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 
1810 and, 'Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process', ibid. p 1329: see D. W. Peterson (ed.) Statistical Inference 
on Litigat~ (1983) 46 L.C.P. (Symposium). 
55. Ibid. P 272. 
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It is generally conceded that proof beyond reasonable 
doubt can not be quantified in such a manner as to indicate 
the level at which it is reasonable to doubt, and that no 
mathematical scale can explain the reason for doubting a 
56 
conclusion. However, some doubt has been expressed about 
the practicability of the inductive solution. To quote the 
words of Professor David Schum 'I, for one, have difficulty 
imagining a situation in which all relevant points have been 
listed, let alone established in fact.,57 Cohen's inductive 
solution of the difficulty is based on assumptions which are 
difficult to justify in familiar contexts of judicial proof. 
It presupposes, for example the performance by the fact-
finder of the whole fact finding task connected with relevant 
facts. It assumes in addition the availability, in probably 
every trial, of a complete list of covering generalizations, 
each with its distinct support-function for the purpose of 
grading its inferential soundness. It also assumes the 
competence of the fact-finder to perform all the cognitive 
58 functions involved in the fact finding task. 
56. See for example, R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate', 
op.cit p 679 and Evidence, Proof and Probability, (2nd ed.), 
op.cit. p 43; D. Schum, 'A Review of a Case Against Blaise 
Pascal and his Heirs', op.cit. p 481; G. Williams, op.cit 
pp 297, 305. 
57. D. Schum, 'A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and 
his Heirs', op.cit. p 482. 
58. See for example, Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, 
pp 248, 275 and, 'Free Proof' in W. Twining (ed.), Facts in 
Law. (1983), p 1. 
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5. The Difficulty about corroboration and convergence: 
The last difficulty mentioned by Mr. Cohen relates to 
two patterns of argument under the British and American legal 
systems. One pattern deals with the mutual corroboration of 
different witnesses testifying to the same fact, the other 
to the convergence of two or more items of circumstantial 
evidence to probabilifi the same fact. 59 When a witness 
testifies to the fact that P, then that fact on its own would 
do something to raise the probability that P. If another 
witness independently of the first testifies that Phis 
testimony would have some force to probabilify that P. 
Subject to the requirement of mutual independence, their 
combined effect should be substantially greater than that 
of either testimony. The requirement of independence is 
given as 
[T]hat neither fact may be causally connected with 
the other (other than through the truth of what is 
testified). If one witness has been told what 
to say by the other, or is influenced by what 
he hears him testify, or is involved in any 
other kind of collusion, there may be no genuine 
corroboration· 60 
59. The Probable and the Provable, op.cit. p 93. 
60. Ibid. p 94. 
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When the requirement of mutual independence is satisfied in the 
case of two or more items of circumstantial evidence the combined 
effect of such items should be greater than the effect of each 
individual item. 6l The logical structure common to both 
corroboration and convergence is given as follows 
If a conclusion, S,has its probability raised by each of 
two premises, Rland R2 , when these are considered 
separately, and R2 is unconnected with R , unless through 
the truth of S, tfien the conjunction of II and R2 makes 
S more probable than does Rl alone. But how is it 
possible to elucidate this familiar principle in terms 
of mathematical probabilitY?62 
On that assumption Cohen proceeded to consider mathematical formulas 
which account for both patterns of argument. He considered two 
suggested formulas which he rejected because they failed to take 
into account prior probabi1ities. 63 However, he admitted that a 
mathematical account of corroboration and convergence is possible 
64 if prior probabilities are taken into account. The conditions 
under which the mathematical analysis admits prior probabilities 
are, according to Cohen, 'never legitimately obtainable in criminal 
1 ' 65 courts of the English and American lega systems •... In what 
follows I shall consider the two formulas treated by Mr. Cohen and 
his criticism of them; his objection against prior probabilities; 
his inductivist solution of the difficulties; and, finally what 
61 . Id. 
62. Ibid. p 95; but see R. Eggleston 'The Probability Debate', op.cit. 
p 679-.-
63. The Probable and the Provable,op.cit. pp 95 and 99. 
64. Ibid. pp 98, 101 and 278. 
65. Ibid. p 107. 
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his critics have objected against his account. 
(a) The traditional formula. Mr. Cohen considered first a 
formula which he attributed to Bernouilli, quoting its exposition 
66 by George Boole as follows: 
Let ~ be the general probability that A speaks truth, 
~ the general probability that B speaks truth; it is 
required to find the probability, that if they agree in 
a statement they both speak truth. Now, agreement in 
the same statement implies that they either both speak 
truth, the probability of which before-hand is pq, 
or that they both speak falsehood, the probability of 
which beforehand is (1 - p) (1 - q). Hence the 
probability beforehand that they will agree is pq + 
(1 - p) (1 - q) and the probability that if they-agree 
they will agree in speaking the truth is accordingly 
expressed by the formula 67 
w = --------------------
pq + (1 -~) (1 - ~) 
To explain this formula I shall assign numerical values to both 
p and q and then work out the solution of the equation. If we 
assign p a value of .7 and q a value of .6 then we have pq = .7 x .6 
= .42 which stands for the probability of their agreement when they 
are telling the truth. Their agreement in telling a falsehood is 
represented by (1 - .7) (1 - .6) = (.3 x .4). The equation works 
out in figures as follows 
.7 x • 6 .42 
w = --------------------- = 
.7 x .6 + (.3) x (.4) .54 
which is roughly equal to .77. 
Mr. Cohen argues that the traditional formula is limited to 
situations where both p and q are independent of one another and 
66. Ibid. P 95. 
67. See G. Boole, Studies in Logic and Probability (1952) P 364 
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they have a probability value greater than .5. 68 When they are 
dependent, or their probability is less than .5 their combined 
probability becomes substantially less. Accordingly: 
[O]ne common type of testimonial corroboration, or 
convergence of circumstantial evidence, is not 
elucidatab1e in this way. One witness, for example, 
may seem rather unreliable because of his shifty 
demeanour, and another may seem rather unreliable 
because of his bad eyesight. Yet perhaps, quite 
independently, they both testify to precisely the 
same set of propositions even though each could have 
told any number of other stories. In such a case 
Boole's formula produces a lower probability for their 
joint veracity, whereas normal juries would assign a 
higher one' 69 
He argued further that the formula is limited to binary domains, 
and it does not take into account prior probabilities. 70 
(b) The Ekelof formula. 71 The other formula considered by Cohen 
72 is a formula suggested by Ekelof in 1964. The terms of the 
formula and its proposed solution are contained in the following 
passage: 
Let us suppose that in an action concerning a highway 
accident there are two facts tending to prove that one 
of the cars concerned had a speed exceeding 60 m.p.h.; 
length of the braking marks, and a witness who observed 
the collision. We further make the unrealistic 
assumption that by examining a great number of similar 
situations it has been possible to ascertain that each 
of these evidentiary facts implies in 3 cases out of 4 
a faithful description of reality, whereas in the fourth 
case it has no value whatever as evidence of the speed 
of the car. At least if the value of each evidentiary 
fact is independent of that of the other,the value [sc. 
of the combined evidence] must be greater than 3/4. 
But how much greater? The length of the braking marks 
proves that the speed exceeded 60 m.p.h. in 12 out of 
68. The Probable and the Provable, op.cit p 96. 
69. Id. 
70. Ibid P 97. 
71. Ibid. p 99. 
72. 'Free Evaluation of Evidence', (1964) 8 Scandinavian Studies ~n 
Law, p 47. 
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16 similar cases; at the same time this is proved by 
the witness-statement in 3 out of 4 remaining cases. 
The convincing force of the combined evidentiary facts 
would thus be 15/16'73 
Ekelof himself did not show the manner in which the calculation 
of his final figure of 15/16 is reached. Martin Edman expressed 
the opinion that the figure is reached according to the following 
74 formula 
w = p + q - (pq) 
Cohen adop ted Edman's view and proceeded accordingly to cri ticize 
Ekelof's principle. The main criticism advanced against that 
principle is that it did not take into account the necessary prior 
probabilities. To illustrate this point Cohen gave the following 
example 
Consider a case where ~ is .25 and is the mathematical 
probability that the criminal was a male on the evidence 
that he had long hair, and ~ is .25 and is the probability 
that the criminal was a male on the evidence of testimony 
to that effect by a supporter of the women's liberation 
movement. By Ekelof's principle these two evidential 
facts converge to give an increased value to the combined 
evidence of .44. Yet if the mathematical probability 
that the criminal was a male, on each separate piece of 
evidenc~ is .25, the probability that the criminal was a 
female is .75, and so the combined evidence has a force 
of .94 in favour of the conclusion that "the criminal was 
a female. we thus have the paradox that, according to 
Ekelof's principle, the two pieces of evidence converge 
in opposite directions at the same time. Or - to put 
the point in other words - the evidence of the witness, 
on Ekelof's view, corroborates whichever conclusion you 
prefer to draw from the fact that the criminal had long 
hair; and evidence that purports to corroborate 
opposite conclusions does not in fact corroborate either. 
Moreover, if the force of the combined evidence is to 
be conceived of as a mathematical probability, we have a 
straightforward contradiction between the calculation 
that the probability of the criminal's being a male is 
73. Ibid. P 58. 
--
74. 'Adding Independent Pieces of Evidence', in J. Hintika et ale (eds.), 
Modality, Morality and Other Problems of Sense and Nonsense: Essay 
Dedicated to S. Hallden, (1973), p 180. 
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. 44 and the calculation that the probability of the 
criminal's being a female is .94, since presumably the 
probability of being a female is in fact the complement 
of the probability of being a male. 
75 
(c) The legal inadmiss ibili ty of pos it ive prl0r probabilities: 
Cohen advanced two arguments against the admissibility of prlor 
probabilities ln judicial trials. The first is based on one of 
his arguments in relation to the difficulties about conjunction. 76 
According to that argument if probative force lS measured by the 
difference between prior and posterior probability, then a party 
could prove his overall case on the balance of probability when 
in fact he fails to prove one or more of his component points on 
its 77 own. 
The second argument is based on an alleged legal rule which 
does not, according to Cohen, admit the use of prior probability 
against an accused person. The admissibility of prior probabilities 
is incompatible with the legal requirement that 'an accused person 
lS to be judged only on the facts before the court. Hence he does 
not come into court with a certain positive prior probability of 
. ,78 gUllt. • On this view the mathematical analysis of judicial 
proof is impossible since 'if there is no positive probability of 
S, where S is the proposition that the accused committed the crime 
ln question we have to suppose that the prior mathematical probability 
of not-S lS 1· , and, if that . the lS standing of not-S, no amount 
of evidence lS gOlng to alter it. ' 79 Cohen considered a number . 
75. The Probable and the Provable, P 100. 
76. Ibid. P 107. 
77. Ibid. p 108 
78. Id. 
79· Id. 
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of escape routes for the mathematicist's account. 80 He suggested 
ass~gn~ng prior probability to any item of evidence other than 
the corroborating or converging premisses. This would work well 
~n cases where there is other evidence than the converg~ng or 
corroborating items. It does not work however when the only 
. d . h . h b' . . 81 ev~ ence ~n t e case ~s t e corro orat~ng or converg~ng ~tems .. 
Apart from this 
There is no warrant for selecting one p~ece of evidence 
to determine a base-point, or prior probability, by 
reference to which the probability-raising capacities of 
other evidential items are to be judged. Nor are there 
any recognized procedures whereby prosecuting or defending 
lawyers may justify, or juries may appraise, the selection 
of one piece of evidence rather than another for this 
purpose· 82 
The suggestion of an infinitesimally small pr~or probability was 
rejected because there ~s no method for calculating it, and because 
of its incompatibility with legal tradition, and the serious 
difficulties which it creates for the rational analysis of judicial 
proof. These difficulties are: 
(i) The evidence for the defence must attain a very high level of 
probability in order to counteract the prior probability of guilt. 
As a consequence this renders 'the task of defending accused persons 
, 83 
unconscionably tough. . 
(ii) When two accused persons, one male the other female, are 
jointly tried and one of them must have committed the offence it 
is not possible to assign 'an infinitesimally small prior probability 
not only to the proposition that the assailant was in fact a male 
8~ Ibid. pp 109, 115. 
81. Ibid. P 109. 
82. Id. 
83. Ibid. P 113. 
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but also to the proposition that the assailant was ~n fact a 
female , 84 
The solution of the difficulties provided by inductive 
probability is that if R1 had probative value to probabilify S, 
and R2 has also some value towards S, they converge or corroborate 
each other if and only if Rl and R2 are two independent relevant 
variables. Accordingly 
It follows that corroboration and convergence are completely 
intelligible within the theory of inductive probability. 
They are just two different ways in which inductive 
probabilities are raised by the favourableness of relevant 
circumstances, and the independence conditions that are 
necessary for corroboration and convergence flow from 
necessary constraints on the method of relevant variables 
- the characteristic method of assessing inductive support 
and inductive probabilitY'85 
This objection is valid if and only if the case Cohen made 
for the mathematical analysis is the only possible one. If, however, 
the mathematical analysis, like Cohen's inductive analysis, presupposes 
a process of selection which reduces the totality of evidence to a 
subclass consisting of genuine and probative items, then the use of 
mathematical analysis to that selected subclass of the whole relevant 
evidence is not affected by his objectio~ In that case the assignment 
of a prior probability does not ere are a problem since the assignment 
of prior probability and the analysis based on it takes place when the 
fact-finding process is over, the determination of issues such as the 
correspondence or lack of correspondence of evidence to the reality 
it reports, its proving force in the particular circumstances of the 
case, form no part of the mathematical analysis. But, this view 
limits the role of the use of mathematical analysis to the justification 
84. Id. 
85. Ibid. P 280. 
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of 'given' judicial decisions and thus has no claim to the 
assistance of any fact-finder to reach a rational decision. 
In short, it provides a formal structure for testing the 
'mathematical consistency' of a 'given' decision on a 'given' 
validated body of evidence. The proposed role for mathematical 
analysis of judicial proof is not in any way inferior to the 
suggested inductive role. Cohen cannot object to it since 
his inductive probability assumes exactly what is assumed here 
and has no serious claim to more than a formal justificatory 
role. 
6. The objections made against the last argument of Mr 
Cohen by his critics can be listed as follows: 
I. That his mathematical formulations are incomplete;86 he 
87 failed to mention Bayes' theorem, and his use of the traditional 
88 formula and Ekelof's formula was wrong. 
II. 
III. 
89 Prior probabilities are not excluded by any legal standards. 
His reductio ad absurdum discussion of the mathematical 
process which represents it as sequential or atomistic is 
90 inconsistent with legal practice. 
86. See D. Schum, 'A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and 
his Heirs', op.cit. p 476. 
87. G. Williams, op.cit p 346. 
88. R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate', op.cit p 685 and, Evidence, 
Proof and Probability, (2nd ed.) pp 203-207; G. Williams, op.cit. 
p 343 and, 'A Short Rejoinder' [1979J Crim.L.R. p 107; see also, 
C. M. G. Ockelton, op.cit. p 61. 
89. See c. M. G. Ockelton, op.cit. p 68. 
90. Ibid. p 64 et seq.; but see J. Cohen 'The Problems of Prior 
Probabilities in 'Forensic Proof', op.cit. p 71. 
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These objections are dealt with at different parts of this thesis. 91 
It is for this reason that I shall consider briefly the first two objections 
which can be dealt with together. The first objection relates to Cohen's 
failure to discuss likelihood ratios. The omission of a discussion of 
liklihood ratios, according to David Schum, misrepresented the role of 
mathematical probability because '[cJertain features of the PM system 
are not evident unless formalizations involving probative weight are 
d i thi f h · ,92 Si h expresse n s as 10n. • nce t e determination of an initial 
prior probability is essential for the calculation of liklihood ratios, 
Cohen's argument against the admissibility of prior probabilities 
in judicial trials may justify that omission. The same argument 
can also explain his failure to mention Bayes' theorem (Cohen 
insists that he mentioned Bayes and G. Williams persists in rejecting 
that claim).93 
As to the two formulas used by Mr. Cohen it is generally 
agreed that they are both defective and have an extremely restricted field 
94 
of possible application which is of purely academic interest. The 
traditional formula is so restricted because (a) the independence between 
the testimonies or items of circumstantial evidence which is necessary for 
its application is hardly possible in practice, (b) it is designed for a 
95 
situation in which the only options are truth and falsity. While 
Ekelof's formula met the requirement of independence, it is an imaginary 
91. See above Section A and below chs. 8 and 10. 
92. D. Schum 'A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and his 
Heirs', op.cit. p 477. 
93. 'Logic of Proof', op.cit. p 100 (n. 20); However, see his 
'Bayesianism versus Baconianism in the Evaluation of Medical Diagnosis' 
(1980), Brit. J. Phil. of Sci; p 45; 'The Mathematics of Proof' 
op.cit. p 346 and, 'A Short rejoinder' op.cit. p 103 at p 107. 
94. G. Williams, 'Mathematics of Proof', op.cit pp 344, 346. 
95. See I. Hacking 'Combined Evidence', in S. Stenlund (ed.), Logical 
Theory and Semantic Analysis (1974) p 113 at 122 .. 
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case which has no application in real life. Glanville Williams 
described . the limited validity and scope of the formula as 
follows: 
Ekelof stated his argument in connection with a 
particular hypothetical case, and his words clearly 
show that he was assuming minimum, not fixed, 
probabilities - i.e. they were of the 'at least' 
form. ('In the fourth case it has no value 
whatever as evidence of the speed of the car.'). 
So limited, his principle was valid. But, having 
correctly quoted from Ekelof, Cohen proceeds to 
assume that Ekelof's principle was meant to apply 
to fixed probabilities, and then has no difficulty 
in showing that it offends against the rule for 
negation, that the probability of the event and 
its complement must total 1. 96 
Both Professor Williams 97 and Sir Richard Eggleston98 are of the 
opinion that the appropriate method for combining the force of 
different probabilities is Bayes' theorem. However they 
maintained the position that, since no quantities are available 
from which probabilities could be calculated, the method suggested 
is 'mainly useful to expose fallacies.' .99 
96. G. Williams, 'Mathematics of Proof', op.cit. p 346. 
97. Ibid. P 346. 
98. R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate' op.cit. p 686 and, 
Evidence. Proof and Probability, op.cit. pp 203-217 
99. R. Eggleston ibid. pp 687, 207; G. Williams, 'Mathematics of 
Proof', op.cit. p 297. 
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PART III 
THE HOLISTIC APPROACH 
In Part I of this thesis I undertook an investigation of a 
hypothesis advanced by Professor William Twining to the effect that 
the Anglo-American scholars and theorists of evidence adopted a 
particular view of rationality which 'found its classical expression 
in English empirical philosophy in the writings of Bacon, Locke and 
John Stuart Mill. '.1 The investigation was meant to ascertain the 
philosophical and intellectual sources of that tradition; and to 
provide an explanation for some of its basic characteristics and 
conceptual framework. My research in Parts I and II has confirmed 
Professor Twining's hypothesis in respect of the mainstream of that 
tradition (ie., the atomist). However, his thesis does not explain 
the thread of ideas which runs throughout the tradition and has its 
earliest expression in the writings of James Glassford in 1820. 
This thread has its intellectual sources basically in the Scottish 
commonsense philosophy and the philosophy of Thomas Reid and that of 
Dugald Stewart in particular. I refer to that approach as the 
2 holistic approach. This part consists of four chapters. The 
first chapter considers the basic features of both atomism and 
holism and discusses some contexts in which the 'whole evidence' 
is used with non-holistic connotations. The second chapter treats 
a body of emerging thought which can not be properly classified as 
1. See 'The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship', in E 
Campbell and L. Waller, (eds.), Well and Truly Tried (1982), p 211 at 234. 
2. See below ch. 9. 
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either atomistic or holistic. This body of thought shall be treated 
under the title 'Emerging Holism'. In the third chapter the early 
beginnings of holism shall be traced to the writings of James 
Glassford and the Scottish School of Philosophy in general. Finally 
the last chapter shall contain the exposition of the holistic thesis 
and its proposed holistic analysis. 
CHAPTER 7 
Atomism and Holism 
A. Atomism 
The atomistic approach inherited certain characteristic 
features from the empiricist philosophy. One of these character-
is tics is its atomistic and discursive analysis of evidence. 
According to that analysis each item of evidence is analysed 
individually and separately from the rest of the evidence: the 
analysis is represented as dealing with each item of the admitted 
evidence. These items are generally treated analogously to inter 
mediate proofs in a demonstration. The atomistic analysis is 
offered as an abstract tool to deal with the judicial fact finding 
task as a whole, without examining the nature of the task, or 
specifying the parts to which it can appropriately be applied. 
However, when the task of the judicial fact-finder is seen as 
involving two stages, the first stage confronts the fact-finder 
with the problems of reaching a judgment, while the second confronts 
him with the task of justifying that judgment, then the position 
of the atomist becomes really precarious and difficult. The 
problems which this distinction and the interaction between the 
two tasks generate renders the atomist position extremely difficult. 
One such problem relates to the question whether the analysis covers 
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both tasks, i.e., the pragmatic and the logical. Some atomists, 
like David Schum, would give an affirmative answer to this question. 
For example David Schum's assumption that all relevant evidence 
has probative force, and his inclusion of all ingredients of 
relevant evidence which are admissible, according to the mathe-
matical calculus, in his sequential calculation of the values of 
these ingredients, suggest that he treats the whole task as a 
3 logical one. The most obvious objection to this approach is that 
it confounds judgmental issues with issues concerned with justifca-
tion. The former consists in a discovery process which is a most 
problematic and complicated stage in a legffifact finding task that 
involves, in certain types of case, the determination of pragmatic 
and psychological issues which give that stage a definite formal 
structure for which, as we shall see, the atomistic approach does 
not account. If, on the other hand, as recent views suggest, the 
analysis is confined to the justification of a judgment when its 
proofs have already been isolated from the whole evidence in the 
case, then its limited usefulness as a tool of analysis in relation 
to the judicial fact finding task can immediately be seen. 
The neglect of the pragmatic problems of judicial proof, 
and the failure of most evidentiary scholars to consider the task 
involved in judicial proof from both the pragmatic and logical 
perspective has, in my view, resulted in a distorted notion of the 
nature of the judicial fact finding task. The nature of the task, 
it is submitte~ should be viewed in the light of the problems that 
face a fact-finder in the complexity of legal trials, which by 
necessity include the solution of pragmatic as well as logical 
3. See above ch. 1., n. 51. 
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problems. The assumption that the judicial fact finding task is 
probabilistic and inferential has been uncritically accepted, and 
the need for its justification has not even been felt. The recent 
probability debates reinforce this assumption, and proceed, 
therefore, to the analysis of a task already assumed to be probabilis-
tic and inferential. An exposition of the main points of the debates 
has already been given in Part II of this thesis. In what follows 
I will pose, and try to answer, the question whether the fact finding 
and problem-solving task in legal trials is probabilistic at all, when 
taking into consideration all the complexities which confront a fact-
finder in different types of case. The answer to this question 
determines whether the proper approach should be atomistic or 
holistic. However, before discussing the holistic approach to the 
judicial fact finding task it is necessary for purposes of exposition 
and completeness to restate in simple terms the main questions with 
which the atomistic analysis deals. Our reference to atomists has 
so far been a general reference to an approach whose salient features 
have already been given. In the light of what has already been said, 
an evidence scholar would be an atomist whenever he approaches 
the analysis or justification of the whole admitted evidence or 
any part of it in a discursive and/or sequential manner, or who 
while rejecting the discursive and sequential analysis of evidence 
adopts a mathematicist position. What emerges from this rough 
test of atomism and atomists is that the atomistic approach 
exists in differing degrees relative to the complexity of the 
task to be analysed. The following classification may be 
conjoined with our rough generalization in order to illustrate 
the concepts in question. Let us refer to the whole admitted 
evidence in trial (T) as (X) and to the fact-finder as (J). The 
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atomists can be classified as follows: 
1. The Rationalist Scholars 
According to most rationalist evidence scholars each 
iteffi of evidence should be estimated as it is introduced. That 
estimation is subject to further revision when other items of 
evidence are received by J in T. Most of the rationalist scholars 
presuppose unrealistically the credibility of witnesses in T. 
While experience in the form of common sense generalization is 
regarded as relevant for the determination of these values, the 
analysis does not go further than that. 
2. The Baconians 
The Baconian thesis was meant to be an articulation 
of an implicit theme in (1) above. Its main assumption, with 
which most lawyers would agree, is that judicial proof is not in 
principle a function of mathematical probability. Even when the 
Baconian claim is granted, the Baconian thesis disregards the 
problems of the judgmental stage in judicial proof and deals mainly 
with the problems of justification of the grounds of that judgment. 
It does not point out any formal structure for the stage of judgment 
in judicial trial. For this reason, it does not provide a method, 
or structure, for the isolation of those parts of X for which J 
seeks justification. In that sense it presupposes the solution 
of all the pragmatic issues relating to X. Apart from this, its 
attempts at justifying each item, whatever parts of X are finally 
isolated by J for justification independently of the other parts 
so isolated, is atomistic. 
3. The Pascalians 
The Pascalians treat each and every item of X as a 
function of mathematical probability. If, for example, X in T 
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consists of xl' x2 ' x3 ' .•. , Xn , then each item is aSSigned an 
individual value by J as the item is introduced in evidence. If 
for example J assigns .7 to items xl he must assign .3 to not-xl 
which is the complement or negation of xl. The calculation of the 
value of an individual item of evidence may take into account 
various probabilistic ingredients, such as the credibility of the 
source of evidence and the probability of the event reported by 
that source. If the ultimate issue to be proved is Q and its 
negation is not Q, then the Pascalian would use a selected prior 
odds of Q tonot-Q as a base for combining all X-items with that 
prior value. Subject to certain constraints all the values of 
X-items go into the calculation. The Pascalian position represents 
the most extreme view of atomism. It is based on the wrong 
assumption that each item of ~ (being relevant and admissible), 
has probative force or evidentiary value. This tends to disregard 
or overlook the fact that X may, and in most cases it does, consist 
of inconsistent and contradictory assertions about facts. For 
this reason the Pascalian approach fails to see the distinction 
between relevance and probative force. It also fails to see the 
distinction between the existence or probability of evidentiary 
facts and their probative force, since it seems to assume all 
evidentiary facts to be probable. It also seems to view probative 
force as a function of individual items of evidence. In short, the 
atomistic approach in general, and its extreme Pascalian expression 
in particular, overlook many significant and real problems which 
confront J in most legal trials, and it fails to explain adequately 
the basic concepts of evidence, (e.g., relevance, probative force, 
evidentiary value, and sufficiency of evidence). One merit of the 
holistic approach to be considered next is that it has none of these 
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disadvantages. 
B. Some Basic Holistic Features 
One basic feature of holism is its rejection of the atomistic 
analysis of evidence not only on account of its atomicity but also 
because holism questions the adequacy of the epistemological and 
logical foundations of the evidence tradition adopting that analysis 
to provide for and capture the complexity of judicial fact finding 
inquiry. 
Another feature of holism is its serious reflection on and 
questioning of the aptness and suitability of the emulation of 
scientific methods by traditional evidence scholarship. While it 
recognises the utility and importance of scientific methods and the 
contribution of the philosophy of science to jurisprudence,it detects 
significant differences between scientific and judicial inquiries. 
The emphasis by most evidence scholars on logical analysis, and 
hence the equation of the analysis of evidence with a justificatory 
and post discovery scientific paradigm,is misconceived. Judicial 
proof and evidence scholarship can gain a lot if the fact finding 
task is compared with the process of scientific discovery. This 
can be done without conceding the irrationality, illogicality or 
non-logicality of judicial fact finding inquiries. The assimilation 
of judicial inquiries to the invention of a new theory in natural 
sciences explains in a clear manner the role of experience (common 
sense generalizations) in such inquiries. The role of generalizations 
in relation to the task of the fact-finder is as limited as the role 
of any existing body of scientific knowledge to an inventor 
investigating any new hypothesis. 
Holism accepts the fact that the trier of fact deals with 
probabilities and not certainties. However it maintains that the 
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logical impossibility of determining the existence of matters of fact 
with certainty does not as a matter of necessity or practice preclude 
the fact-finder from making a choice whereby he selects certain 
facts as either true or probable on a purely conventional, if not 
logical, basis. The existence of such conventions and the practice 
of resorting to them is an acceptable phenomenon in the philosophy 
4 
of science. For this reason holism does not subscribe to the 
view that the logical impossibility of attaining certainty in the 
determinations of the existence or non existence of facts, (whether 
these facts be evidentiary or ultimate facts), justifies the claim 
that no selection of true or highly probable facts is acceptable. 
The alternative suggestion to treat all evidentiary reports as 
probable and probative, provides neither a rational nor a practical 
solution to the problem~ For this reason the holistic approach, 
unlike the probabilistic atomistic approach, stresses an important 
distinction between the probability of facts and their probative 
force. This distinction adds a further complexity to the nature 
of the task of judicial fact-finders, and calls for a restructuring 
of the evidence within definite individual-spatio-temporal regions 
for the determination of the truth of evidentiary reports. The 
relation of validated reports to the ultimate fact or facts to which 
they relate also involves, in some cases, a further elimination of 
true reports which have no actual probative value in the trial 
context. Finally the sufficiency of true and probative reports 
to establish each and every ultimate fact necessary for drawing a 
conclusion one way or another from the legal rule must be determined. 
Holism provides a well structured method for the performance of all 
4. See below ch.lO, Section B; see, for example K. Popper Ope cit. 
pp 37, 86. 
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these tasks. 5 
Another important feature of holism is its clear distinction 
between relevance and probative value not only with regard to single 
items of evidence a~. an item may be relevant yet fails to prove), 
but with regard to the total mass of received evidence. This 
involves a process of reduction of the volume and significance of 
the whole evidence. In this sense the 'whole evidence' is not 
identical with the totality of received evidence. It divides into 
different parts according to a spatio-tempora1 standard. Holism 
accords an important role to facts in the determination of these 
matters. Each individual spatio-tempora1 region constitutes an 
independent whole for the purpose of determining the probability 
or truth of the evidentiary fact or facts within that region. 
According to this view relevance provides a timeless standard for 
the reception of evidence while probative force demands the weighing 
of evidence within a temporal context. It is the sifting out of 
what is true and significant from the whole received evidence. 
A basic feature of holism which cear1y distinguishes it 
from any other theory of proof is its stringent demands regarding 
the transitivity of evidentiary reports vis a vis the co-ordinate 
ultimate facts and the legal conclusion drawn from conjoining them 
with the legal rule or rules. 'Some wholes' or parts of significant 
evidence are transitive only to one ultimate fact and intransitive 
to any other co-ordinate ultimate fact. If this point is valid 
then and for the same reasons the transitivity of any evidentiary 
fact to the legal conclusion is wholly unacceptable. Apart from 
this point the fact that the validity of the legal conclusion depends 
on the establishment of each and every ultimate fact necessary for 
5. See below, ch. 10, Sections A and C. 
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its drawing from the legal rule renders any single fact by itself, 
whether it be evidentiary or even ultimate, completely insignificant 
in relation to that conclusion. It follows from this that the 
pra~tice of assigning prior probabilities to the legal conclusion 
by Bayesian theorists is not acceptable. 6 
C. Emerging Holism and some uses of the 'whole evidence'. 
Many references to the evidence as a whole and even 'holism' 
occur in a number of contexts for different explanatory and 
analytical pruposes. In most of these contexts the purpose behind 
the employment of such terms has nothing, or very little, in common 
with the concept of holism advanced in the present thesis. In very 
few references some common ground with one or more than one feature 
of holism can be discovered. However, even when such common 
grounds can be found they represent either a vague and unarticulated 
dissatisfaction with the traditional atomistic analysis of evidence, 
or, when dissatisfaction is consciously expressed and articulated 
against the atomistic analysis, it often arises from a vague aware-
ness of what is wrong with the atomistic approach. It also fails 
to offer a well argued and properly structured alternative analysis. 
I shall consider these variants of holism under the heading 'Emerging 
Holism' in (1) below. The non-holistic uses of the 'whole evidence' 
is dealt with in (2) below. 
1. Emerging holism 
Emerging holism is a general reference to a broad collection 
of remarks and opinions which are not always and in every case the 
result of a conscious or designed effort to criticise the existJng 
traditional methods or provide an alternative to them. For this 
6. See above, ch. 6. 
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reason it is important to attempt a rough and general classification 
of emerging holistsinto the following groupings; 
(1) Those who adopt a mathematicist's strategy and while 
defending it express isolated remarks or opinions 
which are capable of holistic interpretations. 
(2) Those who, without declaring their strategy, introduce 
conceptual tools or models for the analysis of 
evidence. The model of stories, the requirement 
of consistency and the theory of the case are such 
examples. 
(3) Those who express their dissatisfaction with one 
feature or more of atomism, offer a critique of what 
they regard to be wrong with atomism, and try to 
provide an alternative method of analysis. One 
defect of this last category consists in its partial 
or distorted conception of what is wrong with atomism, 
and/or its failure to articulate an intelligible 
conception of holism, or a well-structured plan for 
holistic analysis. 
2. The use of the term 'whole evidence' in contexts other than 
holistic contexts. 
We have already mentioned the existence of various contexts 
in which the term ~hole evidenc~ is used without any holistic 
connotation. The contexts with which I am going to deal are not 
meant to be exhaustive. The substance of the topics referred to 
in the contexts to be considered are not relevant to this thesis. 
The examples are mere illustrations of some references which, f~r 
lack of explanation, may be mistaken for holistic references. 
One familiar instance of such a reference is the direction 
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of the judge to the jury in his summing up to consider the ~hole 
evidence in the case before they come to a decision. Such direction 
may be mistaken for an invitation to the jury to analyse the evidence 
in a holistic manner. Ho~ever the general reference to the ~hole 
evidence ~ithout more is not sufficient to indicate any of the 
features of holism already stated. If ~e take the object of the 
direction it is too clear to admit of any equivocation. Lord 
Sankey in Woolmington v. D.P.P. stated it to be 
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one 
golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the 
duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt ... 
If, at the end of and on the ~hole of the case, there is a 
reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either 
the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner 
killed the deceased ~ith a malicious intention, the 
prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is 
entitled to an acquittal' 7 
In this context the reference is meant to draw the attention of the 
Jury to the fact that the prisoner may benefit from evidence 
introduced by the prosecution. Reference to the whole evidence 
also occurs in a similar situation where weak evidence for the 
prosecution is significantly strengthened by evidence adduced by 
the prisoner. The rule involving such reference has been 
explained by Sir Rupert Cross as follows 
In criminal cases tried with a jury, the accused is never 
put to his election whether to call evidence or not before 
a ruling is made on his submission that there is no case to 
answer. If the ruling is in favour of the submission 
the jury are directed to acquit. If the submission fails, 
the accused calls his evidence in the ordinary way. 
Contrary to what was once decided by the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, it has been said that on an appeal against 
conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeal considers the 
evidence as a whole, and they can therefore dismiss the 
appeal although they may be of opinion that the judge 
ought to have ruled that there was no case to ans~er 
at the close of the prosecution's evidence if, as 
7. [1935] A.C. 462 at p 481. 
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sometimes happens, the accused is incriminated by his 
own evidence. 8 
Another context in which reference to the whole evidence 
occurred without connotating any holistic meaning is where direct 
evidence is contrasted with circumstantial evidence. The point 
of the contrast is meant to state that while a single credible 
item of direct evidence is sufficient to establish an ultimate fact, 
the sufficiency of items of circumstantial evidence normally requires 
a combination of a number of such items. 9 
Another context closely related to the context under 
discussion is that in which a party who relies on a number of items 
of circumstantial evidence fails to establish some of them. The 
argument that such failure breaks the chain and hence the effect of 
the evidence in which that item is a link was rejected in H.H. Adv. v. 
Humphreys where Lord Meadowbank directed the jury in the following 
terms: 
I must tell you that the Learned Counsel for the panel 
stated the law incorrectly when he said that you must 
have decisive, irrefragable, and conclusive proof of 
every point in a case like the present, before finding 
the instrument to be forged. The law is quite the 
reverse. You are to take all the evidence together, 
and you are bound to consider whether it amounts and 
comes up to affording a moral conviction in your minds 
equivalent to the positive and direct proof of a fact. lO 
8. Cross on Evidence (5th ed., 1979), p 79. 
9. See Wills, Circumstantial Evidence (1896, 1982) pp 300 et 
seq; See also ch. 2 above p 
10. Swinton Rep. p 353, cited in Will, op.cit. p 361. 
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As a consequence the analogy of circumstantial proof to a chain was 
seriously questioned: 
The effect of a body of circumstantial evidence is 
sometimes compared to that of a chai~ but the metaphor 
is obviously inaccurate. Circumstantial evidence is 
not to be considered as a chain and each piece of 
evidence as a link in the chain, for then if anyone link 
broke the chain would fall. A chain cannot be stronger 
than its weakest link, and hence, where the fact of 
guilt depends upon proof of a series of links consti-
tuting a chain, the absence of a single link will be as 
fatal to a conviction as the absence of all the links. 
But the simile of a chain and links can only be 
applicable where there is a series of facts, one 
succeeding the other, and each connected with and 
dependent upon the other. There is no rule of law 
which prescribes any definite number of circumstances 
as necessary to the sufficiency of circumstantial 
proof. There may be and there are cases where a 
single circumstance will justify the jury in finding 
the existence of an inferential fact. ll 
While the above rules contain no reference to any methods 
of authenticating these items, or their evaluation as separate 
items or wholes, their implicit recognition of the existence, in 
practice, of a process of selection and elimination is important 
for the holistic thesis. The border-line rule between this category 
and the emerging holism to be considered next is stated by Lord 
12 Justice Ormrod in R. v. Bracewell. In that case the trial judge 
directed the jury to consider the weight and value of medical 
evidence in the light of the other evidence in the case. The 
defence considered this to be objectionable and appealed. The 
direction was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal since 
'[ruedical evidence is only a part of the material on which a jury 
has to reach a decision and they must relate it to, and judge it 
11. Will, op.cit pp 464-5. 
12. (1979) 68 Crim. App. Rep. 44. 
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in the light of, all the other factual evidence in the case.' .13 
The direction and the rule are justified in the light of the cautious 
and guarded attitude of the expert witness who correctly expressed 
a qualified opinion with no claims to certainty excluding any other 
hypothesis. The obvious risk in such a case is that the attention 
of the jury may be concentrated on that evidence in complete 
isolation from the rest of the evidence. The jury may regard the 
caution of the witness a good reason for the rejection of his 
evidence. To invite the jury to consider the evidence in the light 
of the rest of the evidence is to warn them against the danger of 
allowing that item of evidence to determine the issues in the case. 
The direction, of course, indicates neither the manner in which the 
medical evidence may be related to the rest of the evidence in the 
case nor what is meant by 'all the other judicial evidence in the 
case'. Having said that, the restriction against the atomistic 
evaluation of evidence supports one of the basic features of holism 
already considered. This is why the case is seen as a borderline 
case between this category and emerging holism which we shall now 
consider. 
13. Ibid. at p 49. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EMERGING HOLISM 
Emerging holism [EH] is a general reference to a broad 
collection of remarks and opinions which are not always and in 
every case the result of a conscious or designed effort to criticise 
the existing traditional methods or provide an alternative to them. 
A general and rough classification of emerging holists has already 
been given in Chapter 7. 1 This chapter is an attempt to elaborate 
and enlarge these general remarks. 
A. Mathematicism 
Recent views have been expressed by some mathematicists in 
defence of mathematical probability. These views reject the atom-
istic analysis of certain types or categories of evidence. The 
V1ews of these authors seem to be inconsistent with the position 
which they choose to defend. According to that position, it 
is submitted, the only possible analysis is atomistic. Insofar 
as these views are not expressed as part of a comprehensive treatment 
of the problems of the total mass of evidence in the different types 
of case which usually confront fact-finders they can be read as 
signs pointing in the direction of an alternative non-atomistic 
approach. For this reason I shall treat them as emerging holists. 
This form of EH can be illustrated by examples from the 
contributions of both Sir Richard Eggleston and Professor Glanville 
Williams to the probability debates. They both express the views 
which commit them to the acceptance of an eliminative and selective 
1. See above ch. 7. p. 173. 
185. 
, h d 'd' 2 process Wlt regar to eVl entlary facts. Similar Vlews were 
expressed by both Ekelof and Ian Hacking, well before the current 
probability debates. 3 In one of the most recent contributions 
to the debate Mr. M. Ockelton seems to make an extremely damaging 
admission on the part of the mathematicists when he wrote: 
The mathematicist sees the process of giving a verdict 
as a simple mapping function applied to whatever is the 
final value of g, the probability that the accused is 
guilty, after all the evidence has been considered' 4 
If this means, as it seems to suggest, that the trier of fact asslgns 
values only when he selects what constitutes proofs, the role of 
mathematical probability, according to this view, is relegated to 
that of analysing a foregone conclusion. 5 
Another feature of holism which finds support ln this 
category of EH is that which rejects atomistic analysis of evidence . 
• 
Ekelof's view is by far the most articulate in this respect. His 
view is that each individual item of evidence must be assessed 
on the basis of the available evidence as a whole. 6 Ekelof 
2. G. Williams, 'Mathematics of Proof 1-11'[1979J CrimI L.R. 292-
340 at 344-349 and, 'A Short Rejoinder' [1980J CrimI L.R. 103 at 104; 
R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate' [1980J CrimI L.R. 678 at 
and, Evidence, Proof and Probability (1977-1983) p. 38. 
3. Per Olof Ekelof, 'Free Evaluation of Evidence' (1964) 8 Scandinavian 
Studies of Law, p. 47 at p. 51; I. Hacking, 'Combin~ Evidence', in S. 
Stenlund (ed.) Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis (1974) p. 113 at p. 
121; see a1so'M. Ockelton, 'The use of Mathematical Probabilities in 
Assessing Corroborative or Convergent Testimonies' (1982) 24 Ratio p.6l 
at pp. 62-7; see A. Stening, Bevisvarde, (Weight of Evidence), (1975) 
and, 'Evidence and Statistics (unpublished 1983); see also Per Olof 
Bolding, Bevisbordan Och Den Juridiska Tekniken (Burden of Proof ~nd 
Lege1 Technique), (1951). 
4. M. Ocke1ton, op.cit. pp 67-8. 
5. See above ch.6 p 140 and below chI 10 pp. 250 et seq 
6. Eke10f, op.cit. p.60, 
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suggested two methods for the performance of this task. The 
first method involves an intuitive survey of the whole complex 
of evidentiary facts in the light of general experience which 
apply to them. The problem with the intuitive survey, according 
to Ekelof is that it does not enable the judge to describe exactly 
h h h d hi . d 7 ow e reac e s JU gment. For this reason he seems to prefer 
another method of evaluation which combines both the intuitive 
and discursive analysis of evidence: 
On the other hand, intuition is influenced by our 
earlier experience, although our attention is not 
focused upon it at the moment of the intuitive 
judgment. Therefore, there are good reasons for 
assuming that the result will be more reliable if 
the judge has previously undertaken a careful 
discursive analysis of the material available as 
evidence. In the present writer's view such an 
analysis can only be performed in the manner discussed 
above. First, it is necessary to try to arrive at 
an evaluation of the convincing force of each 
particular evidentiary fact against the background 
of the general experience and of available auxiliary 
facts. In this process, the different links in 
the chains of evidence must be examined separately. 
Thereafter one proceeds to assess the combined 
convincing force of those facts which support the 
allegation that a certain ultimate fact exists. 
From the sum thus obtained, finally one must 
subtract the combined force of such counter 
evidence as supports the existence of facts 
incompatible with the allegation. 8 
Eklof seems to be caught in a dilemma arising from his awareness 
that experience contains no generalizations to match and deal 
with a complex of evidentiary facts: the interaction between 
experience and the evidence in the case should strike a balance 
between the necessity of relying on explicit generalizations which 
7. Ibid pp. 60-1. 
8. Ibid p. 61. 
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result in discursive analysis that undermines, in the light 
of Ek10f's awareness of the limited role of experience, the role 
of the evidence as a whole; or reliance on an intuitive composite 
hunch about the force of the whole evidence which experience 
cannot afford. The last course would in addition confront the 
fact finder with the situation in which he could not explain or 
justify his decision. For this reason Ek10f is indifferent as 
to which method the trier of fact starts with provided that 'the 
final result, however, should always be based, in the present 
writer's view, upon an intuitive evaluation of the whole evidence.,.9 
As we shall shortly see the views expressed by Eke10f are 
remarkably similar to the recent views expressed by Peter Tillers. 
B. Coherence and Consistency 
Another unexpressed dissatisfaction with the atomistic 
analysis can also be detected in the resort by some evidence 
scholars to such notions as 'consistency', 'themes and theories 
10 
of a case', 'stories'. A reference to such notions is, in my 
view, an unconscious rejection of explicit analysis based on 
encapsulated, propositiona1ized and compartmentalized experience. 
It is this rejection of explicitly generalized experience which 
gives these notions their holistic tinge. Resort to such notions 
9. Ibid. pp. 61-2. 
10. See L. Bennettand S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the 
Courtroom, (1981); D. Binder and P. Bergman, Fact Investigation, 
(1984); w. Twining and T. Anderson, Analysis of Evidence, (forth-
coming); W. Twining 'Anatomy of a Cause Celebre: The Evidence in 
Bywate~and Thompson', (Earl Grey Memorial Lecture, Newcastle, 1982); 
Neil MacCormick, 'The Coherence of a Case and the Reasonableness of 
Doubt' (1980) 2 Liverpool Law Review, p. 45 and, 'Coherence in 
legal Justification'~; Theorie der Normen Festgabe Fur Ota 
Weinbergen zum 65 Geburtstag p 37. 
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can also be seen as an indication in the direction of an 
alternative unformulated or fluid conception of experience, 
which aids the fact finder in the selection from the total body 
of received evidence those facts which are acceptable to him. 
Such a conception of experience, if sufficiently articulated and 
related to the task for the fact finder with respect to the 
structures of the evidence; its various divisions and the 
relations of those divisions to the ultimate facts; and the 
relation of those ultimate facts to the applicable legal rule or 
rules, provides a distinctive and rational method for the 
performance of that task. ll It is regrettable, however, that 
very little serious effort in that direction has been exerted 
by evidence scholars. Professor Neil MacCormick who has made 
various references to the test of consistency expressed the need 
for more serious research in that direction when he wrote, 
For quite arbitary reasons of space and time I have 
chosen to exclude from this book any extended 
consideration of the process of proof, the processes 
of reasoning from evidence, of justifying conclusions 
inferred from evidence, and of justifying the rules 
which determine what constitutes evidence and what is 
excluded as inadmissible. That is worthy of a book 
in itself, a book which would both draw on and 
contribute to the philosophy of science and the 
philosophy of historY.12 
The notiornof coherence and consistency form a central 
theme in a recent analysis in which Bennett and Feldman offer 
the story model as an analytical tool for the analysis of judicial 
11. See below ch. 10, Sections A and C. 
12. See Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, (1978)~ p. 88, see also 
p. 100. 
189. 
13 
evidence. The book contains plausible arguments whose potential 
was not fully explored or developed. One of the main reasons for 
this seems to be the unfamiliarity of the authors with an intricate 
and multi-disciplinary subject. 14 This unfamiliarity is, in its turn, 
the cause of their basic misconception of the role of the rules of 
evidence (or what they refer to as courtroom procedures, or formal 
procedures of a justice process).15 They believe quite wrongly 
that lawyers regard these rules as responsible for the production 
f · i 16 o Just ceo They thus waste much time attacking this false 
target. Consequently they devote a lot of space to the justifi-
cation of the role of common sense generalizations, or implicit 
17 
understanding as they referred to it. They concluded that: 
, 0 nce it is clear that implicit judgement practices (and not 
the formal procedures of a justice process) are responsible for 
the production of justice, it is possible to explore the meaning 
18 
of justice in society.' Another misconception which probably 
diverted the attention of the authors from exploring the potential 
of their analysis is about the objectivity of fact finding. The 
authors assumed quite incorrectly that the 'justice procedures' 
are believed by lawyers to perform the objective and mechanical 
13. Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom, (1981). 
14. For the limited information and data on which the authors reached 
their conclusions see ibid. pp 11 et seq; see also ibid. ch. 4 for 
the experiments conducted by the authors. 
15. See Reconstructing Reality, ch. 1 pp 3 et seq. 
16. Ibid. P 4. 
17. Ibid. P 26. 
18. Ibid. P 32. 
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19 function of rediscovering facts. In fact they conducted a 
number of experiments to demonstrate the mistake of such be1ief. 20 
On these assumptions and from the authors observation of a limited 
number of criminal trials they conclude that the criminal trial 
21 process is a simple story telling process. They see this as 
an important discovery: ' 0 ur search for the underlying basis 
of justice and judgment in American criminal trials has produced 
an interesting conclusion: the criminal trial is organized around 
storytelling. ,22 Important functions and roles are assigned by 
the authors to the 'story'. It helps the fact-finder to organize, 
store, check, revise, structure and interpret a vast body of 
information. It provides an analytical device for legal judgment 
and, in addition to that, it provides a coherent theoretical 
23 framework for legal trials. However, the main importance of 
the story for the construction of legal judgments was claimed to 
be the fact that they organize information in ways that help the 
listener to perform three interpretive operations. First, the 
interpreter must be able to locate the central action in a story. 
This is the key behaviour around which the point of the story is drawn. 
Second, the interpreter must construct inferences about the 
relationships among the surrounding elements in the story that 
impinge on the central action. The connections among this cast 
19. Ibid. ch. 2-3. 
20. Ibid. pp 66-90. 
21. As to the information on which they relied see ibid. pp 11-18. 
22. Ibid. p 3. 
23. Ibid. P 4-5. 
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of supportive symbols create the interpretive context for the action 
or behaviour a t the centre of the story. Finally, the network of 
symJo1ic connections drawn around the central action in a story 
must be tested for internal consistency and descriptive adequacy 
or completeness. This simply means that the interpreter must 
determine that the various inferences that make up a general 
interpretation for a story are both mutually compatible (in light 
of what is known about similar episodes in the real world) and 
24 
sufficiently specified to yield an unequivocab1e interpretation. 
The attribution of these mysterious and metaphysical powers to the 
story is rather strange. The absence of any adequate explanation 
as to why or how stories can perform these functions makes things 
even worse. However, it seems that they assume that reference 
to the 'story' itself signifies without further explanation the 
existence of a complex of 'implicit social understandings' which 
the listener not only knows, but has both the ability and the 
25 
skill to apply for the determination of these various tasks. 
The analytical model which the story provides as a basis for legal 
judgment presupposes, according to this interpretation, the 
existence of such a complex of knowledge, together with the ability 
and skill of the fact finder to manipulate it and apply it in 
structuring and integrating stories. 26 This assumption may 
explain why important issues such as the reliability of evidence, 
24. Ibid. P 41. 
25. Ibid. pp 61-2. 
26. Ibid. ch. 4 and pp 44-5, 47 and 61-2. 
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its probative value, the distinction between evidentiary facts 
and ultimate facts, and the relation of the last two to the 
possible legal conclusion are not considered by the authors. It 
is also important to know that the authors express no doubt about 
the role of experience to justify individual inference. However 
the authors' adoption of social frames as general cognitive models 
of social action is not, as we shall see, without its use for the 
holistic analysis. 
c. Tillers' Attempt. 
A conscious effort to interpret and criticize the conven-
tiona1 approaches to fact finding problems can be seen in the 
recent account by Professor Peter Tillers in his Modern Theories 
27 
of Relevancy. Despite Tillers' use of terms such as 'atomicity' 
and 'holism' which are important new conceptual tools, his account 
28 
consists merely of a critique of the atomicity of atomism. 
His reference to the evidence as a whole or even holism, as we 
shall see, occurs in contexts in which these terms are simply used 
29 to provide a contrast with atomicity. For this and other 
reasons, to be explained shortly, I shall argue that Tillers' 
version of holism is as limited as the versions of other emerging 
ho1ists. Before embarking on that criticism, I shall attempt a 
brief summary of those aspects of Tillers' account which are 
relevant for our purposes. 
The analysis is basically a critique of what Tillers'termed 
27. Reprinted from section 37 of Wigmore on Evidence, vol. lA, 
Tillers (Rev.) (1983). 
28. See Tillers, op.cit. pp 1059, 1067, 1079, 1081, and 1083. 1086 
29. Ibid. s. 37.7 (n.10). 
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the modern theories of relevancy.30 He included under that label 
theories of logical relevancy, Cohen's account of inductive 
probability, as well as mathematical approaches to relevance and 
"d 31 eVl ence. The central critical theme against all these theories 
is that they insist on a very restrictive and narrow standard of 
rationality: 
Our central criticism is not, as it might be supposed, 
that Michael and Adler had an insufficient understanding 
of the possible implications of the 'calculus of chances' -
which they did - but that their conception of reason was 
too narrow insofar as it asserted that rational processes 
are those which conform to the model of logic as a 
formal system with carefully defined constituents and 
which employ exhaustively defined operational rules to 
transform statements of one form in statements of 
another form. 32 
The same accusation is levelled against Professor James, the 
33 
mathematicists, and Jonathan Cohen, Tillers views the 
insistence of the theories of logical relevancy and inductive 
probability on explicit structures of inferential mechanism, 
in the form of common sense generalizations, as a product of that 
34 
unduly constricted image of rationality. 
30. Ibid. SSe 37.4, 37.6 and 37.7. 
However, the author 
31. Id.; the main sources considered by Tillers are: J. Michael 
and M~Adler, 'The Trial of an Issue of Fact' (1-11) 34, Colum. 
L.Rev. 1224, 1462; Professor James 'Relevancy Probability and the 
Law' (1941) 29 Calif. L.Rev. 689; Trautman 'Logical or Legal 
Relevancy - A conflict in Theory', (1952) 5 Vande L. Rev. 385; V. Ball, 
'The Moment of Truth: Probability Thecryand Standards of Proof', 
(1961) 14 Vande L. Rev. 807 and, tThe Myth of Conditional Relevancy', 
(1980), 14 Ga.L.Rev. 435; Weinstein, 'Some difficulties in Devising 
Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials' (1966) Colum. L. Rev. 
223. 
32. Tillers, op.cit. 1030. 
33. Ibid. SSe 37.4 and 37.7. 
34. Ibid. pp. 1039-40, 1071. 
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does not doubt, or question, the inferential nature of judicial 
processes in which 'experience' provides the nomo logical founda-
tions of inference. But he considers reference by the theory of 
logical relevancy to generalizations as an over-simplification of 
the nature of conceptual interpretive mechanisms. 35 He sees in 
the works of Jonathan Cohen a significant contribution which reveals 
the complex and elusive nature of generalizations. But it does 
not go far enough: 
However, in our view, Cohen does not take us far enough, 
either qualitatively or quantitatively. Qualitatively, 
he does not take us far enough because, all provisos 
considered, he still takes the view that the interpretive 
conceptual principle that speaks to the probative force 
of a piece of evidence in essence still amounts to a 
statement that describes (within its appropriate domain) 
certain events that occur with a certain frequency 
relative to other events. However, there are conceptual 
interpretive structures that, though speaking to the 
probative force of a piece of evidence, take a quite 
different form. The term "generalization" implies 
that the beliefs and theories and concepts of the 
observer always amount to a generalized description of 
the course of nature that constitutes an extrapolation 
from regularities noted by the observer in a limited 
number of instances. However, "experience" can work 
in quite different ways and may lead to the formation 
of conceptual and interpretive systems that cannot 
easily be described as statements that describe the 
relative frequency of various types of events under 
various conditions' 36 
Tillers notes a principle defect in Bayesian analysis of the nature 
of inference. It is 'its failure to adequately account for the 
fashion in which a fact-finder in fact uses a complex of assumptions, 
beliefs, theories, and received or self-developed perspectives in 
35. Ibid. pp 1073, 1079. 
36. Ibid. P 1079; see also ibid. p 1077. 
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his evaluation of the degree to which an item of evidence adds 
force to the probability of some fact in issue.' He again explains 
this on the narrow conception of rationality to which Bayesians 
subscribe. They, according to his view; 'treat the nomological 
foundations of inference as irreducible and unanalysable ("subjective") 
i iti t i 11 i t ,,37 pr m ve assessmen s n a ns ances .••. The author noted 
further the atomicity of the analysis by all conventional theories 
and criticised it: 
The legal habit of taking evidence piecemeal and supposing 
that each separate piece of evidence thus admitted may be 
considered separately for its evidentiary significance 
seems to reflect a Bayesian cast of thought. But there 
is no intrinsic reason for supposing that all evidence 
will or must present itself in this dissected form; we 
may encounter some masses of evidence that we do not 
know how to dissect in a meaningful fashion without 
destroying the significance and value we see in the 
evidence as a whole. We may discover, contrary to 
received legal wisdon, that some evidence does seem to 
be intrinsically or inherently related to other evidence 
and that the assumption of the atomicity of separate pieces 
of evidence does not hold. Indeed, we may discover or 
believe that some masses of evidence must be treated as 
a whole and connot be meaningfully dissected into pieces 
at all. In this case, Bayesian analysis is of no use 
whatever, for there are then no primitive hunches to be 
integrated into composite hunches. There is, as it were, 
only one hunch with regard to the evidence as a whole. 38 
The two terms 'evidence as a whole' and 'holism' are not explained 
39 
or analysed. Their main function in the analysis seems to provide 
a contrast with atomicity. It provides also the opportunity to 
introduce an alternative or modified standard of rationality: 
37. Ibid. P 1073. 
38. Ibid. pp 1067-8. 
39. See above, n 28. 
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We believe that rational evaluation can remain rational 
even though the process employs presuppositions and 
processes that remain implicit, and there is no need 
to force a choice between explicit and implicit 
inferential processes since it is quite sensible to 
think that rational evaluations may involve both implicit 
and explicit processes. To demand that everything be 
made explicit is to foreordain the failure of reason 
since the demands we make on reason are too great and 
hence are impossible to satisfY.40 
This unstructured, fluid and elusive conception of experience 
as the foundation of inferential processes is a matter for the 
fact-finder to apprehend and apply in partitioning the evidence 
as well as assessing its probative force: 
If it may be assumed, as we do, that fact-finding can be 
"rational" even though no transcendental basis exists 
that determines the appropriate classification, 
characterization, or dissection of evidence, it seems 
probable that rational inquiry into the nature and 
implicationsof evidence and facts is advanced when the 
trier persists, insofar as possible, in the effort to 
determine whether the characterization, interpretation, 
dissection, and so on, of the evidence that he has 
adopted is in fact a truly meaningful dissection and 
characterisation (from his point of view) in the light 
of the assumptions and beliefs he entertains (both of a 
general character as well as of the general constitution 
of the whole of the evidence before him). It is 
tempting to think that what happens (and should happen) 
is that a trier of fact - any trier of fact - engages in a 
sequential process in which there is a repeated reciprocal 
interaction between a general vision of the evidence as a 
whole and a general vision of its parts, a process in 
which each vision is progressively revised and checked 
by the other but in which neither can ever be supposed, 
in principle, to be entirely independent of the other. 4l 
It is hoped that this summary, though brief and general, contains a 
fair and accurate description of Tillers' views. In what follows 
I shall express a few remarks, by way of criticism, by which I shall 
either elaborate some general points I alluded to in the course of 
40. Tillers, op.cit. p 1040. 
41. Ibid. pp 1083-4. 
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the exposition, or point out and discuss new points 
As has already been noted Tillers' account consists in the 
main of an attack on atomicity which is just one of the other various 
42 features of atomism. However a proper understanding of atomism, 
which is a prerequisite of a comprehensive holistic thinking demands 
a search into the complex factors which make up atomism. Such a 
search should include a careful and deep look into the underlying 
philosophical framework of the conventional evidence tradition, 
its approach to analysis, what it regards as a proper candidate for 
such analysis, its understanding or lack of understanding of the 
problems of evidence and the corresponding task they pose for the 
fact finder in different types of cases in legal trials. The 
search should also include the meaning such a tradition assigns 
to experience, and the role it assigns in judicial inquiries and 
problem solving in general. Most important of all, such a search 
must question the appropriateness of the cognitivist attitude of 
that tradition toward thinking, inquiry, and problem solving in 
judicial fact finding inquiries. The answers to these and various 
other questions related to them, as we have shown in this thesis, 
should provide the basic features of atomism which constitute the 
43 proper target for holistic attacks. In this light it can be 
seen that Tillers' understanding of what is wrong with the 
conventional theories of relevancy is not broad or deep enough 
to outline and comprehend the various parameters and features 
which constitute its atomism. We have already noted some context 
42. See abov~ nn. 28 and 38. 
43. See below ch. 10, pp 
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in which this lack of full and comprehensive coverage of atomism 
allowed some mathematicists and other atomists to question atomicity 
without realising at the same time the effect of such questioning on 
the validity of the methods they adopt and defend. 44 The reason 
why these mathematicists and others fail to detect any inconsistency 
in attacking atomicity and retaining atomism is explicable on the 
ground that holism contrasts with atomism not atomicity. 
Another limitation in Tillers' account is his contrasting 
holism with atomicity without feeling any need to explain or define 
what he meant by holism apart from his reference to its negative 
standard of rationality. His suggested standard is a mere contrast 
to the standard of rationality of conventional systems. It does 
not conform to logical forms of reasoning or resort to explicit 
inferential structures. If this is, as I understand it to be, a 
concession on the part of Tillers that any alternative standard of 
rationality should abandon any claim to logicality, that concedes a 
great deal to atomism. It is, in effect, an acceptance of the 
rationalist thesis that analysis is only possible within logical 
domains. According to this view the domain of logical analysis 
does not include either the process of thought of the investigator 
or the structures of the material on which he works. The reason 
which is generally given is that any thought process prior to the 
expression of its final result is hidden from any observer. It 
is not possible for anyone, and probably the investigator himself, 
to tell exactly how he thinks and why he thinks the way he does, 
what forms and aids his thought processes and his conception of 
relevancy and 45 rationality. 
44. See above, ch. 8, p.174. 
However, this view accepts the 
45. See below ch. lO,Section B; P. Medawar, Induction and Intuiion in 
f:'~3~_~3&3~ 'T'\..~ •• ~\..~ t10t:.O\ 0.8. 
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position that the investigator is probably the best judge of his 
thought processes. This cognitivist and subjectivist view seems 
to appeal to Tillers since he accepted the fact-finder as the best 
judge of the partitioning of evidence as well as the evaluation of 
its probative force. Of course this may be true in situations 
where the observer knows nothing, or very little, about the data 
on which the investigator works and the nature of the task he is 
called upon to perform in relation to that data, and how that 
type of task in relation to that data is normally performed in 
similar contexts. However, when, as in legal trials, the observer, 
like the fact-finder, can have the same knowledge about the data 
and the nature of the task and what is normally required for its 
performance, our concern ought not to be directed to what actually 
passes inside the mind of the fact-finder during a trial process, 
but what should and ought to be his responses in relation to a 
definite body of evidence with respect to a definite task. In 
this sense the nature of the evidence and that of the task and our 
knowledge of what the performance of that task in relation to that 
evidence demands on the part of a fact-finder, supply the logical 
and heuristic frames for the manner of performing that task. As 
I shall argue later on in this thesis, my analysis provides a 
strong argument for a logic of judicial discovery distinct from 
that of scientific discovery and a better explanation for the basic 
46 
concepts of evidence and the trial processes. 
Tillers' account can also be criticised for accepting or 
at least condoning atomistic assumptions such as the inferential 
nature of the trial process, the role of experience in providing 
the inferential foundations for such processes, the emphasis on 
46. See below ch. 10, pp 259 et seq. 
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the interpretive structures of the evidentiary facts rather than 
those facts themselves, and possibly the transitivity of evidentiary 
re~orts to the legal conclusion and the assignment of prior 
probability to that conclusion. 47 
Tillers' discussion of relevancy and weight is the most 
problematic and least satisfying aspect of his account. His 
general assumption, or at least what his title suggests and his 
treatment confirms, is to treat the entire problems of proof as problems 
of relevance is an obvious indication of his failure to distinguish 
48 between relevancy and weight. Tillers' views in this respect 
are expressed mainly as part of his criticism of the theories of 
logical relevancy. The gist of his criticisms seems to be this: 
the claim of these theories to deal with relevancy rather than 
weight is incorrect. It is incorrect, according to Tillers, 
because the determination of relevancy for the purposes of admiss-
ibility often confronts the fact-finder with the problem of weighing 
the evidence to determine its probative force. The activity of 
weighing for this purpose involves the selection by the judge of 
a general proposition which is accepted as providing a covering 
law for the evidential proposition in question. The conjunction 
of these two propositions yields a conclusion or an inference which 
equals the probative force of the evidential fact. The same process 
and activity of weighing is encountered by the fact finder in 
49 
assessing the probative force of the admitted evidence. Having 
construed logical relevancy in that way, Tillers saw its major sin 
47. Tillers, op.cit. pp 1031, 1059 and 1073 
48. See above ch. 3, n. 69, and below ch. 9 n. 54. 
49. Tillers, op.cit. pp 1022, 1024-5, 1089-90, and 1086 (n. 10) 
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in its reliance on explicit and articulated inferential mechanisms 
50 (generalizations). 
An inquiry into whether Tillers' construction of these 
theories of logical relevancy is correct or not, and whether the 
criticism he based on that construction is valid, is not necessary 
or even important for our present purposes. This is so because 
my own conception of logical relevancy is not affected either by 
his construction or criticism. Apart from this poin~his 
criticism seems to be based on a confusion of two possible contexts 
of weighing covering two distinct activities of weighing employing 
diff t t t d h i f · d 51 0 ib1 eren s ruc ures an mec an sms 0 JU gment. ne poss e 
context, which is not necessary for the determination of relevancy, 
involves a timeless weighing. The weighing of the probative 
force of the admitted evidence, on the other hand, is circumscribed 
in various specifiable ways. For this and other purposes it is 
important to state what I mean and understand by logical relevancy. 
The account which follows is a simple description of my 
conception of logical relevancy. Logical relevancy 
presupposes the existence of observable regularity in nature 
which can be, and is in fact, used to support the making of law-like 
statements about the course of nature. How these statements are 
thought out and investigated, confirmed, qualified, accepted and 
their degrees of reliability determined is not essential for the 
theory of logical relevancy. They, together with the initial 
conditions necessary for their application, are assumed to exist 
as part of objective human knowledge. Each of these laws stands 
50. Ibid. pp 1039, 1071-3 
51. For example see, ibid pp 1022, 1024-5, 1089-90, 1086 (n.10). 
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in one relation or another to other singular propositions which tend 
either to validate or invalidate it. Logic neither creates nor 
identifies the existence of this connection. When the law and its 
initial conditions are expressed logic can work out the formal 
connection between the two. To identify the law and its initial 
conditions provides a function for logic, but the identification 
itself is not a logical function. It follows that logic cannot 
assist in the determination of the acceptability of a general 
proposition, the determination of the conditions under which it 
is acceptable or applicable, or the strength of the inference it affords 
under those conditions. So the role of logical relevancy is 
limited to stating the relationship between two propositions: a 
general proposition performing the function of a law of experience 
which applies under certain specified conditions, and a particular 
proposition which performs the function of an initial condition 
or one of the initial conditions for the application of that 
general proposition. It is this abstract connection between the 
law of experience and its initial condition, or conditions, which 
constitutes logical relevancy. In this sense, logical relevancy 
can be interchanged with potential relevancy when 'actual relevancy' 
is used as a synonym of 'proof'. However useful that distinction 
may be in other contexts, in a legal context the concept of relevancy 
should have a distinctive function identifiable independently of 
the mental processes of the fact-finder or investigator. For this 
reason I shall contrast the relevancy of evidence with its weight 
or probative force. 
In a legal context relevancy simply means an abstract 
relationship which can be expressed as follows: with regard to 
the requirements of a particular legal rule which specifies the 
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establishment of certain conditions for its application (ultimate 
facts), and when all or any of these conditions must be established 
in any inquiry regarding the application of that rule, then, any 
proposition (about an evidentiary fact) which tends to stand , 
either by itself or in connection with other propositions, in the 
relationship of initial conditions or one of the initial conditions 
for the application or otherwise, of one or more of the initial 
conditions of the legal rule, is relevant. To the question why a 
particular proposition is relevant to another general proposition 
the answer is simple: the former stands to the latter in the 
relationship of initial condition. Accordingly the degree of the 
acceptability of the general proposition, the truth or probability 
of the particular proposition, the probative force of the particular 
proposition and the degree of that probative force and its sufficiency 
either by itself or in connection with other propositions to establish 
the issue to which it relates, are matters which have no bearing 
whatsoever on the determination of relevancy. Some of these matters 
~e. the truth or probability of the evidentiary proposition, its 
probative force in the trial context, and the sufficiency of that 
probative force cannot be determined in advance of the actual trial 
process which, in any particular trial context, is a stage subsequent 
to that of the determination of relevancy and admissibility. The 
importance of the distinction between relevancy and weight and its 
validity, does not stem from the fact that these determinations 
occur at two different stages in the trial process, or that each 
task is (in cases tried by jury) performed by a different body. 
It is important from a holistic point of view because relevancy 
performs, in a trial context, a distinctive function different 
from that of weight or probative force. It is also important 
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since holism assigns to articulated experience (commonsense 
generalisations) an important role in determining what is relevant 
in the sense already explained. Holism does not regard the judging 
process in a trial context as an inferential process in which either 
explicit or implicit presuppositions, or both, provide the inferential 
base for that judgment. In a judicial context a judgment is always 
comparable to a new invention in natural sciences. 
In the light of the preceeding discussion we can now 
turn to Tillers' views about relevancy, weight, and probative 
force. As has already been indicated Tillers' construction of 
logical relevancy is different from the present author's conception 
of it. He considers the weighing of evidence to determine its 
52 probative force to be essential for the determination of relevancy. 
What he seems to have in mind is a timeless weighing in which the 
acceptability and the inferential soundness or probativity of a 
general proposition is assessed by the judge in order to assess the 
force of the conclusion to be drawn from it in conjunction with the 
evidentiary proposition to which it relates. This conception of 
weighing is no doubt possible where a legal rule demands it as a 
requirement of admissibility. In such a case the legal rule would 
stipulate a certain standard of general probative force as a condition 
of admissibility.53 This would mean that the general proposition 
under which the particular evidentiary proposition can be subsumed 
should attain a certain standard of inferential soundness or 
probative force which would secure the required standard of probative 
force for the conclusion to be drawn from the conjunction of the two 
propositions. Tillers seems to doubt the role of logical relevancy 
52, Ibid. pp 1019-26. 
53. For an elaborate discussion of this point see M. Y. Abu-Hareira 
The Protection of the Accused Against Prejudice, 1970 (unpublished) ch. 3. 
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to provide an adequate standard of admissibility. His view is 
that 'many and perhaps most admissibility decisions properly and 
necessarily require that the trial judge assesses the weight of 
the proffered evidence. ,.54 This view of Tillers is based on the 
commonly repeated claim that 'every proposition of fact is relevant 
to every other proposition of fact,.55 To say, by way of justifi-
cation of such claim, that logic cannot perform the role of 
excluding the possibility of a relationship between any two facts 
whieh can be cast in a logical form is to misconceive the role and 
function of logic. Th O 0 t h 1 d b 1 0 d 56 1S p01n as a rea y een exp a1ne • 
Tillers attributes to logic a role which it does not claim, and it 
cannot perform. 
How does a court logically assert that one fact may be 
inferred from another fact, and because of logic alone? 
It does so by asserting a logical connexion between two 
propositions of fact, an assertion that takes the form, 
if X, then Y. This connexion between X and Y is purely 
a logical connexion logic, however, cannot establish 
the degree to which this proposition should be regarded 
as probable. But how does logic determine whether one 
proposition of fact is relevant to another proposition 
of fact? Simply by saying so, as it were; for logic 
alone cannot rule out, in any case, a connexion between 
two propositions of fact that take the form, if X, then 
Y. Accordingly, in a strict sense, every proposition 
of fact is relevant to every other proposition of fact. 
This is shown simply because every two propositions of 
fact can be logically related by casting them into the 
form of the logical proposition, if X, then Y' 57 
It is true that any proposition of fact can be cast in a logical 
form making it formally relevant to any other proposition of fact 
as in; if X, then Y. Tillers' criticism of logical relevancy 
would have been valid had that test been advanced by the theory 
of logical relevancy. Logical relevancy as I understand it does 
54. Tillers, op.cit. p 1025. 
55. Ibid. P 1027. 
56. See above pp. 201 et seq. 
57. Tillers, op.cit. p 1027. 
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not accept this purely formal connection as the test of relevancy. 
What makes a proposition relevant to another is not its logical 
form or its occurrence in one of the argument places in a logical 
functor in which the other proposition occupies the other argument 
place. It is the existence of a relationship between two types 
of events which we know from our previous experience that justified 
the casting of propositions about these events in a logical form. 
Logical relevancy should therefore be confined to this type of 
casting which excludes any arbitrary formal casting as the test of 
relevancy. When logical relevancy is understood in this way the 
claim that it renders every fact relevant to every other fact 
becomes groundless. A proposition of fact is relevant if there 
is a general proposition which tends when conjoined with the 
proposition of fact to yield a conclusion supporting the existence 
or non-existence of the matter of fact in question. The supposed 
knowledge by the judge of the common sense generalisations and their 
relationship to other propositions which perform the function of 
the initial conditions for their application, rendered the identi-
fication of this connection for logical casting a simple task. 
However, the determination of relevancy involves no process of 
inference or weight. This is so because relevancy in judicial 
inquiries performs a function different from the function of weight. 
Relevancy admits in most cases all possible proofs including 
contradictory evidence. Accordingly any attempt to weigh relevant 
evidence in order to determine its reliability, its probative force 
and its sufficiency to establish any fact to which it is relevant 
is incompatible with the principal role of relevancy as a test for 
admissibility of conflicting and contradictory evidence. The only 
possible weighing in this context is a timeless one of each 
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evidentiary proposition in isolation from any other proposition 
to determine its general probative force. 
Tillers associates weight with this timeless weighing and 
thereby conf1ates the two conceptions of weighing to which we have 
58 
already referred. He does not see a valid distinction between 
weighing by the judge (for determining relevancy) and weighing by 
the fact-finder. This position of his can only be maintained on 
the assumption that weighing is always a timeless one simply because 
weighing by the judge cannot be anything but timeless. This view 
also finds support in his rejection of generalisations and explicit 
inferential mechanisms because of their inadequacy to supply the 
inferential structure of weighing. He probably saw for the same 
reason the inadequacy of explicit presuppositions for the determina-
tion of relevancy. This may explain why his account is silent on 
this point. 
Tillers refers to some situations in which the judge is 
confronted with the problem of weighing the evidence before 
determining its admissibility. This takes place where the evidence 
is both relevant and prejudicial to an accused person. 59 It is 
true that in such cases the test of relevancy by itself is not 
sufficient. The admissibility of the evidence must be based on 
its probative force. However this probative force is not the 
general probative force which results from conjoining the covering 
generalisation with the evidentiary proposition. It is a particular 
probative force of that item of evidence as a member of a consistent 
58. See above p. 200. 
59. See Ti1e1rs, op.cit p 1022. 
60 body of evidence. 
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This type of probative force is different 
from the general probative force of an item of evidence because 
it is not inferred from the general proposition. This weighing 
is not timeless •.. 
60. See below ch. 10, Sections A and C. 
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CHAPTER 9 
An Early Holistic Conception of 
Judicial Fact Finding 
A. Introductory Note 
The current probability debtates in this country and the 
United States can be seen as significant attempts to raise some of 
the problems relating to judicial fact finding either at the level 
of the individual element or/and that of the total mass of judicial 
proof. However these attempts have not proved successful because 
1 their approach is basically atomistic. 
A similar intellectual concern took place in the Scotland 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The 
discussions at that time, of philosophical speculations and their 
adaptation to the solution of the epistemological and methodological 
problems of moral inquiries and evidence connect directly with the 
current Anglo-American concerns in the same field. 2 In particular, 
James Glassford's book entitled An Essay on the principles of Evidence 
and Their Application to subjects of Judicial Enquiry, is a skilful 
adaptation of the "Common Sense" philosophy to problems of judicial 
1. The main contributions to the debates have already been given 
1n ch. 6 above. 
2. Thomas Reid's Works which were edited by Sir William Hamilton 
in 1803 include: An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1704), Intellectual 
Powers of Man (1785), and Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788). 
These works shall be referred to as 'Reid's Works', the reference is 
to Hamilton's Seventh edition (1846). The works of Dugald Stewart 
which are of interest to us are, Account of the Life and Writings of 
Thomas Reid (1803), published in Reid's Works; Elements of the. 
Philosophy of the Human Mind; 2 Vols. (Vol. 1, 1792-1812, and Vol. 11, 
1813-1821, hereafter referred to as "Elements" followed by volume number, 
'The dissertation on the progress of sciences,'see below n. 9; 
of G. Beattie's writing, our interest is in his Essay on Truth (1820). 
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fact-finding. 3 
B. Glassford and his Essay 
Very little information is available on either Glassford 
or his books and other writings. 4 Apart from what may be gathered 
from his own writings, there is hardly any useful information in 
print about him or his Essay. The only available source which 
purports to account for his life and publications is an entry in 
The Dictionary of National Biography. That entry, however, does 
not contain Glassford's date of birth and incorrectly gives the 
date of the publication of the Essay as 1812 instead of 1820. 5 
According to the above mentioned source, Glassford 
was the son of John Glassford of Dougalston. He was admitted 
to the faculty of advocates in 1793. He became Sherriff-Depute 
of Dumbartonshire and succeeded to Dougalston in 1819. He died 
in Edinburgh in July 1845. 
Although Glassford's interests were vast and varied,6 
his interests in the legal field were primarily in evidence and 
3. Hereafter referred to as "Essay". 
4. I have spent a considerable time looking into Scottish magazines, 
Reviews and journals of the first half of the 19th century in the 
hope of finding useful information on either Glassford or his books. 
Very little came out of this effort. I also consulted other 
probable sources, but again the result was fruitless. 
5. See an entry in DNB under "James Glassford"; see also an entry 
on John Glassford. 
6. As to his other interests see id.; see also some of his 
contributions to the Supplement of the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(1824) which included one article on C. B. Beccaria, and another 
on John Bacon (a sculptor). Glassford's contributions were 
signed "EE". 
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and procedure. His first book, Scottish Courts of Law, was 
published in 1812. The Essay was not intended originally to be 
published as a book. As Glassford himself told us in the advertis-
ment to the Essay, it was intended as a contribution to the 
Supplement of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 7 It was probably one 
of the four discourses on the progress of science proposed in a 
letter by D. Stewart to A. Constable in 1812. 8 The other three 
Dissertations, which were actually published in the Supplement, 
were by D. Stewart, John Playfair, and W. Thomas Brande. 9 
The fact that the essay was not meant originally to be 
published in book form may explain its heavy emphasis on the 
theoretical aspects of evidence. This circumstance may be one 
of the reasons for the deplorable disregard of the Essay by the 
legal profession. An early reference to Glassford's Essay lends 
support to this conclusion. It is by George Tait: 
The author had this work nearly ready for the press, and 
had written this preface, when Mr. Glassfurd's (sic) work 
on evidence was published. But, although that work 
contains enlarged and interesting views on the general 
sources and principles of evidence, it did not appear 
to him to supersede the occasion for a work of more detail 
and reference to authorities for practical use. lO 
7. See Essay, advertisment page •. 
8. See Encyclopaedia Brittanica vol. 9 p 379 (History of the 
Enclyclopaedia.) 
9. See D, Stewart "The progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and Political 
Philosophy since the Revival of Letters in Europe", Supplement of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1824) vols. 1 and 5, pp 1-166, 1-252 (hereafter 
referredto as "Supplement"); J. Playfair, "The progress of Mathematical 
and lliysical Science, since the Revival of Letters in Europe", Supplement 
'1824) vols. 2 and 4, pp. 1-127 and 1-90; W. Thomas Brande, "Tbe 
Progress of Chemical Philosophy, from the Early Ages to the end of the 
18th Century", ibid. vol 3 pp. 1-79. 
10. See, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Scotland, (1824) preface 
p. xii; see also Glassford, Essay, advertisment page 
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The disregard and neglect of Glassford may also be explainable 
as part of the general neglect and disregard of the philosophical 
tradition which constituted his intellectual sources, i.e. common 
11 
sense philosophy. It is rather ironical that Glassford's book 
was abridged and translated into Spanish as early as 1842. 12 
C. Glassford's Intellectual Sources 
Whether or not Glassford is a philosopher in his own right, 
is a matter which can not be adequately investigated in the present 
13 thesis. However, the first part of his book contains many 
14 indications of his original and independent thought. It contains 
a critical assessment of the major philosophies in the Western 
15 Tradition from the early Greeks to his own contempories. Leaving 
the issue of his originality apart, Glassford was either a follower 
of the Scottish School of common sense or one of its important 
11. N. MacCormick Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982) p. 103: 
The following interesting reference to Glassford occurred in J. Cohen's 
The Probable and the Provable p. 281 (n.4)," f or implicit anticipations 
of the view that judicial probabilities are inductive it is interesting 
to look at the account of "degrees of legal evidence", and their 
balancing, in J. Glassford, An Essay on the principles of Evidence and 
their Application to Subjects of Judicial Enquiry (1820), pp 638-80 .•.. 
The most interesting parts of the Essay, i.e. those rejecting the 
employment of mathematical analysis and doubting the usefulness of the 
Baconian methods in the field of judicial proof were not referred to by J. 
Cohen. 
12. Los Principios de la prue~a, y su aplicacion a las _Pesquisas Juridicas, 
por Santiago Glassford, Jose Maria T. Y. Herrera, (Trans.), 1842. 
13. For the same reasons similar issues relating to Bentham were 
not dealt with in chapter 2 above. 
14. See Essay, pp 1-230. 
15. It is a matter of interest that both Glassford and Bentham 
managed to avoid reference to one another. This may'; be explicable by 
the fact that Bentham wrote in 1802-13, but published after Glassford. 
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16 
members. Though he made occasional references to George Beattie17 
(the references are to Beattie's Essay on Truth) he shared most of 
18 the views of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart. Since the philosophical 
tradition to which Glassford belonged, namely the common sense 
philosophy of Reid and Stewart, contrasts significantly with the 
philosophical sources of the atomistic rationalist tradition, it 
is important to consider the main assumptions and doctrines of 
that philosophy.19 However, before attempting that task it is necessary 
to make it clear that our main concern with the Scottish philosophy of 
common sense is limited to an attempt at ascertaining its contribution 
to the thought of James Glassford as expressed in his Essay. For 
this reason the controversies surrounding the sources of Thomas Reid; 
his interpretation and understanding of the 'ideal theory'; who count 
as members of the Scottish common sense school are not of much concern 
20 for our present purposes. In what follows I will consider some of 
16. The School was founded by Reid. Those who are considered 
to be its members include in addition to Beattie and Stewart, J. 
Oswald and probably Sir William Hamilton, see generally S. A. Grave, 
The Scottish philosophy of Common Sense (1961), p. 5. 
17. First ed. 1770 (Edinburgh). 
18. See above n. 2. 
19. For further references on Reid and Stewart see generally, A. 
Seth, Scottish Philosophy (1885) Lectures 111 and IV; L: Schneider 
(ed.), The Scottish Moralist, (1967); s. A. Grave, Op.C1t. J. D. 
Newell, Philosophy and Common Sense (1980) p. 43 et.seq. 
20. See generally D. Stewart, Account of the Life and Writings 
of Thomas Reid, op.cit., and Elements II, pp 85-92. 
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the basic re1~vant features of their phi1osoohy and its doctrines. 
(1) Main Objectives of Common Sense Philosophy 
The main objectives of the Scottish Common Sense philosophers 
in general and Reid and Stewart in particular can, for present 
purposes, be stated as follows: (i) To refute what they termed 
'the ideal system' or 'ideal theory'; (ii) To offer, explicate 
and vindicate a common sense approach to the philosophy of mind 
and knowledge; and (iii) to advocate the application of Baconian 
methods of investigation for the acquisition of general knowledge 
in both natural and moral inquiries. 
(a) The Ideal System 
For Reid and other members of his school the 'ideal system' 
included Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Bereke1ey and Hume. 21 The 
ideal system, according to Reid, derived both its spirit and 
22 fundamental principles from Descartes. It originated in 
Descartes' universal doubt which prevented him from admitting anything 'but 
23 
what was absolutely certain and evident'. Descartes,doubt was 
based on the supposition that his senses, memory, reason and every 
other faculty might be fallacious. For this reason he resolved to 
disbelieve everything, until he was compelled by irresistible 
evidence to yield assent. Descartes noticed, however, that the 
mind is conscious of its own operations of thinking and doubting. 
He concluded from that assertion that the only reliable faculty of 
21. See Reid's Works, passim and esp. pp 99-104, 201-9, 298-306; 
Stewart, Elements I chs. 1, 2 and 4. 
22. Reid, Works p 204. 
23. Ibid. p 205. 
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of the mind is that of consciousness. According to Reid the 'ideal 
system' was grounded on that principle which attempted to establish 
the existence of the material world and truth through consciousness. 
Des Cartes no sooner began to dig in this mine, than 
scepticism was ready to break in upon him. He did 
what he could to shut it out. Malebranche and Locke , 
who dug deeper, found the difficulty of keeping out 
this enemy still to increase; but they laboured honestly 
in the design. Then Berkeley who carried on the work, 
despairing of securing all, bethought himself of an 
expedient:- By giving up the material world, which 
he thought might be spared without loss, and even 
with advantage, he hoped, by an impregnable partition, 
to secure the world of spirits. But, alas! the 
"Treatise of Human Nature" wantonly sapped the foundation 
of this partition, and drowned all in one universal 
deluge· 24 
According to Reid the 'ideal theory' admitted one first 
principle, namely, the faculty of consciousness. 25 As a consequence 
the ideal theorists were led to 'give attention only to operation, of 
which the mind is conscious without borrowing 'his' notion of them 
26 from external things' • Existence, according to Reid's interpre-
tation of the ideal theory, is 'what by just reasoning can be deduced 
f .,27 rom our sensat10ns. 
The major defects of the ideal theory or ,system as seen 
by the Scottish Common Sense philosophers can be roughly stated as 
follows 
(i) Simple ideas or notions: The Scottish Common Sense 
philosophers rejected the notion of the ideal theory which represented 
the faculty of consciousness as merely furnishing the mind with simple 
24. Ibid. P 103; for a charge that Reid and his followers misinterpret 
the ideal theory see, for example, S. A. Grave op.cit. ch. 3 esp. p 86 et.seq. 
25. Works p 206. 
26. Ibid. P 205. 
27. Id. 
216. 
apprehensions or 'notions' which the mind has of things without 
forming any judgment or belief regarding them before it further 
compares them to determine their agreement or disagreement. 28 
This distinction was not acceptable to the Common Sense philosophers 
since it disregarded the fact that every operation of sense involves 
both a simple apprehension of the object of sense and a judgment or 
belief about it. 29 Reid viewed the matter in a completely 
different light; 
[TJhese first notions are neither simple, nor are they 
accurate and distinct: they are gross and indistinct, 
and, like the Chaos, a rudis indigestaque moles. 
Before we can have any distinct notion of this mass, 
it must be analysed; the heterogeneous parts must 
be separated in our conception, and the simple elements, 
which before lay hid in the common mass, must first 
be distinguished, and then put together into one 
whole· 30 
(ii) Distinction between knowledge and judgment 
It was argued further that the distinction made by the 
31 ideal theory between 'knowledge' and 'judgment' is not acceptable. 
This is so because the distinction between self-evident or intuitive 
32 
conclusions and those which result from reasoning is groundless. 
According to Reid and Glassford the knowledge we get from either 
sense or reflection (consciousness), with the exception of the 
28. Ibid. P 208, Glassford's Essay, p l7b. 
29. Ibid. P 209; J. Glassford, Essay, pp 2, 3, 15, 62-3. 
Essay on Truth, pp55, 360. 
30. Works, p 418, see also ibid. pp 419 and 421; see also 
Glassford's Essay, pp 63-4. 
G. Beattie's 
31. Reid, Works, p 415,426; Glassford, Essay, pp 64-6, 68, 69.' Reid 
and Glassford rejected the treatment of judgment and knowledge as faculties 
of the mind, see Reid Works p. 415 see Glassford Essay, pp 62-3. 
32. Reid, Works, pp 308, 420; Glassford, Essay, p 66, when he stated 
that 'the real difference, in like manner, between self-evident or intuitive 
conclusions, and those which are the result of reasoning, lies, not so 
much in the nature of the intellectual faculty which is exercised, as in 
the repetition of its acts, and the duration of the process', see also 
ibid. pp 64-5. 
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conception of simple apprehensions, involves judgment and reasoning. 33 
Consciousness has no great advantage over external senses. 
(iii) 
Mr Locke very properly calls consciousness an internal 
sense. It gives the like imaediate knowledge of things 
in the mind - that is, of our own thoughts and feelings _ 
as the senses give us of things external. There is this 
differance, however, that an external object may be at 
rest, and the sense may be employed about it for some 
time. But the objects of consciousness are never at 
rest: the stream of thought flows like a river, without 
stopping a moment; the whole train of thought passes 
in succession under the eye of consciousness, which is 
always employed about the present. But is it 
consciousness that analyses complex operations, 
distinguishes their different ingredients, and combines 
them in distinct parcels under general names? This 
surely is not the work of consciousness, nor can it be 
performed without reflection, recollecting and judging 
of what we were conscious of, and distinctly remember. 34 
Appeal to Reasoning 
The major defect of the 'ideal theory' according to the 
Scottish Common Sense Sctool is its appeal to reasoning to establish 
facts and truths which can not be established by reasoning. These 
35 facts are matters of belief which cannot be regulated by reasoning. 
The philosophy of the 'ideal theory' attempted to establish by 
reasoning what ordinary people of COffimon sense accept without proof: 
Poor untaught mortals believe undoubtedly that there 
is a sun, moon, and stars; an eart~which we inhabit; 
country, friend~ and relations, which we enjoy; land, 
houses, and movables, which we possess. But philosophers, 
pitying the credulity of the vulgar, resolve to have no 
faith but what is founded upon reason. 36 
33. See Reid, Works pp 360 et.seq and pp 418 et.seq; see Glassford, 
Essay, p 62. 
34. Reid, Works, pp 419-20. 
35. Reid, Works, p 100; Glassford, Essay, p 14. 
36. 'Reid, Works, p 100; see also ibid. p 482. 
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Common sense philosophy offered 'First Principles' or 
'Fundamental Laws of Human Belief' to counter and refute the 
scepticism of the ideal theory. To this we shall now turn. 
(b) What is Common Sense? 
The primary sense in which Reid used the term Common 
Sense was to denote the source of what he called the original and 
natural judgments about existence and faith. According to Reid 
these judgments 
[A]re the inspiration of The Almighty, no less than our 
notions or simple apprehensions. They serve to 
direct us in the common affairs of life, where our 
reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They 
are part of our constitution; and all the discoveries 
of our reason are grounded upon them. They make up 
what is called the common sense of mankind; and, 
what is manifestly contrary to any of those first 
principles, is what we call absurd. The strength 
of them is good sense, which is often found in those 
who are not acute in reasoning. 37 
Reid also used the term common sense to describe an ability shared by 
38 
common people to discern evident truths. He also used it to mean 
the corr.mon judgment of mankind as a measure of truth. 39 Both 
Reid and Beattie were criticized for the imprecise use of the term 
40 
already noted. 
The account of common sense given by Glassford, who also 
37. Ibid. P 209; see Beattie's Essay on Truth, pp 55, 360 (where he 
opposed common sense with reasoning). 
38. See Reid, Works pp 422 et.seq, this is probably the same as the 
'Universal Cognitive Competence' recently revived by Jonathan Cohen, 
see below n 85, and the accompanying text, 
39. Reid, Works p 423. 
40. See D. Stewart, Elements II, pp. 85-93. Stewart attempted to defend 
Reid (i0id. pp 91-3) by throwing the blame on Beattie who believed common 
sense as 'a power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, 
not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive and 
irresistable impulse', Beattie, op.cit. p 40. 
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criticized both Beattie and Reid is very clear. 4l For Glassford 
common sense denotes 'that belief which is entertained by men in 
general, of the information given by their various faculties:,42 
He did not seem to accept its other meaning as 'that ordinary 
measure of knowledge and information which these faculties afford; 
and, in this last acceptation, resolves into a common or general 
consent of mankind,43 In its second possible meaning as a 
measure of truth in general, common sense, according to Glassford, 
is too vague a doctrine to be admitted without many limitations. 44 
In this regard Glassford is in agreement with Stewart who consciously 
avoided the employment of the terms 'first principles'. What Reid 
termed 'first principles' or Common Sense, Stewart called 'Fundamental 
Laws of belief'. Stewart summarized these laws and explained their 
nature, and criticized Reid's terminology in the following passage: 
From such propositions as these - ! exist; ! am the 
same person to-day that I was yesterday; the material 
worrd has an existence-independent of my mind; the 
general laws of nature will continue; in fUtUre, to 
operate uniformly as in time past - no inference can 
be deduced, any more than from the intuitive truths 
prefixed to the Elements of Euclid. Abstracted from 
other data, they are perfectly barren in themselves; 
nor can any possible combination of them help the 
mind forward one single step in its progress. It is 
for this reason, that, instead of calling them, with 
some other writers, first principles, I have distinguished 
them by the title of fundamental laws of belief; the 
former word seeming to me to denote,according to Common 
usage, some fact, or some supposition, from which a 
series of consequences may be deduced. 45 
Accordingly, the doctrines of Common Sense are axiomatic. 
41. Glassford, Essay, 160-6. 
42. Ibid. pp 163, see also pp 164-5. 
43. Id. see also ibid. pp 119-20. 
44. Ibid. P 164. 
45. Elements, II, pp 59-60, see also pp 52 et.seq. 
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Their truth is 'metaphysical or transcendenta1. 46 In this respect 
they have nothing in common with Common Sense Generalizations. The 
essential role of Common Sense doctrines is to refute the sceptical 
doctrine of the 'ideal theory'. According to both Reid and Stewart 
the acquisition of general knowledge in both moral and natural fields 
of inquiry is regulated by the Baconian methods of investigation. 
This we will consider in the next section. 
(2) Scientific Methods of analysis and investigation. 
(a) Mathematical analysis: 
Reid, Stewart, and Glassford opposed the application of 
47 
mathematical analysis to moral inquiries. Their opposition was 
based on the incompatibility of that type of analysis to moral 
inquiries. I shall deal with this point in a subsequent section 
48 in this chapter. 
(b) The Baconian Methods of investigation. 
Both Reid and Stewart were great admirers of Francis Bacon 
49 
and his methods of investigation. The method itself was included 
b R ·d 50 in one of the first principles of Common Sense y el . 
to Stewart: 
According 
46. Ibid. P 57, but see Glassford, Essay, p 18-9 (where he used the 
terms 'first principles'. 
47. Reid, Works, Vol. 11, ch. IV. , also Works, Vol.l., ch. 1; 
Stewart, Elements, II ch. 2; Glassford, Essay, pp 77, 79, 90, 190-9. 
The analysis they opposed was the type of analysis suggested by both 
La Place and David Hartley, see below pp. 240 et seq. 
48. See below, p 236. 
49. Reid, Works passim, see esp. pp 436, 484-5; Stewart, Reid 
Works, p 8; and, Elements, I pp 48-56, and Elements II chs. 4 and 5. 
50. Works, p 436. 
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The idea of prosecuting the study of the human mind 
on a plan analogous to that which had been so succes;fully 
adopted in physics by the followers of Lord Bacon, if not 
first conceived by Dr Reid, was, at least, first carried 
successfully into execution in his writings 
·51 
Though Glassford seems to have been interested in the writings of 
52 Francis Bacon, he had no great faith in the application of the 
53 Baconian method to moral inquiries. This stance marks him off 
from that enclave of the Scottish school consisting of Reid and 
Stewart, so he is not a 'Baconian'; neither is he an idealist, 
nor a sceptic nor a Pascalian. If he is not any of these, what 
makes him different? In what follows I shall argue that Glassford 
is a holist. I shall explain his approach and contrast it with the 
atomistic approach in relation to relevance, common-sense general-
isations and probabilities in judicial fact finding processes. 
D. Glassford's Approach to the analysis of Evidence 
(1) Relevance and Weight: 
The relation between the relevance and the weight of an 
evidentiary item and the lack of a proper distinction between the 
two concepts is a source of great difficulty and confusion in 
54 
writings on evidence and proof. 
51. Ibid. P 8. 
To understand the relation, and 
52. Glassford translated Bacon's 'Exemplum Tractatus de Fontibul 
Juris' in 1823. 
53. See Essay, pp 188-9, 195-9; see also below n 96, and the 
accompanying text. 
54. See for example Phipson on Evidence (11th ed. 1970) p 64; see 
also Wigmore on Evidence (1940) Vol.l pp 289-411. The distinction 
which Wigmore made between weight and relevance (inference) is of an 
entirely different kind from the one I have in mind. It is one between 
the impact of the probative force of a single item of evidence and that of a 
total mass. It's significance is to show that a single item of evidence 
has no demonstrative or conclusive proof, see ibid. P 296. What I 
have in mind is that certain relevant items may have no probative 
value in the particular circumstances of a case. 
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grasp the main source of the confusion, it is desirable to observe 
that there was a time in the history of the law of evidence and its 
discourse when both concepts were unknown. The concept of evidence 
itself covered both. That was so when evidence consisted of 
Testimony and documents which were believed to be credible according 
to an a priori scale (rules of competence). When the rules of 
admissibility were satisfied the observation of a competent witness 
was regarded as equivalent to observation by the Tribunal itself -
evidence was proof. 
The subject of evidence was the 'fact in issue' in its 
totality, so the issue of 'inference' did not arise. In this sense 
its sufficiency could not raise any issue. A concept of evidence 
so narrow and limited entails an equally limited mental operation 
on the part of the fact-finder. Proof was seen as very similar 
to perception. 
Clearly, any change in this concept of evidence and its 
object is bound to involve new mental operations on the part of the 
fact-finder. This change can be said to be brought about by the 
acceptance of circumstances evidence. 55 Obviously circumstantial as 
evidence posed new problems for discourse about evidence. The first 
problem, which was not posed by testimony or documentary evidence, was 
what made a circumstance 'evidence'? The second problem was that, 
unlike testimony and documentary evidence, a circumstance may be 
admitted without rendering 'proof'; that is, a single circumstance 
is never sufficient to prove a probandum, indeed. The first problem 
poses the issue of relevance, the second poses that of weight. It 
is interesting to note that Bentham's and Glassford's examples of 
55. Compare, for example, I. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability 
(1975) pp 31-48. 
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relevance came mainly from circumstantial evidence, and the same thing 
56 
can be said about weight. A test of what renders a circumstance 
relevant was needed. When that test was provided circumstantial 
evidence was still found to be different from 'evidence' of testimony 
in another important respect ~ 1 t involved a complex mental process 
" 
on the part of the fact-finder to determine its persuasive force. 
The last issue is distinct from that of whether or not the sources 
relating the individual circumstances are credible or not. This is 
still an aspect of testimonial evidence in so far as circumstances 
are generally proved by evidence of testimony. It can be seen that 
the credibility or reliability of the source of evidence is distinct 
from the impact of the evidence on the mind of the fact-finder. The 
former is credibility, the latter is weight. The importance of the 
issue of credibility, for our present purposes, is that it meant that 
both testimonial and circumstantial proof can be unreliable as asserted. 
Evidence, therefore, was distinct from credibility and weight. A 
failure to make this distinction is often occasioned by thinking about 
evidence in its narrow and limited sense explained above. The 
applications and definitions of relevance in terms of probative force 
57 
are good examples of this confusion. 
By contrast, Glassford made the distinction between relevance 
and weight central to his conceptual framework and consistently 
adhered to it throughout his book. Unlike many scho1ar~ he made no 
direct connection between relevance and weight and his clear distinc-
tion avoided the whole source of the confusion associated with the 
56. See Bentham, 7 Works, ch. 4; see Glassford Essay, pp 569-70. 
57. See above n 54 see also ch. 8 pp 192 et seq. 
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relation between the two terms. He stated ~n relation to suspicious 
evidence: 
[O]n account of some reasonable susp~c~on attaching to it, 
[objectional evidence] may be received in the absence of 
other proof... But it is obvious that in such examples 
where evidence of a suspicious kind is admitted for ' 
consideration, the credibility of it, or the effect which 
it shall have upon the mind of the judge or jury is a 
separate thing, and must .•. be weighed by the dictates 
of reason, and the natural principles of belief'
s8 
The concept of relevance was not treated in a detailed or systematic 
manner by Glassford. His thinking about it has to be constructed 
from his views about the consistency of truth, the concurrence of 
proofs and the role of commonsense generalizations and probabilities. 
However, he referred to relevant facts as 
[F]acts which being proved serve to create a reasonable 
belief, in the absence of testimony or other direct evidence, 
are in general either such as usually attend upon and are 
connected with that other fact, not discovered, which is the 
object of inquiry; or such as in all cases attend and 
are combined with it, such as cannot, according to our 
notions of the consistency of truth be supposed separate 
from it, and without which it appears utterly inexplicable' s9 
These remarks can be criticized as representing proof as one-sided 
and overlooking the heterogeneous nature of judicial proof. But 
as has already been mentioned, the other concepts used by Glassford 
about proof are interrelated. The above remark by Glassford, there-
fore, should be read in conjunction with his views on the consistency 
of truth and the role of generalizations which will be explained below. 
When this is done, the concept of relevance will be seen to be confined 
. 60 
to facts which point to any of the possible conclus~ons. It is 
58. See Essay, pp 260-1, see also p 571. 
59. Ibid. pp 569-70, and 258-9, 573. 
60. Ibid. pp 186-7 and 575. 
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true that these possible conclusions, when viewed within their sets 
or types, are capable of being thought of probabilistically. In 
this relation a fact can be said to be probable , or more probable 
or less probable than another related fact. The mental process 
of the fact-finder involves comparative judgments regarding the 
frequency of occurrence of the set members. In judicial proof 
we are not concerned, normally, with a set or even comparable sets. 
But even within a single se~ relevance is not concerned with judging 
frequency. It is concerned with identifying their 'possibility' 
as members of the set. In so far as each member of a set is known 
to have existed before, it is relevant, if its existence is connected 
with the subject of inquiry. To argue that relevance is concerned 
with probability or probative force is to say that what is compara-
tively less probable is irrelevant; while, in fact, we admit any 
relevant evidence of a fact and its contradiction, and one of them 
must be comparatively improbable. In short, it can be said that when 
we think of what is relevant we are simply conceiving the possibility 
of the 'relevant', not perceiving it. We are not believing or 
61 judging or even comparing. According to Glassford judging and 
believing in judicial fact· finding processes should not be done, in 
point of time, and reasoning, in a deductive manner from general 
experience or what takes place in the majority of cases. 
62 
He has a particular concern for the individual case. 
This is shown by his discussion of presumptions: 
61. See Reid, Works, pp 360-79; for a criticism of Reid's views on 
conception see Stewart, Elements I,ch. 3 pp 133 et.seq. 
62. Glassford, Essay, pp 130-1. 
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Presumptions, on the other hand, are conclusions drawn 
without regard to the circumstances of an individual case' 
and sometimes, though not necessarily, are independent of' 
any proof respecting even the implied will or motives of 
a party. They are conclusions of a general nature; or 
such as, being comformable to what most frequently 
happens under the circumstances where we have evidence 
of the fact, are applied to cases where the same situation 
occurs, but in which we have no evidence, either direct or 
indirect of the particular fact. They are inferences 
drawn from that which takes place in the great majority of 
instances' 63 
This particular regard for the individual case should emerge clearly 
when we discuss his views and the holistic approach to judicial 
proof in relation to weight. 
(2) Weight: 
The discussion of a single item of evidence or a total mass 
usually employs terms like: weight, inference, credibility, 
assessment, etc. The concept of weight is generally used to include 
all of these. 64 It is sometimes used to signify the actual impact 
of the 'evidence' on the mind of the fact-finder. This ought to be 
possible only when we take into account the internal point of view of 
65 the fact-finder regarding the operations of his mental powers. 
It can also be used to describe the function which is usually performed, 
in evidence discourse, when discussing what fact-finders usually do 
when they are weighing. In this last respect it is usually done 
without taking into account the internal point of view of the fact-
finder. We are here concerned with 'weight' and its cognates in 
relation to four contexts. 
63. Ibid. pp 582-3. 
64. However see above n. 54. 
65. See Glassford, Essay, p 182. 
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The first deals with the credibility of a source of evidence. 
The second with the assessment of the impact of a single item on the 
mind of the fact-finder. The third deals with the indiscriminate 
impact of a mass of evidence on the mind of the fact-finder. The 
last context is what is consciously known to the fact-finder to have 
impact on his mind, i.e. to produce assent. These distinctions and 
their implications are not generally attended to in discussions of 
evidence and proof. The operations involving these concepts and the 
contexts giving rise to them in judicial fact- finding and writings 
about evidence have not, to my knowledge, been questioned. In fact 
the atomistic approach to judicial proof assumes their existence, and 
66 bases its treatment on that assumption. The holistic approach 
rejects most of these assumptions, as we shall see. 
To illustrate what I mean by the assumptions of the atomistic 
approach we may consider some of Wigmore's views and see what objections 
can be made against them. For Wigmore, the trial process consists 
of at least two stages. This can be seen in his 'four steps' of 
apprehending and evaluating evidence and its source. 67 The first 
stage consists of successive stages in which each source of evidence 
is apprehended. At this stage specific single inferences are drawn 
the source is believed or disbe1ieved. 68 When this process is at 
an end and all the probable inferences are drawn, the second stage 
starts. This 'consists in the analysis of the effect of a mass of 
evidential facts. This is something larger than the analysis at each 
,69 
separate fact, though it involves no new canons of reasoning. 
66. See for an example of this assumption, Wigmore's Science of 
JUdicial Proof (1937) pp 34-6. 
67. Id. see also above n. 54. 
68. The Science of Judicial Proof, pp 2, 8, 25, 21-2,310, 859. 
69. Ibid. P 37 and chs. 30-31. 
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The importance accorded to generalized knowledge and the role 
assigned to it in making inferences and asserting propositions are at 
the heart of the atomistic approach. That position is shared by both 
the Pasca1ians and the Baconians. In this respect their analysis is 
70 
employed on validated inferences. One of the main assumptions of 
the atomistic approach (Pasca1ian and Baconian) is that the weighing 
of evidence, that is to say the crediting of the sources of propositions 
and the assertion of single propositions as true or probabl~ starts at 
the beginning of the trial process. This is basic for the Pasca1ians 
(especially the Bayesians) who can not apply their method without a 
prior assumption. The Baconians' assumption is that the general 
proposition, under which the elementary proposition is subsumed, is 
valid and true. The elimination procedures are intended to affirm 
71 
or exclude the qualifications of that general rule. As we shall 
see the process of elimination does not function effectively in judicial 
inquiries; and it is further submitted that the assumption that 
weighing starts at the beginning of the trial is not sound. 
Three basic objections can be made to the atomistic approach: 
Firstly that the evidence in any contested case normally consists of 
the elements of at least two contradictory stories. One must 
be true, the other false. The elements of both stories are inter-
mixed. It is, therefore, illogical to assign a truth value or 
probability indiscriminately to the mixed elements. The elements 
of the true story can only be known, or believed to exis~ when a 
final decision is made. Prior to that moment no judgment or belief 
70. See above ch. 7. 
71. See J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, (1977), chs. 13-16, 
18. 
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regarding any single item of evidence ought to take place. 72 
The second objection is that in so far as the elements of 
proof of an occurrence are connected together and produce proof 
as a connected whole, no single element of that whole should be 
treated in isolation from the other elements. 
Finally, the atomistic approach is objectionable on the 
ground that it undermines the factual nature of judicial proof. 
It converts facts into propositions inferred from general experience 
with little regard to the circumstances of the particular case. 
Support for the first objection can be found in Glassford's 
notion of the consistency of truth. This notion has narrowed his 
concept of relevance (as we have seen above) and that of weight as 
well. According to Glassford weight is the actual effect of evidence 
on the mind of the particular fact-finder. It is not, even, the 
effect of the indiscriminate mass of all the evidence in the case. 
It is the effect of some of the relevant evidence which is found by 
73 the fact-finder to constitute a consistent story. As to the 
second objection, Glassford's view is that the ultimate assent or 
72. See Reid, Works, p 434 where he stated that it is 'not in our 
power to judge as we will. The judgment is carried 
along necessarily by the evidence, real or seeming, which appears to 
us at the time. But, in propositions that are submitted to our 
judgment, there is this great difference - some are of such a nature 
that a man of ripe understanding may apprehend them distinctly, and 
perfectly understand their meaning, without finding himself under any 
necessity of believing them to be true or false,probable or improbable. 
The judgment remains in suspense, until it is inclined to one side 
or another by reasons or arguments.'. 
73. Glassford, Essay, pp 569-70. 
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conclusion is not reached by any consideration of single items of 
evidence, separately considered, or in succession. Reasoning can 
only obtain ultimate assent on the whole evidence in the case, 
and only when proofs concur according to our notion of the 
consistency of truth. On this he said: 
The concurrence of different evidences is a circumstance 
of great importance in the investigation of truth; and 
forms a powerful motive to assent. From the united 
testimony of many witnesses to the same matter and , , 
generally, from the combination and union of various 
proofs, whatever their kind may be, an additional 
probability arises, and a conviction is produced, which 
may often be much greater in degree than any which would 
be afforded by each particular evidence, separately or 
successively considered. 74 
The above requirement is made particularly clear in relation to 
circumstantial evidence. He thinks that: 'it is the effect of 
all the circumstances, combined and united together, which forms 
the evidence; and no part of the facts proved, however remarkable 
in themselves, shall be considered separately from the rest.,.75 
As to the third objection we have already seen that he is sceptical 
of generalizations used in judicial proof. For him; 
[TJhere is no positive line and boundary, according to which 
the truth or falsehood of the fact testified can be 
assigned, without a consideration of the particular 
evidence so adduced. It cannot be resolved, a priori, 
that any contingent truth, by whatsoever number of witnesses, 
and in whatsoever circumstances attested, is absolutely 
incredible. It is a question of more or less. The 
individual/instances must always be examined, without 
resting in the supposed general rule; and the judgment 
74. Ibid. P 216, 'Consistency of Truth' is an important principle of 
Common Sense philosophy. It means that 'of their contradictory 
propositions, if we can prove one to be necessarily true, we th~reby 
prove the other to be necessarily false. Contingent truths admit of 
being proved in the same manner, not demonstratively indeed, but probably. 
In many subjects of probable reasoning, if we prove either of two 
contradictory propositions to be probably true, we no less prove thereby 
that the other is probably false, whether the medium of proof be the 
same in both, or different methods be applied •.. ' Reid, Works, p 73-4; 
see also Glassford, Essay, p 34. 
75. Essay, p 573. 
231. 
can only be formed after such an examination of 
particulars· 76 
If the above analysis is correct then it follows that with regard to 
each independent issue, there is one moment in the trial process 
where the evidence ought to be weighed. That moment is at the very 
end of the trial when all possible evidence on that issue has been 
heard. One possible objection is that as a matter of practice, 
relevant evidence is adduced in stages and each single item at each 
stage must have an impact on the mind of the fact-finder, and as 
such, have some weight. Glassford would probably have a number of 
answers to this objection. The first of these probable answers is 
that judicial proof, invariably, involves complex issues and various 
mental processes, but it is ultimately resolvable by the faculty of 
reasoning. According to Glassford: 
In every conclusion of reasoning, not only are we conscious 
of exercising the faculty of reasoning, but we have also a 
belief of some existence or relation, concerning which our 
judgment is formed, or on which it is employed. The 
latter kind of assent does not, indeed, in every exercise 
of the reasoning faculty, necessarily follow our conception 
of the terms, or the definition of them, nor attend each 
part of the process; for the assent accompanies the 
conclusion, and the process of judging is not complete 
till the mind has formed its inference. But whenever the 
last step is made, and the ultimate conclusion reached, 
then follows in all cases that act of assent or belief, 
which has now been noticed as the peculiar result of 
evidence· 77 
The second possible answer may be that, it is true that the evidence 
may have an impact on the mind of the fact-finder but that impact 
need not be a belief. It involves a conception of the facts, and, 
of course, perception of the fact that they have been asserted by 
76. Ibid. pp 215-6 
77. Ibid. P 2; see also above n. 72. 
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witnesses, if that is the case, but there need be no inference about 
the existence or non-existence of the fact testified to. It is quite 
familiar in any day-to-day affair in life that we suspend belief in 
the existence of a fact or matter in the knowledge that more informa-
tion is on its way to us. 78 
A clear and distinct contrast between James Glassford's views 
and the holistic approach, on the one hand, and the atomistic approach, 
on the other, can be seen in the attitude of the former to the use 
of common-sense generalizations (or generalized experience) in the 
process of weighing evidence. In the next section we shall consider 
in this light various attitudes to common-sense generalizations. 
(3) Common-sense Generalizations. 
The commonly accepted view in writings on judicial proof is 
that an inference from each individual fact, adduced in evidence, 
can only be believed or disbelieved by being conjoined to a general 
proposition whose truth is generally accepted. The qualifying term 
'generally' in the preceding sentence is meant to indicate that the 
inference or conclusion from such generalizations is not a necessary 
one. This is so because; 
[M]uch of our every day vocabulary has been developed to 
describe the complexly diverse surface features of our 
everyday experience, and the terms of this vocabulary 
do not readily line up one-to-one with one another in the 
construction of well-supported first-order generalizations. 
Human conduct, plant and animal life, the weather all 
these are fields for which we have a rich descriptive 
vocabulary. But we can rarely construct well-supported 
generalizations about these fields in terms of our every-
day vocabulary without introducing several qualifications 
into the antecedents of the generalizations· 79 
78. See above n. 61; see also Reid, Works, pp 222-4. 
79. J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, pp 201-2. 
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The incomplete nature of these proof-rules (i.e. the relevant 
generalizations) prompted Wigmore's analysis contained in his 
'four steps' and his chart-method. BO Mr. Jonathan Cohen endeavoured 
to apply Baconian methods of investigation together with those 
of Mill to ensure the inferential soundness of these proof-rules. 
His basic assumption is that the eliminative procedures of these 
methods are effective at the levels of inductive support and 
Bl inductive probability. If this basic assumption is wrong, then, 
the same question, namely how are these eliminations made and 
what aids the fact-finder to make them, poses itself anew and 
demands an answer which Jonathan Cohen does not provide. Let us 
for the purpose of testing the assumption take one of Jonathan 
Cohen's examples. I shall limit my criticism to this case only. 
For this reason the example to be chosen is a very simple one in 
which the choice of the initial hypothesis, the evidence indicating 
it, the fact that it is well-supported and the proper choice of the 
relevant variables should be assumed. The example is: 
Perhaps a policeman swears, and defending cousel 
accepts that the accused was found at 3 a.m. in the 
garden of a house which had just been burgled, and also that 
the stolen jewels were then in his pocket. The 
conclusion proposed (italics added) by the prosecu-
tion is that the accused was the burglar. The rough 
generalization tacitly invoked as a licence for this 
inference might be that normally, if an object has been 
moved from its usual place and a man is found nearby immed-
iately afterwards in possession of the object, then he 
deliberately removed it himself. So the defence has 
to try to prove, in effect, that this generalization is 
inapplicable to the situation in question. Perhaps, 
for example, the defence can produce testimony alleging 
that some other stranger also was in the garden imme-
BO. Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof, pp 34 et.seq. 
Bl. The Probable and the Provable, p 175. 
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diately after the burglary and that the defendant me 1 
. d . h h' . re y p1cke up, W1t t e 1ntent10n of returning, what the 
other man had dropped. Clearly the presence of one or 
more other people is one relevant variable for such 
genera1izations~s th~t tacitly invoked by the prosecution ... 
So the prosecut10n, 1n order to remove any element of 
reasonable doubt, would need to destroy the force of the 
defence's testimony in some waY"'82 
This example assumes much of what the method of relevant variables, 
and its eliminative procedures, is intended to achieve. One of the 
relevant variables, however, is the alleged presence of other people 
at the scene. How is this proposition to be resolved? It may 
be true or false. What about the allegation that the accused was 
seen running away? Both these involve issues of crdibi1ity and it 
is admitted by Cohen that questions of the credibility of testimonial 
evidence can raise issues about a number of relevant variab1es. 83 
But issues like the above are real issues in judicial proof which 
should not be assumed. In physical sciences and inquiries which 
admit of controlled experiments the elimination of alternative 
explanations is achieved by the observed findings of the experiment 
itself. In judicial proof it is a complex reasoning process. 
Glassford anticipated such methods and their limitations when he wrote 
that: 
When we endeavour, as above, to apply the scientific 
methods of calculating probabilities, to measure, for 
example, the degrees of probability in the evi~ence of 
testimony, we are immediately met by this diff1c~lty, 
that the terms are unknown; an obstacle which, 1n 
reasoning, not from hypothesis, but fact, renders the 
information so acquired nearly, if not altogether, 
useless. We neither do, nor can know,the number of 
cases in which men have given evidence in particular 
supposed circumstances; and we neither know, nor can 
82. Ibid. pp 248-9. 
83. Ibid. pp 250-1 
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know, the number of cases in which men so circumstanced 
have spoken the truth. There is therefore no real 
light gained by the calculus' 84 
It seems that both Wigmore and Cohen regard this as a pure subjective 
exercise in which the fact-finder's competence can be assumed. Cohen 
mentioned this in the following: 
The inductivist analysis, however, has no difficulty at all 
here. It presupposes only that when a juryman takes up 
his office his mind is already adult and stocked with a 
vast number of commonplace generalizations about human 
acts, attitudes, intentions, etc., about the more familiar 
features of the human environment, and about the inter-
actions between these two kinds of factor, together with 
an awareness of many of the kinds of circumstances that 
are favourable or unfavourable to the application of each 
such generalization. Without this stock of information 
in everyday life he could understand very little about 
his neighbours, his colleagues, his business competitors, 
or his wife. He would be greatly handicapped in 
explaining their past actions or predicting their future 
ones. But with this information he has the only kind of 
background data he needs in practice for the assessment 
of inductive probabilities in the jury-room. 8s 
It may be true that Glassford shares the same conviction as to 
'Universal Cognitive Competence', yet he does not accord the same 
or a similar role, as the atomists do, to common-sense generalizations. 
He expressed this clearly when he said: 
As these calculations are founded upon, and derive their 
authority from, the evidence of experience, so they are 
limited by it; since experience affords the only data 
by which the probability can be estimated. They do not, 
indeed, according to any very accurate notion, furnish 
the evidence of truth or facts, but only serve, by a 
limitation of cases to determine the reasonableness of , . 
our expectation in certain given conditions. And,.1n 
reality this is the true nature and amount of exper1ence, , . 
in all instances, so far as it may be said to const1tute 
a species of evidence: for the evidence of past and 
present events cannot be said to rest on experience; 
and, with regard to the future, it is a ground of 
84. Essay, pp 197-8. 
8 274 see al so Wigmore, Science 5. The Probable and the Provable, p ~~~~~--~----~----~C~T.~.--r. d T~'1·n'1·ng 'Some Sceptcism about some of Judicial Proof, p 65. r1t1c1ze w 
Scepticisms II' (forthcoming). 
86 
anticipation only. 
(4) Probability 
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Glassford referred to two types of probability in his book. 
One of the probabilities is mathematical, the other is non-mathematical. 
I chose to refer to the latter as non-mathematical because Glassford's 
use of it is very general. In this section I shall deal only with 
non-mathematical probabilities, reserving the topic of mathematical 
probability for the next section. 
(a) Non-Mathematical Probability: Though Glassford contrasted 
what he called moral probability with mathematical probability it is 
not wholly clear what he meant by moral probability. He used the 
word 'probability' in at least four different senses. 
Firstly, he used it in contrast with demonstrative and 
certain knowledge. In this sense: 
[IJt applies to, and denotes, those truths which, from the 
evidence attending them, we are inclined to believe, 
although that evidence falls short of what we consider 
as certainty ... 87 
In this sense it is used at a very high level of abstraction to denote 
one type of human knowledge as contrasted with another. This use 
. involves no particular conclusion about a particular knowledge 1n 
relation to any circumstance or a mental process of a person. 
In a second sense, it is used at an even higher level of 
abstraction. In this sense, all human knowledge 1S probable when 
contrasted with possible non-human knowledge. This is the meaning 
referred to in the following passage: 
86. See (ssa~, pp 187-8; see also J. Cohen, "Free proof'in William 
Twining, ed. , Facts in Law, (1983) p 1. 
440 448 482 et seq; Stewart 87. Essay, p 184; see also Reid, Works pp " -
Elements, pp 180 et seq. 
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~robability and Certainty are relative terms, not only 
1n respect of each other, and as applied to the hum 
. b . an 
m1nd, ut 1n respect of the knowledge which we may 
conceive to be possessed by different orders of created 
intelligence. In the latter sens~ it may be true that 
all human knowledge is comparatively uncertain as well 
as comparatively limited. 88 ' 
In the above mentioned two senses probability has no reference to any 
particular evidence, information, decision or decider. When, 
however, he refers to a particular decision of a particular person, 
he does not seem to regard that decision as one of probability. It 
is a certain decision from the point of view of that decider; he 
(the decider) accepts the evidence. 'But in the former sense (the 
case referred to in the passage above quoted in note 8~), that is to 
say, in relation to ourselves and our purposes and duties, much of 
our knowledge is altogether certain, being attended with such evidence 
as produces the unqualified assent of our minds. ,.89 This is the 
third sense in which probability is used. The most interesting 
aspect of Glassford's treatment of judicial proof is his seeing the 
effect of evidence from the perspective of the judicial fact-finder. 
He is not simply reporting 'the decision,.90 In other words, when 
the internal point of view of the fact-finder is considered, in the 
light of the evidence he believes brings about that assurance, his 
finding is a matter of certainty for him. Finally, he used probability 
to refer to general conclusions derived from experience. As we 
shall see, Glassford regards the ultimate judicial decision as a 
matter of choice for the fact-finder (Judge or Jury) and he does not 
88. Glassford, Essay, p 6. 
89. Id.; see also ibid. p 182; see Reid, Works, p 487. 
90. See N. M. L. Nathan, Evidence and Assurance, (1980) pp 8-65. 
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offer a criterion for that decision. In that sense, it is a subjective 
decision from the external point of view of the observer. 
It seems, however, that Glassford would regard all the 
evidence, before the final decision is reached by the fact-finder 
as probable evidence in the first sense explained above. This, in 
my view, explains the following and similar passages written by Glassford: 
'the comparison and balance of probable evidence does not admit of 
being reduced to a system of perfect and absolute rules. ,91 It depends 
on the extent and nature of the particular proof. Conclusions from 
experience help the fact-finder to narrow the field of inquiry. He 
seems to refer to those conclusions when he contrasts mathematical 
reasoning or probability with what he refers to as moral probability, 
in the following statement; 
[IJt is unquestionable that principles, similar to those 
on which the ratios of probability may be calculated by 
that science, are admitted into our reasonings on the 
subject of testimony; not, indeed, as limits of this 
reasoning but as parts and elements of it. Without an 
attention to the qualifications which moral evidence thus 
admits, our knowledge would be altogether vague and full 
of errors' 92 
When referring to the measurability of moral probability his reference 
to conclusions from experience becomes obvious. This is supported by 
the following statement. '[tJhe only question of importance under this 
head, is whether, and ho~ far, this probability admits of being 
measured. ' It is difficult to measure for two causes: 
First, from the various extent of the faculties which 
are employed, and the great diversity of measure in 
which they are possessed by different individuals; and, 
Secondly, from the complexity of cases, and the ever-
varying combination of the premises, on which all our 
conclusions regarding probable or moral evidence depe~d'93 
91. Essay, p 201. 
92. Ibid. P 45. 
93. Ibid pp 185. 
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The concept of moral probability is similar to Mr. Jonathan 
Cohen's inductive probability. As we shall shortly see, Glassford 
used less rigorous arguments against the applications of mathematical 
probability than those used by Cohen. It remains to be said that their basic 
points are similar, although the role assigned by Glassford to moral 
probability is far less ambitious than that assigned to inductive 
probability. For Glassford's claim is that: 
All that, in many cases, can be attained, is, to 
circumscribe and narrow the range of inquiry, and 
limit, to a certain number, those conclusions which 
are possible, under the actual circumstances; or, 
at most, perhaps, reduce them to an alternative. 
And this, although it is still an imperfect state of 
information, and leaves the truth, even at last, 
involved in some obscurity, is however, in many 
cases, a very important and useful step of knowledge' 94 
So the most that can be achieved by this method is to reduce the 
possible conclusions to an alternative, which alternative 1S just 
a possibility. The only advice that Glassford was ready to g1ve 
to the fact-finder is to obtain more facts by enlarging the field 
of inquiry and assume one particular explanation or hypothesis and 
apply to the known phenomena, and this in succession with any greater 
95 
number of conceivable or given hypotheses. 
This is comparable to Jonathan Cohen's method of relevant 
variables without any claim to an effective objective elimination 
procedure. For Glassford the scientific methods of discovery are 
of a limited value and use in moral inquiries. The eliminations 
which are secured in controlled experiments are not possible in 
moral inquiries because: 
94. Ibid. p 186. 
95. Ibid. pp 223-4. 
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[M]o:al events, or phenomena, distinguished from 
phys1cal! do not bear to be.experimentally examined 
and cons1dered, as those wh1ch are strictly of a 
physical nature may be; in so far as the individual 
cases are less permanent in their duration, and 
seldomer repeated under the same circumstances' we 
can neither arrest their operation, nor command their 
presence, neither combine nor separate the conditions. 
neither accelerate the trials, nor renew them'
96 
' 
Mathematical Probability: It is hoped that reasons have 
already emerged from the previous discussion to indicate why 
mathematical probability is not acceptable to Glassford as a 
criterion of truth in judicial proof. It seems that he does not 
see the possibility of objective criteria in fact finding processes 
97 
of mixed nature. His main arguments were in answer to the method 
proposed by La Place for the application of the Calculus of chances 
h b · . f . . 98 to t e com 1nat10n 0 test1mon1es. He also responded to the 
proposed application of the methods of scientific discovery to 
judicial fact-finding. His arguments centre around the measurability 
of moral probability to which those methods are recommended; the fact 
that the two probabilities are based on two different premises, that 
mathematical probability deals with abstract relations while judicial 
proof deals with particular cases. He argued also that the ratios 
1n mathematical probability are fixed a priori without a parallel to 
be found in matters of moral inquiries on account of their transient 
96. Ibid. p 188. 
97. Ibid. pp 201-2, 189, 223-5. 
98. P. S. M. La Place, Theorie Analyl~ue des Probablit~s!(1795j; 
see also David Hartley, Obervation on Man, (1749) propos1t10ns, 87-8; 
see Glassford, Essay, pp 77, 88, 90, 95, 190-2, 199, 223. 
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nature, and the fact that they do not admit of being experimentally 
controlled. Finally, he thinks that judicial methods are by far 
superior to the suggested mathematical reasoning. 99 
In dealing with the issue of measurability of moral probability 
Glassford was responding to the proposal of La Place in which he 
suggested the application of mathematical reasoning to the combination 
of testimonial estimates. Glassford summarised La Place's view in 
the following passage: 
Among the ingenious applications which, in late times, 
have been made of mathematical science to the doctrine 
of probability, may be here briefly noticed the attempt 
to calculate the precise diminution of evidence which 
takes place, or is to be expected, in the transmission 
of testimony. Let it be supposed, for example, that, 
in the original report of any fact by an eyewitness, a 
certain portion only of his report, expressed by the 
fraction 9/10, may fairly be estimated as true; and 
that, upon the same principle, a like diminution of the 
evidence, namely one tenth part, takes place in the report 
of that first testimony by a second witness; and so on 
in succession: the probability of an event, it is said, 
may be thus calculated in an exact ratio, according to 
the steps through which it is transmitted; and, in 
proportion to the length of the series, its evidence 
will be reduced, or altogether destroyed. lOO 
For the mathematical calculus to be applicable to the determination 
of the value of testimony the terms on which the calculation can be 
made must be the same as those of mathematical probability. They 
must be measurable in order to receive numerical values. If they 
are not measurable then the multiplication principle does not apply. 
Glassford saw one important pre-requisite for measurability in the 
knowledge of the terms of probability or its premises. He found that 
. '1' 101 lmpossible in the case of moral probabl lty. 
99. Ibid. pp 43-5. 
100. Ibid. p 42-3. 
101. Ibid. P 84. 
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According to this view, probability is a ratio which can be 
determinate or indeterminate. However, irrespective of the possibility 
of its determinability, it deals with ratios rather than particular 
events. For this reason, he does not accept either form of 
probability as a criterion of proof. As to the determinability 
of moral probability he has this to say: tbJut there are few 
instances, or classes of events, 1n which the possible number of 
cases, or the recurrences to be calculated, can be thus rendered 
definite, except by hypothesis: and, accordingly, the practical 
I . t' f h th . I' . d' 102 app 1ca 10n 0 suc eorem 1S very 1m1te. 
We have already seen that the mixed nature of subjects of 
moral inquiry and the extent of the faculties involved in them 
together with the variety of circumstances render the measurability 
of the terms of moral probability an impossible task. As we have 
just seen it is not acceptable to Glassford to determine these terms 
or render them definite by hypothesis. He concluded that even if the 
ratios are fixed in whatever manner, it would not be of any help 1n 
matters of judicial inquiry because of the lack of replicability of 
moral acts. 'Neither would it be found, perhaps, if the inquiry 
could be accomplished, that any number of cases, or even any two 
cases, ever have been precisely alike in all their circumstances. 
In these respects, moral probability is altogether different from 
. f ' 103 mathematical, or even metaphys1cal, proo •• 
It seems that Glassford's objection to the application of 
mathematical reasoning is a basic one. He regards the supposition 
of mathematical probability and the possible outcome as pre-determined. 
102. Ibid. p 85. 
103. Ibid. P 198. 
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On top of that it deals with classes and ratios and all this is 
achieved 1n a very different way from the determination of judicial 
proof. He summed up his position in the following words 
But the cases are very different. The results which take 
place, in consequence of the gravity and figure of a cube, 
and the resistance of the plane on which it is thrown, admit 
of calculation, because the possible number of such results 
are limited, and the principal circumstances attending the 
experiment, and affecting these results, may be understood 
with precision; hence, the physical probability, if it 
may be so called, admits of a determination' 104 
As has already been pointed out this lack of certain and 
precise determination in matters of moral or judicial inquiry is a 
sufficient feature to mark off moral probability from mathematical 
probability and the methods of scientific discovery. In this light 
105 the limited value of J.Cohen's eliminative process can be seen. 
In fact, Glassford anticipated such methods when he wrote; 
It may be remarked, in general, that the same difficulties, 
which occur in an application of the mathematical calcula-
tion of chances to moral truths, will be found to exist in 
regard to those proposed methods of inquiry which have now 
been noticed. With respect to all of them, it is observable, 
in the first place, that they have a reference rather to the 
arts of discovery or invention, properly so called, than 
to the rules of evidence; since many things are useful as 
directions, in the investigation of truth, which cannot be 
employed, at least in the same degree, for confirming and 
displaying those truths, of which, after their discovery, 
the evidence alone is in question. l06 
Glassford did not only regard it impossible to apply mathematical 
reasoning or probability in order to ascertain the truth of testimony 
or its probability, but he considered judicial methods to be far 
superior to those of mathematical probabi1ity.107 It is interesting 
104. Ibid. pp 189-90. 
............... 
105. See above nne 79, 80. 
106. Essay, pp 194-5. 
107. Ibid. pp 43-5. 
............... 
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that he referred to methods, not criteria. This is quite under-
standable in the light of the limited role Glassford assigns to 
general knowledge in decision making. However the possibility 
of such a method shall be investigated in the next chapter. 
1. 
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CHAPTER 10 
The Holistic Thesis: and the 
Holistic Analysis 
A. The Holistic Thesis 
The Fact- finding Task. 
The concept of holism advanced in this thesis takes 
as its starting point Glassford's account of the principles of 
evidence as well as the limited expressions of holism in the 
classic and contemporary literature on evidence and proof. l 
It identifies a central theme in that literature which can be 
stated as follows: proof is not a function of individual items 
of evidence; 'it is a function of the evidence in the case as 
a whole.'. The most significant terms of this proposition 
for holistic analysis are 'proof', 'evidence in the case', 'in 
the case as a whole'. However that significance can best be 
seen in relation to the developmental complexities of a trial 
context. For this reason I shall refer to the types of case 
which categorise, in a general way, the different issues to 
which the holistic analysis is related. There are roughly 
four types of case in which the fact finder faces different 
tasks. Let us assume that in each of the following hypothetical 
cases we have two parties only: A (prosecutor or plaintiff), 
D (defendant in a criminal or civil case). Let us assume 
further that X items of evidence are relevant and admissible. 
U is the ultimate factual proposition in issue, and not-U is 
its negation 
1. See chs. 8 and 9 above. 
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(I) The first type of case is where A alleges U and D admits 
the truth of U (D may admit liability in a civil suit and plead 
guilty in a criminal trial). In this type of case the task of 
J is confined to the assessment of punishment or compensation as 
the case may be. 
(II) A calls evidence tending to prove U, whilst B does not 
question the truth of the evidence but contests its sufficiency 
to prove U. Again JI S task does not involve pragmatic or 
judgemental issues relating to the validation of evidential 
reports, it is confined to seeing whether or not the relevant 
standard has been satisfied. 
(III) A calls q items of evidence which D does not contest, 
either arguing (i) that even if U is proved by q U does not 
satisfy some necessary condition or conditions of a substantive 
rule of law, e.g. ,the existence of a duty to take care, or 
the commission of an offence, or (ii) D calls ~ items of evidence 
which tend to explain away the effect of q items of evidence. 
While different standards apply, depending on whether D is a 
party to a criminal or a civil proceedings, the formal structure 
of this case is not basically different from the next situation 
which I will consider at some length. 
(IV) Finally a situation which involves the highest degree of 
complexity for J is one in which A calls q items of evidence, 
e.g., ql' q2' ••• , qn tending to prove U, while D calls p items 
of evidence in rebuttal. The whole evidence in the case is 
x;(q + p). Let us assume that q consist of ql the evidenc~ 
of an eye witness to the occurrence of U; q2 the evidence of 
a witness who testified to seeing D leave the place where U 
took place; and q3 which is the evidence of an expert 
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testifying that fingerprints found at the place where U is 
alleged to have taken place are similar to the finger prints 
of D. While these are different ways in which D may challenge 
q items of evidence, let us assume that the evidence called 
by D consists of one item p, the evidence of a witness testifying 
that at the relevant time when U is alleged to have taken place 
D was at a different place from which it is impossible for him 
to commit U. This is an extreme example of X consisting of 
contradictory parts. However, many other examples can be 
given from situations in which the time element is not so 
crucial, as in the previous example. D may deny an alleged 
motive or making a confession for example. These are just 
simple examples to illustrate the type of case where X consists 
of contradictory parts. 
2. Distinction between Facts in Issue and Legal 
Conclusions drawn from them 
I have so far used the symbols "U" and not "u" to 
stand for the ultimate factual proposition to be proved and 
its negation respectively. However, since "the ultimate 
proposition to be proved" is sometimes used in two different 
senses, it is necessary to explain in which of the two senses 
I am using it in this thesis. In order to do this I will 
introduce another symbol 'R' to stand for a substantive legal 
rule, and explain the relation of U to R. Substantive legal 
rules, (whether criminal or civil), require certain necessary 
conclusions to follow on the satisfaction of certain specif.ied 
conditions. For instance a rule may declare a certain type of 
act done with a certain mental state and without justification 
a criminal offence or a civil wrong. Any such legal rule can be 
expressed as a conditional of the form 'If a then b': 'a' 
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stands for the conditions which are sufficient in law for the 
truth of 'b'. In our simple example 'a' will be instantiated 
by a conjunction of the three propositions defining the offence, 
or civil wrong, as the case may be. 
is alleged to be an instantiation of 
In any particular case U 
'a' . 
-' 
and this is the 
sense in which I am using 'u' in this thesis. When U (which 
is usually a compound proposition) is established, it is used 
as a minor premiss to be conjoined with R as a major premiss, 
and from the conjunction of the two the consequent of R follows. 
Sometimes this conclusion is referred to as "the ultimate 
proposition to be proved". This is the second sense in which 
'u' is sometimes used. In this sense 'u' and 'not-U' are used 
as equivalents of the propositions "D is guilty" and "D is 
innocent" respectively (hereafter referred to as Q and not-Q). 
The traditional usage is very misleading and extremely dangerous: 
misleading because it takes what is generally accepted to be an 
empirical statement, 'u' as the antecedent of 'if U and R then 
Q', for a logical proposition viz. (whether if D satisfies the 
conditions of a legal rule he is guilty); dangerous since it 
assumes the relevance of the total admitted evidence to that 
conclusion; it also assumes that the probative force of each 
item of admitted evidence moves in the direction of that conclusion 
or its negation. It also assumes that probative force is 
transitive. 
With these distinctions in mind we can now return to our 
four hypothetical cases. Case (I) illustrates a situation in 
which D admits the truth of the initial conditions for the 
application of the consequent of R to his case. It can also be 
said that D accepts (Q), the conclusion drawn from U and R. Part (1) 
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of (III) illustrates a situation in which D admits U b 
, ut argues 
that it is not an instantiation of the antecedent of R, and for 
that reason R's consequent does not apply at all; or probably 
that there is no rule in the relevant legal system for the 
application of which U can be regarded as initial conditions. 
(II) illustrates a situation where the truth or probability of 
U is the main subject of inquiry for J. The truth of the 
evidence reports and hence their correspondence with reality is 
not contested. However this is possible only where the evidence 
reports indicating U are exclusively circumstantial reports about 
U. If on the other hand the evidence in (II) consis~ of direct 
reports about U then it is sufficient evidence. (III) (ii) and 
(IV) pose, in addition to the problem posed by (II), two distinct 
types of problem. One of these problems relates to the truth or 
probability of evidential reports: the other to their probative 
force. The solution of these two problems constitutes the basic 
and primary task of the fact finder in most types of judicial 
inquiries. The first of these problems demands an inquiry into 
the correspondence of the evidence reports with the reality which 
these reports claim to report truthfully. But since the total 
admitted evidence in T consists normally of heterogeneous elements 
(in terms of their correspondence, or lack of correspondence with 
U), the issue becomes one of enormous complexity. The considera-
tion and inquiry into the second problem should not arise before 
the first problem is posed and settled. For this reason the 
solution of the first problem requires dividing X into two pa~ts: 
the reliable and unreliable reports. Only true reports qualify 
for the second stage of the determination of probative force. 
I say qualify because a report may be true yet have no probative 
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force. 
An atomistic discursive and sequential analYSis of the 
whole evidence in the case tends to overlook the heterogeneity 
of the evidence and its complexity. It also conflates the two 
problems, or disregards one of them, namely the first. To say 
that the solution of either problem is the function of the 
whole admitted evidence in the case is also inaccurate. As I 
shall argue the whole admitted heterogeneous evidence consists 
of various parts, and each part provides a self-contained structure 
or model against which the reliability of the reports relating 
to facts within that part can be investigated - i.e. the prosecu-
tion (or plaintiff aims to tell one coherent story, and the 
2 defence another. According to this view the truth of an 
individual report is a function of a consistent whole of which 
Lhat report is a member. When this process of investigation 
reduces X to its consistent and true parts, another inquiry into 
the probative force of these parts to prove U starts. If we 
refer to these accepted true parts as Y then we can say X -y 
items have been eliminated in the first stage. Y may also lose 
some of its members in the second stage since a report may be 
true (motive for example), yet have no probative value in the 
instant case. If we use Z to refer to the reports selected by 
J from Y as probative of U, then Y minus Z reports are further 
eliminated from that portion of the total admitted evidence. 
These eliminations which take place at different stages of a 
trial constitute a strong argument against any theory which 
considers all members of x to be probative, if only, indirectly, 
of an ultimate fact in issue. As a matter of fact there is a 
2. See p 266 below. 
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clear intransitivity between U and the eliminated parts of X and 
Y. The much confused use of 'probative force' interchangeably 
with 'relevance', which abounds in the literature on evidence and 
proof, is a good example of the failure to see and recognise the 
practical implications of these eliminations for judicial proof. 3 
The most recent illustration of this can be found in David 
Schum's analysis of different categories of evidence, which is 
based on the mistaken belief that all relevant evidence is 
4 probative. A further illustration is also provided by attempts 
by Schum and others to organise and evaluate all the admitted 
evidence in relation to the logical conclusion from the conjunc-
tion of U with R (i.e. Q), and the suggestion that the prior 
probabilities of that conjunction to its negation can provide 
the basis against which the values of each and every item of 
5 
evidence can be calculated. 
If we take (III) or (IV) as a simple paradigmatic model of 
a legal trial, and the issues in them as typical issues in most 
judicial fact finding inquiries, then, in the light of our claims 
about evidence in those cases at different stages of the trial, 
the following statements (E) can usually be made about the 
evidence. The chronological order of the statements is meant 
to represent in a descending order the reduction of the total 
admitted evidence by the process of elimination, and in an 
ascending order the complexity of the task for J (fact finder). 
3. See above ch. 3, n. 69. 
4. See above ch. 1, n. 51. 
5. See above ch. 6, p 140 and passim. 
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The model can also serve as a standard against which the competing 
analytical methods may be evaluated. The statements are that 
pvidence is or includes; 
(E) (1) All the occurrences or facts reported to J in T 
(all the admitted evidence in T); 
(2) All the reports about (1) (evidence reports); 
(3) Both (1), and (2) above in the light of general 
experience. (This statement is usually made 
to emphasize the importance of experience as a 
method, or a system of propositions, to aid the 
transition from the acceptance of reports about 
alleged facts to a belief in their occurrence); 
(4) The statements selected by J (fact-finder) out 
of (2) and/or out of (3) to be true, (in the 
sense of genuine correspondence with reality in a 
restricted spatio-temporal individual region); 
(5) Any part of (2) and/or (3) which is rejected by 
the fact finder, because it lacks correspondence 
with reality in the sense explained in (4) 
above; 
(6) All the statements selected by the fact-finder 
J out of (4) which he finds to be probative 
of U or not-U; 
(7) All the propositions which in addition to 
satisfying (6) above, are accepted by J to be 
sufficient proof of U; 
(8) All propositions which are probative but insufficient 
to prove U or not-U, as the case may be, to a given 
253. 
standard. 
(9) The probabities assigned by the fact finder to the 
members of (1) and (2) above in the light of (3) 
which, probabilities must satisfy the formal 
requirements of the calculus of chances, and the 
combination of such probabilities, made to assess 
the probability of U, by e.g. Bayesian conditional-
isation. 
All the propositions in the above model with the exception 
of the last one (number 9) are statements descriptive of the 
structure of the evidence in a typical trial context in which 
the investigation of the evidence of one event or more takes 
place. The matter of fact to be investigated, if it existed 
at all, would exist within a limited spatio-temporal region. 
The investigation in some trials may involve only one spatio-
temporal region; however, in most trials more than one such 
region is involved. While the facts which correspond to the 
statement(s) about U either existed, or did not exist, in a 
given spatio-temporal region(s), the evidence in the typical 
context of a legal trial often consists of contradictory reports 
about the existence or non-existence of those facts within the 
region in question. For example, if one report asserts the 
existence of a fact or occurrence within an individual spatio-
temporal region, while another report asserts the non-existence 
of that same fact within that same region, one of the two 
reports mayor may not be true, but it is logically impossible 
6 for both to be true. 
6. See ch 9 above n. 74. 
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The same logical result follows if one report asserts the 
occurrence of an event within an individual spatio-temporal 
region, while another report asserts the occurrence of the same 
event at a different spatio-temporal region. The space - time 
context of the evidence when the judicial fact finding inquiry 
extends over more than one such context, providesa self-contained 
standard for the determination of the truth or falsity of con-
flicting evidential reports. In such types of case the evidence 
divides into various distinct structures or parts. The main 
task of the fact-finder is to work on these parts and resolve 
any conflict between them. When a number of evidence reports 
attemp~ to describe two sets of conflicting realities (spatio-
temporally), the fact-finder may declare both sets to be un-
reliable, or accept one of them to be correct. 
Whether the fact-finder is dealing with one self-contained 
structure or with more than one, he is often called upon to 
determine three distinct questions about each structure, and the 
reports which claim to describe it. The first determination 
refers to whether or not the reports describe a genuine reality 
(whether they correspond with the spatio-temporally limited event 
or occurrence). The second determination relates to the probative 
force of true reports, (true if accepted as genuine description of 
the reality they report), i.e., whether they establish, or tend 
to establish, the proposition to which they purport to relate. 
Since the truth of a report is distinct from its probative force, 
in relation to a given proposition, the report may well be true 
yet be without probative force in relation to that proposition. 
The third question relates to the determination of the sufficiency 
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of true and probative evidence to establish or tend to establish 
the proposition to which it relates. Each of the three questions 
in these inquiries poses a task whose nature is distinct from the 
nature of each of the other two. However, the determination of 
the truth or probability of the evidence reports (in the sense 
explained above) is a necessary condition for entry upon the 
second inquiry which, in its turn, is also a necessary condition 
to be satisfied before the third inquiry could be correctly 
entertained. Apart from the distinction just noted, another 
important distinction is that each inquiry is determinable on 
a completely different concept of evidence and proof. The first 
deals with the empirical basis of the evidence reports, which is 
a pragmatic task, while the second involves the determination of 
the logical relationships between accepted statements, and the 
third deals with the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a 
proposition, which is also a pragmatic inquiry. For example if 
we assume that numerical values can be assigned in the determina-
tion of each question these values should not be combined for the 
simple reason that the three problems investigated are incommen-
surable with one another. It follows that any system which 
fails to keep the three questions apart, or allows the combination 
of their values (assuming that is possible) would not only be 
inadequate for the analysis of judicial fact finding problems, 
but obviously false. The mathematical analysis, insofar as it 
overlooks these distinctions and what follows from them, is both 
inadequate and false as a system. The Baconian analysis, on . 
the other hand, assumes that it is possible to settle the second 
problem without determining the first one, and hardly says anything 
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useful about the third problem. In this respect both systems, 
(Pascalians and Baconians), overlook the heterogeneous nature 
of the total admitted evidence in a given trial. For this 
reason the above statements (4) - (8) inclusive in our model, 
which are descriptive statements of the evidence at different 
stages in the on-going trial process, have no equivalants in 
either the Pascalian or Baconian systems. 
The central problems of the atomistic approach to judicial 
proof can best be seen in the light of the quest for certainty, 
which was believed to be achieveable, through the adoption of 
scientific methods of inquiry. The object of this quest was 
generally expressed to be the employment of scientific methods 
of inquiry in judicial investigations. However, the real 
object, as we have already seen in the case of Stephen and that 
of Cohen, of such a quest is the identification of general laws 
of experience (the common sense generalizations) which are 
believed to perform a role in judicial inquiry analogous to 
7 the role of scientific theories or laws. While jurists realize 
that scientific methods could not be employed for establishing 
these laws they believed that when general laws of experience 
are identified, and sufficiently qualified, they perform a 
function similar to scientific propositions: an evidence report 
provides the minor premiss, and the appropriate generalization 
the major premiss from which an inference can be deductively 
made. The emphasis is mainly on the theoretical analogue 
between scientific theories and judicial inquiries. In the 
terminology of the methodology of science the emphasis of the 
7. See above chs. 3 and 6; see also below Section B. 
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approach is on justification rather than discovery: the 
identification of laws rather than the finding of facts and the 
selection of genuine reports about reality. The basic problems 
of judicial inquiries (the factual problems) are thus bypassed 
and overlooked. 
Even as a theoretical construct the claim of the atomistic 
inductivist approach to provide general inferential laws for 
judicial proof is questionable. It does not explain how these 
individual inferences can establish complex, independent and, 
in most cases, incommensurable issues in a trial. It follows 
from this that the current atomistic approaches to the examina-
tion and analysis of evidence undermine the complexity and 
uniqueness of judicial fact finding inquiries. The following 
remark by Ekelof, when discussing a similar point is in line 
with the criticism presently made against the Baconians: 
It follows from what has now been said that all 
evaluation of evidence takes place by the subsuming 
of actual facts under laws of general experience. 
Let us now return to the question why, at least on 
a first view, this does not seem to be the case, 
when, e.g., oral evidence is evaluated. As we 
have found, the court has to base its reasoning 
in these cases upon frequency relations which have 
a very indefinite degree of probability. • .• As 
a rule, the court must try for itself to arrive 
at an opinion based on greater certainty by using 
available auxiliary facts. Thes~ however, vary 
from one case to another, and their convincing 
force is equally difficult to ascertain. Where 
there are a great number of statements by witnesses 
and of other facts constituting evidence, the 
difficulties are increased. Under the principle 
of free valuation of evidence, the force of the 
evidence as to each particular theme of proof 
must be assessed on the absis of the available 
material as a whole. But in a case of the kind 
now discussed this material appears to be 'unique' 
in the sense that we possess no knowledge of any law 
of general experience concerning a complex of 
evidentiary facts of exactly that kind· 8 
8. See Per 010f Eke10f, 'Free Evaluation of Evidence', (1964) 8, 
Scandinavian Studies of Law, p 60. 
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The holistic analysis takes off from the realization 
that Judicial fact finding differs from scientific inquiries 
in many important respects. It sees the factual aspects of 
judicial inquiries as its dominant and most important part. 
In this respect it is more like a discovery process, than a 
process of justification in scientific inquiry. However, the 
definition of the nature of the task presented by the total 
heterogeneous evidence in the typical judicial fact finding 
context, as distinct from the actual performance of that task, 
admits of and is susceptible of logical analysis. I am quite 
aware of the fact that the assertion that the discovery process 
is susceptible of logical analysis is unacceptable to the 
scientific methodologist. But as I hope to argue this is 
possible in judicial inquiries because both the aims of these 
inquiries and their nature are different from scientific inquiries. 
In this sense I am not strictly following the distinction between 
discovery and justification as is understood in the philosoophy 
of science. In the following section I shall sketch an account 
of the distinction between discovery and justification as is 
used by the methodologists of scientific discovery. I will 
also advance some arguments against the strict adherence to that 
distinction in the examination and analysis of judicial evidence 
and judicial fact finding processes. 
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B. Discovery and Justification. 
The distinction between the discovery of a theory and its 
justification is well established in the philosophy of science. 9 
However to say this does not suggest that the implications of that 
distinction are acceptable to all philosophers of science. lO What 
is important for our present purposes is that the distinction is made 
and seen by many philosophers to serve an important methodological 
role for the philosophy of science. The current controversies in 
the philosophy of science as to whether the distinction is valid 
or can be made to serve any rational purpose for the philosophy of 
11 
science need not concern us here. The distinction is meant to 
separate two stages in the process of scientific discovery. The 
first stage is generally referred to as the stage of inventing or 
thinking out a theory. That stage is over when a 'finished 
12 
research report' of that theory is presented. The second stage 
starts where the first ends. The main object of making the 
distinction is to determine the stage at which the genuineness of a 
theory and its claim to account for and explain not only the data 
9. See L. Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, (1981) ch. 11, pp 181 et.seq; 
P. Medawar, Pluto's Republic, (1982) pp 28 et.seq, and 75 et.seq; K. 
Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) pp 31, 107-11; see 
also N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, (1978) esp. 
pp 15-6, 88. 
z1"C""' • _________ -
10. See generally n.9 above, see also L. Laudan, Progress and its Problems, 
(1977); see I. Hacking, (ed.) Scientific Revolutions (1981-3) 
11. See nne 9 and 10 above; see also T. Kuhn, The Structures of 
Scientific Revolutions (1962). 
12. 
The 
and 
L. Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, (1981) 181, and 184-5; I,. Lakatos, 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, (1978) Vol. I, pp 10-11 
14-6. 
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in its genesis but all other data which its logical conclusions are 
13 
meant to explain and account for. In short it is the isolation 
of that part of a scientific inquiry which is susceptible of logical 
1 . 14 ana YSl.s. Again the manner in which the logical testing is 
carried out (eg. inductively or deductively), what it aims to achieve 
(verification, confirmation, or falsification) is not of direct 
relevance for our present purposes. My main concern is to explain 
clearly the usual distinction between discovery and justification 
in order to specify exactly the meaning I shall assign to the two 
terms in this context. This caution is called for because one of 
my main arguments is that judicial inquiries are process inquiries; 
and that that process involves both logical and psychological tasks. 
To most philosophers of science such an argument, if left unexplained, 
15 
would not only be unfashionable but palpably wrong. For these 
philosophers to talk about a discovery process is to talk about what 
b 1 · 1 16 is irrational, illogical, or at est non- ogl.ca • But none of 
these epithets, I hope, applies to the logic of discovery in judicial 
inquiries, since the proposed logic has no justificatory function. 
This I will elaborate on later. 
The present position should also be distinguished from that 
of the early empirical methodologists ~.g. Bacon, Locke and John 
Stuart Mill) who believed that scientific discovery is merely concerned 
13. L. Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, p. 189; K. Popper, op.cit. 
32-3. 
14. See K. Popper, op.cit. pp 27, 30, see also R. Carnap, Logical Foundatic 
of Probability, (1951) passim. 
15. K. Popper, op.cit. p 31. 
S' d H th 's ch 11' P. ~fedawar, op.cit. 16. L. Laudan, Cl.ence an ypo esl., . , 
p. 102. 
261. 
with establishing empirical laws from infallible observations and that 
science proceeds from individual observations to general laws. 17 
Apart from the fact that the process-logic I am proposing here is not 
justificatory it is not in any sense meant to describe, regulate, 
control, determine or analyse the subjective beliefs of the fact-
finder. It is true that it defines the task of the fact-finder, 
but it does not control its performance. This is quite consistent 
with my rejection of the atomistic analysis which has its intellectual 
underpinnings in that philosophy whose commitment to a psychological 
and cognitivist conception of knowledge has already been discussed. 
However the simplistic view of scientific inquiries held by empiricist 
philosophers is probably one of the closest analogues to the nature 
of judicial fact finding inquiries: a fact which may explain the 
emulation of its methodologies and conceptual frameworks by most 
18 theorists of evidence and proof. It probably explains also their 
adoption and attempts to justify one of its main assumptions; that 
19 
of the infallible empirical base. The main challenge to that 
philosophy was presented by the enormous growth of scientific 
knowledge which generated many problems for both the scientist and 
20 
the methodologist of scientific discovery. The problem of 
demarcating what is scientific from what is non-scientific, of 
demarcating observational statements from theoretical statements, of 
deciding the possible basic statements for a theory, the selection 
from possible statements, statements which are favourable or un-
favourable to the theory, all these problems can be seen as being 
17. Ibid. pp 189-90. 
18. See above chs. 1, 2 and 3. 
d 20 . L. Laudan, Science 19. I. Lakatos, oop.cit pp.12 et. seq. an et. seq., 
Hypothesis, p 186. 
2 L k i 14 L d Science and Hypothesis, O. I. a atos, op.c t. p. ; L. au an, 
p. 186; K. Popper, op.cit pp 34 et.seg. 
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generated by problems of scientific growth. 2l It is true that the 
realisation that it is not logically possible to infer general 
statements from facts, together with the realisation that facts 
cannot be conclusively established has added to the difficulties 
of that approach, and led ultimately to the distinction between 
di d · if· i 22 scovery an Just 1cat on. 
It can be seen that judicial fact finding inquiries face 
no problems of growth because a fact finding report, though it may 
be reached in the same way as a scientific theory, is very unlike a 
scientific theory in the sense that its function does not extend 
beyond the data upon which it is based. For this reason fact 
finding reports do not present a problem of growth similar to the 
problems of growth of scientific knowledge. Some are stillborn, 
others are born to die immediately after their one specific unique 
function is over. The problem of demarcation is not serious in 
judicial inquiries, and it is not generated by any problem of growth. 
The logical problems are there: but they are there for any theory 
to con tend wi th. There is no demand or need in judicial inquiries 
similar to the need for deep-structure explanatory theories in 
23 
scientific inquiries. 
The above account is not meant to defend induction as a 
method of discovery. It is meant to demonstrate that the reasons 
which convince the methodologists of discovery to shift to the post 
hoc testing of theories are non-existent in judicial fact finding 
21. J. Lakatos, op.cit. pp 20-2. 
22. L. Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, p 186. 
23. Ibid. ch. 11 esp. pp 186-7. 
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contexts, for the simple reason that judicial fact finding inquiries 
have problems which are basically different from the problems which 
face a modern scientific inventor. 24 
Our sketchy account has so far revealed that the scientific 
discovery process is generally equated with what goes into the mind 
of the inventor prior to the moment of hitting on a testable hypothesis. 25 
In this sense it is a psychological process contrasted with the 
26 logical process of testing. The discovery process is thus depicted 
as a mysterious and obscured process contrasted with a vivid and clear 
justification process. The following definition is a good example 
of such depiction. 
The term 'logic of discovery', like 'discovery' itself, 
is notoriously ambiguous. If one views the logic of 
justification as concerned exclusively with a study 
of the evidence relevant to the proverbial 'finished 
research report', then the logic of discovery - cons trued 
as dealing with development and articulation of an idea 
at every stage in its history prior to its ultimate 
ratification - has a very wide scope indeed. It would 
include an account of how a theory was first invented, 
how it was preliminarily evaluated and tested, how it was 
modified, and the like. 27 
What is relevant for our purposes is that the discovery process is 
associated with the psychology of knowledge, while justification is 
28 
associated with the logic of knowledge. This distinction is 
fundamental in one of the most currently popular scientific 
24. See above Section A. 
25. See K. Popper, op.cit pp 30-2, 44; P Medawar, op.cit. p 
see L. Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, pp 182-3. 
26. K. Popper, op.cit. p 31. 
27. L. Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, p 181. 
28. K. Popper, op.cit. pp 30-1. 
but 
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theories, the hypothetico-deductive method. 29 The following stat~ment 
from Karl Popper is of particular significance to the evidence 
theorist 
Before I can elaborate this view (which might be called 
'deductivism', in contrast to 'inductivism') I must 
first make clear the distinction between the psychology 
of knowledge which deals with empirical facts, and the 
logic of knowledge which is concerned only with logical 
relations. For the belief in inductive logic is 
largely due to a confusion of psychological problems 
with epistemological ones. It may be worth noticing, 
by the way, that this confusion spells trouble~not only 
for the logic of knowledge but for its psychology as well'
30 
If the problems of judicial proof were to be treated as 
justification problems, they should be so treated only if there is 
a function for justification in judicial proof comparable to the 
function of justification in scientific discoveries. This 
question can be answered without going into the difficult and subtle 
requirements of testing theories or hypotheses. I will attempt 
to answer the question by seeking an answer to the following two 
questions: why is there a need for testing a scientific theory or 
hypothesis? Is the empirical evidence required for testing a 
31 
theory different from that involved in its genesis? In the 
light of the answers to these questions it would be possible to 
determine the relevance or irrelevances of testing in judicial 
fact finding context. If the need for testing a theory arises 
mainly from the claim of a scientific theory to have universal 
application whenever its initial conditions are satisfied, then 
the relevant tests of a scientific theory can be seen to be wider 
than those of a judicial hypothesis. This is so because a judicial 
29 Ibid i W. Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific Inference • ., pass m; 
(1966-71) p 21. 
30. K. Popper, op.cit. p 30. 
31. L. Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, P 189. 
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hypothesis is not a theory, and as such has no claim to universal 
application, or in fact any application to any other facts than 
those in its genesis. A scientific theory is tested with the 
object of determining its logical consistency and capacity to account 
for the data it was designed to account for, its empirical or non-
empirical nature; its relation to other theories, and finally the 
f . d" 32 correctness 0 1tS pre 1ct10ns. It is submitted that of 
these four sorts of testing of scientific theories only the first 
applies to judicial hypotheses. The second and third sorts have 
no application, because a judicial fact finding hypothesis is not 
a theory. The last one which may be thought to be relevant to 
judicial investigations is not relevant for two reasons. The 
first of these reasons is that the conclusion on the evidence in a 
judicial fact finding context is confined to a unique and un-
repeatable occurrence. The second reason is that the evidence 
which is used for testing a theory is different from the evidence 
d .. • 33 use 1n 1tS genes1s. In judicial inquiries there is only one 
type of evidence: that adduced before the fact-finder during the 
discovery process. 
The above analysis is meant to support the thesis that 
judicial inquiry is analogous to the process of scientific discovery, 
its evidence is comparable to the evidence suggesting a theory, its 
process is mainly a discovery process. The distinctiveness of 
judicial fact finding inquiries calls for a methodological treatment 
of its problems which is not only different from the methodologies 
of both Pascalians and Baconians, but also from the accepted 
32. See K. Popper, op.cit. pp 32-3. 
33. L. Laudan, Science and Hypothesis, p 189. 
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methodologies in the proper context of scientific discoveries. 
c. The Holistic Analysis 
In the preceding discussion the concept of holism has been 
elucidated and explained. It requires that both the authenticity 
and probative force of evidence reports should be a function of 
wholes or structures of evidence, and not a function of the 
individual elements of those wholes or structures. The discussion 
also emphasises that reference to the "evidence as a whole" should 
be understood to refer to these wholes or structures. The extent 
and complexity of the fact finding task in any particular trial 
context vary with the nature and number of the structures of 
which the evidence consists, and the number of the ultimate 
propositions of which these structures or wholes are evidence. 
For the purposes of holistic analysis the conception of 
spatio-temporal region (STR) is very important. It is an 
analytical tool of the holistic approach which distinguishes that 
approach from the alternative atomistic approach and provides 
substitution for the nomological inferential basis of atomism. 
Since the facts on which the fact-finder works are either evidentiary 
or facts in issue, holism employs two spatio-temporal regions 
corresponding to the distinction between evidentiary facts and 
facts in issue. In what follows I shall refer to the evidentiary 
facts spatio-temporal region as (ESTR) and to that of the facts 
in issue as (PSTR) (a fact in issue shall . be referred to as a 
probandum fact). As we shall further explain each ESTR has a 
distinctive role to play in holistic analysis. 
As has already been indicated, facts play an important role 
in holistic analysis. The analysis of evidence within spatio-
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temporal regions, does not only relegate the role of explicit 
nomological standards to the determination of relevancy but provides 
a standard of decision in which facts play an important role in 
decision making. It is true that the concept of STR can be very 
indeterminate since it involves the two difficult and elusive 
concepts of time and space and whatever is situated within such 
region at any particular portion of time. For this reason it 
is important to provide a test which may render the concept 
more definite. The objective of holism in this regard is very 
simple and specific: it attempts to delineate, out of infinite 
space, a portion as an individual region and tries to ascertain 
what existed within that region at a particular portion of time. 
Any test offered to perform such delineation must take into 
consideration the purpose behind such delineation as well as the 
available means for its accomplishment. If the purpose is, as 
is meant here, to ascertain what is capable of being perceived 
within a certain region at a particular point of time, the capa-
bilities of a perceptor in relation to that space and time provide 
a feasible test. The standard test should, therefore, be the 
perception of an ideally situated observer in a position similar 
to that of any alleged witness in relation to that reg10n at the 
particular past point of time, whose perception, if true, would 
coincide with that of the similarly situated ideal observer. 
Whenever the spatio-temporal region is ascertained in accordance 
with this test, then, the alleged existence and juxtaposition of 
objects and persons within that portion of space and at that 
portion of time, the different relations, qualities as well as 
their relevant activities form the subject matter of inquiry. 
The fact-finder should perform various and different tasks 1n 
relation to each independent spatio-temporal region. His first 
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task is to view and survey the entire content of the region at the 
specific place and time in order to discern any incompatibilities 
or inconsistencies in relation to what the parties allege to have 
existed within that region at that time. His second task should 
consist in asserting the existence of those alleged contents of 
the STR which are both possible and capable of co-existence within 
that reg10n without inconsistency or contradiction. His third 
task should be the selection from all co-existent and consistent 
contents of the STR those contents whose existence within that 
region coincides spatio-temporally with the existence of the 
probandum fact, and whether such coincidence is sufficient to 
establish the particular probandum fact. Finally the fact-finder 
should ascertain whether the established probandum facts satisfy 
the initial conditions of the legal rule in question. 
The previous discussion concentrates on two types of STR. 
The PSTR and every ESTR which 1S alleged to co-exist with the 
PSTR and coincides in one way or another with the existence of the 
probandum fact within that region. The PSTR subserves an important 
fact finding function. It should help the fact-finder to select 
out of the various facts alleged to have existed within that region 
those which form consistent and compatible elements which mayor 
may not include the probandum fact as one of its elements. An 
evidentiary fact on the other hand may have its STR outside its 
PSTR. Evidence which tends to establish motive, or preparation 
for the commission of the crime, or the possession of a stolen 
item, or the expression of an intention to commit the crime in 
question are good examples of these evidentiary facts. The 
time and space within which any of these facts may be alleged to 
have existed is often different from the time and space within 
which the probandum to which they relate is alleged to have existed. 
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Any items satisfying this description can be referred to as an 
independent ESTR. The role of the spatio-temporal region of such 
iten.s is limited to the determination of the existence of whatever 
is alleged to have existed within that region and not its probative 
force, which must be the function of connections inside the PSTR 
to which they are related through the concept of relevancy. 
The analysis of all the admitted relevant evidence within 
a spatio-temporal region must initially present what the parties 
allegations represent it to be. The parties, for example, may 
allege all or only part of the relevant evidence to have occurred 
within a single spatio-temporal region while they may allege the 
existence of some fact related to that region to have existed 
within independent spatio-temporal regions outside their PSTR. 
In a particular case there may be only one or more than one PSTR. 
The probanda may either have independent STR's, they may all share 
one common STR while others may have their distinct and independent 
spatio-temporal regions. The analysis of judicial evidence should 
take into account and present all these variations and differences 
so as to approach an approximation of what actually existed. 
For the purpose of a diagrammatical representation of 
holistic analysis I suggest the employment of circles to stand for 
the different types of regions. A probandum region (PSTR) can 
be represented initially by a large circle containing the entire 
allegations of the parties. The evidentiary regions (ESTR) whether 
they be located inside the probandum region or outside it, can be 
represented by small circles. The connections which the parties 
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allege, and the appropriate body accepts in accordance with the 
standards of relevancy can be represented by straight lines 
connecting the independent ESTR with ESTR inside the circle and 
the inner ESTR circles with others inside the PSTR circle. In 
most cases this representation is bound to contain contradictory 
or inconsistent reported locations, juxtapositions, relations and 
qualities of the alleged contents of the region in question. 
The next important task of the fact-finder is to attempt the 
resolution of the various conflicts which the first large circle 
and its related smaller circles present. His primary task at 
this stage should consist of selecting from the alleged contents 
of the various regions those which he believes to have actually 
existed. The nature of the task involved, and its performance, 
depend on the type of the STR in question (whether it is a PSTR 
or an inside ESTR or an independent ESTR). The resolution by the 
fact-finder of this type of difficulty shall be represented in a 
second circle in which all the regions which are not selected by 
the fact-finder to correspond to reality shall loose their small 
circles. The second circle represents what should be accepted 
as a consistent region free from conflict and inconsistency. In 
all cases of direct evidence which must co-exist and coincide 
spatio-temporally with the probandum, the determination within the 
second circle should contain sufficient evidence for or against 
the existence of the probandum. However in the case of circum-
stantial evidence whether it be inside or outside the PSTR, such , 
evidence may not be sufficient. This is so since the items of 
circumstantial evidence may either co-exist with the probandum 
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without coinciding with its existence 1n time and s a p ce, or may 
exist within independent spatio-temporal regions with no conflict 
or inconsistency with its existence at all. For this reason 
a third circle is needed in the case of circumstantial evidence 
to indicate the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence as 
the case may be. 
A concept of STR which is roughly explained for the present 
purposes of this thesis, and which needs further refinement 1n 
the future, is a basic analytical tool of holistic analysis. 
With its help we can now attempt the analysis of some of the 
issues posed by the four types of cases g1ven above. If we start 
from the last case (case IV) then it can be seen that both logic 
and commonsense demand that J should not assert both q and p to 
be true or probable, because of the spatio-temporal incompatibility 
1n relation to the probandum STR. The first and primary task for 
J is to resolve the conflict between q and p by accepting either of 
them or rejecting both but he should not accept both of them as 
true or probable in relation to U. The choice of any of these 
three options in our example is decisive since accepting ql entails 
the rejection of p and vis versa. Another reason for the 
decisiveness of the choice in our example is that the example involves 
direct evidence in relation to both U and not-U, the ESTR and the 
PSTR in each case coincide. For this reason the probative force 
of a true or probable item of direct evidence has sufficient probative 
force to prove the probandum to which it relates. A basic feature 
of this type of case is that its total admitted evidence divides 
into two wholes or structures (i.e. q and p). Each structure has 
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an archetypal image incompatible with that of the other. The 
incompatibility is a spatio-temporal incompatibility: V and not-V 
to which q and p are relevant cannot both occur at two places at 
one and the same time. 
The position becomes more complex in the cases where the 
evidence consists mainly of circumstantial items which may be 
alleged to be located wholly inside the PSTR, partly inside it and 
partly outside it, or wholly outside it. In such a case the need 
for some link inside the PSTR to connect the genuine and authentic 
items of circumstantial evidence with the probandum is essential. 
In any particular case more than one probandums may be 
alleged. These facts may either be alleged to co-exist without 
contradiction or inconsistency, or exist separately within distinct 
and independent spatio-temporal regions where no spatia-temporal 
incompatibility is at all possible. This is a position where the 
evidence consists of more than one binary palr of structures or 
wholes relating to a compound V (e.g. where V consists of VI' V2 , 
V3.). For example VI may allege the existence of a contractual 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant while V2 may allege 
a breach of that contractual relationship by the defendant, and 
V3 may allege a frustrating event. Both VI and V2 constitute 
the initial conditions for the application of a legal rule R. 
Each of these conditions can be independent and unrelated to the 
other except through the requirement of R. Where each of VI and 
V2 has its independent spatio-temporal region what is relevant 
and probative to either of them is not relevant or probative to the 
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other. The need to establish both U and U f th 1 2 or e purposes of 
R should not be understood as a warrant for treating the evidence 
of either as being relevant, in all cases, to the other or as a 
justification for combining such evidence for the purpose of 
proving either or both of them. 
The set of U3 , as shall be shortly explained, reinforces 
the need for a distinction between the satisfaction of the require-
ments of the application of substantive legal rules and what the 
proof of those rules demand as necessary and sufficient conditions 
for their application. The establishment of U3 (the frustrating 
event) despite the establishment of the existence of a contractual 
relationship and what normally amounts to its breach (Ul and U2) 
explains away the effect of both Ul and U2 and consequently the 
application of the substantive rule for which they are the necessary 
initial conditions, and justifies the application of another 
substantive legal rule. 
The above analysis, though incomplete and tentative has the 
merit of sufficiently indicating the different tasks involved in 
judicial fact finding and the general frames for their performance. 
It starts from the whole admitted evidence in any particular trial 
and attempts to identify the conflicts and inconsistencies which 
relevant evidence presents. The fact-finder should resolve these 
conflicts with the help of the various types of spatio-temporal 
regions whose contents should, in order to be selected and accepted 
as genuine, be consistent and free from contradiction and linked 
directly with the probandum in question. The relevant facts, 
their meaning and role can be easily ascertained and distinguished 
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from genuine facts whose selection by the fact-finder entails 
the rejection of other facts as ungenuine. The suggested 
analysis also explains the distinction between genuine facts 
which have no probative force within or in relation to a 
particular spatio-temporal region and those which have such 
probative or proving force. It also explains why evidence may 
be relevant, genuine and probative without being sufficient to 
establish the probandum to which it relates. It further 
distinguishes the sufficiency of evidentiary facts to establish 
a probandum fact which is a requirement of establishing these 
facts from the sufficiency of established probandum facts to 
justify the application of a substantive legal rule or rules. 
The last category of sufficiency relates to the requirement of 
the logical proof of a substantive legal rule by proving the 
necessary and sufficient initial conditions for its application. 
The proposed holistic analysis is meant as a substitute 
for the traditional analysis of the rationalist scholars whose 
entire approach and methodological techniques have been criticised 
in part I and II of this thesis. I am quite aware of the fact that my 
thesis in some important aspects runs counter to most, if not all, of the 
intuitioffiof, and the received wisdom from the greatest known 
minds in the Anglo-American evidence tradition. This realisa-
tion made my research both difficult and onerous. However, the 
thesis can be judged on its own merits in the light of the 
criticism it offers against the philosophical assumptions of 
that tradition and its conceptions of the fact -finding task ana 
the methodological techniques that tradition offers for the 
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performance of such tasks. My proposed method of analysis and 
its practical utility for both decision making and the elucidation 
of basic evidence concepts can be compared for the purpose of 
determining its plausibility with the traditional methods. Having 
said that, I must admit a feeling of apprehension and uneasiness 
for disagreeing with the scholars I regard with awe and deep 
respect. In that regard, I compare, if I may, my present position 
and apprehensions (with no claim or pretentions for any merit for 
myself or my work from such comparisons), to those of Francis 
Bacon when introducing his Novum Organum. Since the words he 
used in that context both capture my present feeling and aptly 
express my sentiments they may as well end this thesis. 
But whence can arise such vagueness and sterility 
in all the physical systems which have hitherto 
existed in the world? It is not certainly from 
anything in nature itself; for the steadiness and 
regularity of the laws by which it is governed 
clearly mark them out as objects of certain and 
precise knowledge. Neither can it arise from any 
want of ability in those who have persued such 
inquiries, many of whom have been men of the highest 
talent and genius of the ages in which they live; 
and it can, therefore, arise from nothing else but 
the perversness and insufficiency of the methods that 
have been pursued. Men have sought to make a verdict 
from their own conceptions, and to draw from their 
own minds all the materials which they employed; but 
if, instead of doing so, they had consulted experience 
and observation, they would have had facts, and not 
opinion, to reason about, and might have ultimately 
arrived at the knowledge of the laws which govern the 
material world. 
34 
34. Novum Organum., Lib., i. Aph. 41 (quoted by J. Playfair), 
op.cit., ch. 9 n 9. 
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APPENDIX I 
GLOSSARY OF LOGICAL TERMS 
Analytic. Used of a proposition whose den1'al 1'S If se -contradictory. 
Such a proposition is true either by virtue of its logical form alone 
(in which case it is called a logical truth, or logically necessary) 
or by virtue of both its logical form and the meaning of its constituent 
terms. An instance of a logical truth is "It is raining or it is not 
raining"; an example of an analytic truth that is not a logical truth 
is "All bachelors are unmarried." Analytic propositions cannot be 
false and are therefore said to be necessary truths. 
Antecedent. The part of a hypothetical proposition that precedes the 
implication sign. 
Assertion sign. The sign ~,introduced by Gottlob Frege to indicate 
in the object language that a proposition is being judged as true and 
is not merely being named. Some authors now use this sign in the 
metalanguage to express that the formula to which it is prefixed is 
a theorem in the object language. 
Attribute. Although it is now often used synonymously with "property," 
this term was traditionally confined to the essential characteristics of 
a being. 
Category. A general or fundamental class of objects or concepts about 
whose members assertions can significantly be made which differ from 
those that can significantly be made about nonmembers of this class. 
Collective term. In traditional logic, a term that denotes a collection 
of objects regarded as a unity. An example is "the rockies." 
Completeness. The word "completeness" is used in varying senses •. 
1 if and In the strongest sense a logistic system is said to be comp ete 
only if for any well~formed formula A, either A is a theorem of the 
system or the system would become inconsistent upon the addition of A 
(1) see P. Edwards, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol, 5 (1967) pp 57 et seq, 
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as an axiom (without any other changes); in this sense propositional 
calculus, but not pure first-order functional calculus, is complete. 
,In a second, weaker sense a logistic system is said to be complete 
if and only if all valid well-formed formulas are theorems of the 
system; in this sense both propositional calculus and pure first-
order functional calculus are also complete. In a third, and still 
weaker, sense of completeness a logistic system is said to be complete 
if and only if all secondarily valid well-formed formulas are 
theorems of the system; in this sense the pure second-order functional 
calculus and functional calculi of higher order are complete. 
Conjunction. A binary propositional connective (&,.), usually read 
"and," whose truth table is such that "A and B" is false when A or 
B or both are false and is true when both are true. 
Connective. A symbol that is used with one or more constants or 
forms to produce a new constant or form. When the constants or forms 
are propositional ones the connective is known as a propositional 
connective (or sentential connective). The most common propositional 
connectives are negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication, and 
biconditional. They are classified as singulary, binary, etc., according 
to the number of propositional constants or forms with which they 
combine. 
Consistency. A set of propositions has consistency (or is consistent) 
when no contradiction can be derived from the joinst assertion of the 
propositions in the set. A logistic system has consistency when no 
contradiction can be derived in it. Two syntactical definitions of 
the consistency of a logistic system are Alfred Tarski's, that a system 
is consistent if not every well-formed formula is a theorem, and E. L. 
Post's, that a system is consistent if no well-formed formula consisting 
of only a propositional variable is a theorem. There is, in addition, 
a semantical definition of consistency, according to which a set of 
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propositions (or a logistic system) is consistent if th i 
ere s a model 
for that set of propositions (or for the set of all the theorems of the 
system). It must not be assumed that any of these definitions are 
equivalent; in any case where it is claimed that they are, a proof is 
required. 
Constant. A symbol which, under the principal interpretation, is a 
name for something definite, be it an individual, a property, a 
relation, etc. 
Contradictory. Two propositions are contradictory if and only if 
their joint assertion would be a contradiction. "All men are mortal" 
and "Some men are not mortal," for example, are contradictory 
propositions. Two terms are contradictory when they jointly exhaust 
a universe of discourse and are mutually exclusive. In the domain 
of natural numbers other than 0, for example, "odd" and "even" are 
contradictory terms. 
Contraposition. In traditional logic, a type of immediate inference 
in which from a given proposition another proposition is inferred which 
has as its subject the contradictory of the original predicate. (It 
should be noted that a change of quality is involved in some cases.) 
Partial contraposition results in a new proposition that is the same 
as the subject of the original proposition; full contraposition results 
in a predicate of the new proposition that is the contradictory of the 
subject of the original proposition. The process of contraposition 
(whether partial or full) yields an equivalent proposition only when 
the original proposition is an A- or a-proposition; when it is an 
E-proposition traditional logicians allowed for contraposition per 
accidens (or by limitation)-that is, contraposition plus a change in 
the quantity of the proposition from universal to particular-claiming 
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that the proposition formed is equvalent to the original i i propos ton. 
The process of contraposition yields no equivalent proposition when 
the original proposition is an I-proposition. 
Contrary. Applied to two propositions that cannot both be true but 
can both be false. "All men are mortal" and "No men are mortal," 
for example, are contrary propositions. Also applied to two terms 
that are mutually exclusive, but need not be jointly exhaustive, in 
a universe of discourse. In the domain of natural numbers, for 
instance, "less than 7" and "more than 19" are contrary terms. 
Contrary-to-fact (counterfactual) conditiona. A conditional 
proposition whose antecedent is known to be false. 
Converse of ~ relation (inverse of ~ relation). For any relation R, 
the relation R* such that aR*b if and only if bRa. 
Disjunction, exclusive (alternation). A binary propositional 
connective, one possible interpretation of "or," whose truth table 
is such that "A or B" is true if and only if one of the two propositions 
is true and the other false. 
Disjunction, inclusive. A binary propositional connective (V), one 
possible interpretation of "or," whose truth table is such that "A or B" 
is true in all cases except where both A and B are false. 
Dyadic relation. A two-place relation. 
Entailment. The relation that exists between two propositions one of 
which is deducible from the other. 
Equivalent. Used of two propositions that are so related that one is 
true if and only if the other is true. Some authors also use this 
term, as applied to sets, synonymously wi th "equipollent." 
Existential import. The commitment to the existence of certain 
objects that is entailed by a given proposition. 
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Existential quantifier. The symbol (E) or (a), read "there exists." 
It is used in combination with a variable and placed before a well-
formed formula, as in "(:aa)------" ("There exists an object a such 
tha t------" ) . 
Extension. Although often used synonymously with "denotation." this term 
is sometimes used to refer to the set of species that are contained 
within the genus denoted by a given term. In the first sense the 
extension of "men" is the set of all men; in the second sense it is 
the set of sets into which mankind can be divided. 
Extensional. Used of an approach to a problem which in some respect 
confines attention to truth-values of sentences rather than to their 
meanings. Thus, a logic in which, for purposes of deductive relations, 
truth-values may be substituted for sentences is an extensional logic. 
Formula. For a given logistic system, any sequence of primitive 
symbols. 
General term. A term that is predicable, in the same sense, of more 
than one individual. 
Iff. A common abbreviation for "if and only if." 
Indirect proof (reductio ad absurdum). An argument which proves a 
proposition A by showing that the denial of A, together with accepted 
propositions Bl , B2 ••• , B , leads to a contradiction. n Strictly 
speaking, this fails to prove the truth of A, since one of the 
previously accepted premises may be false; the force of the argument 
therefore rests on using premises that are far better established than 
the denial of A, so that the denial of A will be rejected and A 
accepted. 
Induction. Among acceptable inferences, logicians distinguish those 
in which the joint assertion of the premises and the denial of the 
conclusion is a contradiction from those in which that joint assertion 
is not a contradiction. The former are deductive inferences; 
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inductive inferences are to be found among the latter. 
Much has been written about the precise nature of inductive 
inferences, but few definite results have been obtained. It is 
likely that there is a wide variety of types of inductive inferences. 
Two quite different types are the inference from observational data 
to theoretical conclusions and the inference from the composition of 
a sample to the composition of a whole population. 
Inference. Derivation of a proposition (the conclusion) from a set 
of other propositions (the premises). When the inference is 
acceptable the premises afford good reasons to assert, or render 
certain, the conclusion. 
Intensional. (1) Used of an approach which in some respect considers 
the meaning as well as the truth-value of a formula. A characteristic 
of such systems is that some propositions in them are referentially 
opaque. Systems of modal logic are usually intensional systems. 
(2) Used of a proposition that contains a referentially 
opaque part. Cf. extensional. 
Intersection of sets (product of sets). The set of all the objects 
that are elements of all the sets aI' a 2 .•• , an (symbolized "aln a2n 
... n a tt). 
n 
Inversion. In traditional logic, a type of immediate inference in 
which from a given proposition another proposition is inferred whose 
subject is the contradictory of the other. 
Judgment. (1) The affirming or denying of a proposition. (2) The 
proposition affirmed or denied. 
Logical implication. The relation that holds between two propositions 
when one is deducible from the other. 
Metalanguage. A language used to talk about an object language; 
a meta-metalanguage is a language used to talk about a metalanguage, 
and so forth. Derivatively, a proposition is said to be in the 
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metalanguage if and only if it is about an expression in the object 
language. 
Modali ty. (1) The characteristic of propositions according to which 
they can be described as "apodictic," "assertoric," or "problematic." 
An assertoric proposition asserts that something is the case; an 
apodictic proposition asserts that something must be the case; a 
problematic proposition asserts that something may be the case. This 
type of modality was called by the medieval logicians modality sine 
dicto (de re). 
----
(2) The characteristic of propositions according to which 
they can be described as "necessary," "impossible," "possible," or 
"not-necessary." Medieval logicians called this type modality cum 
dicto (de dicto). 
Modus ponendo tollens. An inference of the form "Either A or B; A· , 
therefore, not-B." This type of inference is valid only if "or" is 
interpreted as exclusive disjunction. 
Modus ponens. An argument of the form "If A then B; A; therefore, 
B." Some authors use the term to designate the rule of inference 
that allows arguments of this form. 
Modus tollendo ponens. An argument of the form "Either A or B; 
not-A; therefore, B." 
Modus tollens. An argument of the form "If A then B; not-B; 
therefore, not-A." Some authors use the term to designate the rule 
of inference that allows arguments of this form. 
Negation. A singulary propositonal connective (~, -, -, -), 
usually read "not," whose truth table is such that "not-A" is true 
if and only if A is false. 
Null set (empty set). A set with no members. 
Ob ' 1 A language used to talk about things, rather than ]ect anguage. 
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about other languages. 
Operator. A symbol or combination of symbols that is syncategorematic 
under the principal interpretation of the logistic system it Occurs 
in an~ that may be used with one or more variables and one or more 
constants or forms or both to produce a new constant or form. 
Universal and existential quantifiers are the most common examples 
of operators. 
O-proposition. In traditional logic, a particular negative 
categorical proposition. An example is "Some men are not mortal." 
Ordered pair. For given objects a and b, the ordered pair (a,b) 
is the pair set of which one member is the unit set whose only member 
is a and the other member is the pair set whose members are a and b. 
Petitio principii. Begging the question. 
Predicate. Traditionally, the word or group of words in a categorical 
proposition which connote the property being attributed to the subject 
or denote the class which the subject is being included in or excluded 
from. The term is often extended, in contemporary works, to cover all 
words or groups of words that connote properties or relations in any 
type of proposition. Thus, in "All men are mortal" the predicate is 
"mortal." 
Predication. The attributing of a property to a subject. 
Premise. A member of the set of propositions, assumed for the course 
of an argument, from which a conclusion is inferred. 
Primitive basis. The list of primitive symbols, formation rules, 
axioms, and rules of inference of a given logistic system. 
Quantifier. An operator of which it is true that both the constant 
or form it is used with and the constant or form produced are propositions 
or propositional forms. Thus, an existential quantifier, when joined 
to a proposition or propositional form A, produces a new proposition 
or propositional form "(aa)M." 
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Reductio ad absurdum. The method of proving a proposition by showing 
that its denial leads to a contradiction. In this sense it is often 
known as a reductio ad impossibile. 
Relation. This term is not adequately defined in traditional logic. 
The failure to offer an adequate definition is symptomatic of the lack 
of serious consideration, on the part of traditional logicians, of the 
significant differences between categorical and relational propositions. 
Augustus De Morgan and C. S. Peirce were the first logicians in the 
contemporary period to study the logic of relational propositions. 
Since their time this subject has become an important part of logic. 
In contemporary works, particularly in works on set theory, a relation 
is defined as a set of ordered pairs. 
A relation R is reflexive if "aRa" holds for all a that are 
members of the field of R, irreflexive if "aRa" holds for no members 
of the field of R, and nonreflexive if "aRa" holds for some but not all 
members of the field of R. For example, "is a member of the same 
family as" is a reflexive relation, "is not a member of the same family 
as" is an irreflexive relation, and "loves" is a nonreflexive relation. 
A relation is symmetric if for all a and b that are members of 
the field of R, aRb if and only if bRa, asymmetric if for all a and b 
that are members of the field of R, aRb if and only if not-bRa, and 
nonsymmetric when "aRb" and "bRa" hold for some but not all a and b 
that are members of the field of R. For example, "is a member of the 
same family as" is a symmetric relation, "is a child of" is an 
asymmetric relation, and "is a brother of" is a nonsymmetric relation. 
A relation R is transitive when for all ~, ~, and £ that are 
members of the field of R, if aRb and bRc, then aRc, intransitive when 
for all ~, b, and c that are members of the field of R, if aRb and bRc, -- --
then not-aRc, and nontransitive when if aRb and bRc, then "aRc" holds 
for some but not all of the ~, and c that are members of the field ~, 
-
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of R. For example, "is a descendant of" is a transitive relation 
, 
"is a child of" is an intransitive relat';on, d II" 
.... an 1S not a brother of" 
is a nontransitive relation. 
The foregoing classifications are said to apply to a relation in 
a set if the corresponding properties hold for all members of the field 
of a relation that are members of the set. A relation is connective 
in a set if for all distinct a and b that are members of the set, either 
aRb or bRa. 
The study of relational propositions has raised many philosophical 
issues-and has greatly influenced discussions of older issues-about the 
nature of relations. 
Synthetic. Used of a proposition that ~s neither analytic not self-
contradictory. 
Tautology. A compound proposition that is true no matter what truth-
values are assigned to its constituent propositions. Thus "A or , -
not-A" is a tautology, Slnce if "A" is true, then the whole proposition 
is true, and if "A" is false, then "not-A" is true and therefore the 
whole proposition is still true. 
Term. Traditionally, the subject or predicate in a categorical 
proposition. Some authors extend the word "term" to cover all 
occurrences of categorematic words or expressions which, although not 
propositions by themselves, are parts of a proposition. 
Transitive relation. See relation. 
Transposition. A rule of inference that permits one to infer from 
the truth of "A implies B" the truth of "Not-B implies not-A," and 
conversely. 
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Truth-function. A function whose arguments and values are truth-
values. A compound proposition is said to be a truth-functional 
proposition if the connective that is adjoined to the constituent 
proyositions to form the compound proposition has a truth-function 
associated with it. In such a case, since the only arguments of the 
function are truth-values, the truth-value of the compo~nd proposition 
depends only on the truth-values of its constituent propositions. 
Truth-value. One of two abstract entities, truth and falsehood, 
postulated in Fregean semantics to serve as the reference of true 
and false sentences. In many-valued logics other truth-values 
are introduced. 
Universal instantiation, rule of. The rule of inference that permits 
one to infer from a statement of the form "Property P holds for all 
objects" a statement of the form "Property ~ holds for an object a." 
Universal quantifier. The symbol ':) or (V), read "for all." It 
is used in combination with a variable and placed before a well-formed 
formula, as in "(~)------" ("For all ~,------"). 
Universe of discourse. Those objects with which a discussion is 
concerned. 
Valid inference. An inference the joint assertion of whose premises 
and the denial of whose conclusion is a contradiction. 
Variable. A symbol that under the principal interpretation is not 
the name of any particular thing but is rather the ambiguous name of 
anyone of a class of things. 
Well-formed formulas. Those formulas of a given logistic system of which 
it can sensibly be asked whether or not they are theorems of the system. 
In any particular system, rules are given that define the class of well-
formed formulas and enable one to determine mechanically whether or 
not a given string of symbols is a well-formed formula of the system. 
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